

CENTER
FOR THE
STUDY OF
DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS
**REPORT
OF THE
PRESIDENT**

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 1965 • 1966 • 1967

I

3	The Truth About the Center
19	The Academic Program
20	The Fellows of the Center
28	External Affairs
29	Pacem in Terris
33	The University in America
36	Continuing Education
38	The Publications Program
42	The Membership Program
43	The Convocations' Supporters
44	Financial Statement

In 1929, after serving as Dean of the Yale Law School, Robert M. Hutchins came to the University of Chicago. There, as President and as Chancellor, he spent two decades characterized by intellectual ferment and experimentation that have affected the whole of American higher education. After an absence of sixteen years, most of which he has devoted to founding and presiding over the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Hutchins returned to the Chicago campus in late 1967 to deliver one in a special series of Encyclopaedia Britannica lectures. He was asked to discuss education as it takes place outside conventional institutions of higher learning. He chose his own creation, the Center, as an exemplar, and described its genesis and function in detail. Excerpts from the Britannica lecture are offered in this periodic President's Report in answer to the most pertinent, and persistent, questions about the Center: What do you do? Why do you do it? What are the practical effects? The President hopes his remarks also say something about the spirit of the enterprise.



THE TRUTH ABOUT THE CENTER

✿ I used to say of the University of Chicago that it was not a very good university; it was just the best there was.

✿ The truth about the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions is that it is not a very good center, but it is the only one there is.

✿ The essential facts may be briefly stated. The Center consists of twenty-five men who meet every day in a Spanish-style building known to the members as El Parthenon.

✿ The men, one of whom is a woman, are writers, philosophers, scientists, social scientists, and lawyers, with two bishops and two ex-college presidents thrown in. The two bishops were once lawyers. So was one of the ex-presidents. The other was and is an historian.

✿ The daily meeting proceeds through the discussion of a statement by some member of the group or by a visitor, of whom there are three or four hundred a year. All the discussions are recorded.

About a sixth of the papers presented and the tapes of the meetings are made available to the public. Some seven million copies of documents and records from the Center are now moving about the world. *The Center Magazine*, with a projected circulation of 50,000, made its first appearance in October, 1967.

✿ The Center has an annual budget of around \$1,500,000, currently supplied by some 40,000 members who contribute annually sums ranging from ten to several hundred thousand dollars. The Center receives no money from government and none from large foundations or corporations.

✿ It is not a think tank hired to do the planning that public agencies or private businesses cannot or will not do for themselves. Neither is it a refuge for scholars who want to get away from it all to do their research and write their books. It is an organized group, rather than a collection of individuals. It is an



organization of men who are free of any obligation except to join in the effort to understand the subjects they have selected to study. It is a community, and, since its members are trying to think together, it may be called, at least in potentiality, an intellectual community.

✿ This description may be a little high-flown. An eminent philosopher was asked what people would do with themselves when automation had thrown them all out of work. Mortimer Adler replied, "They could talk with one another."

✿ The Center may be regarded as a happy augury of this bright future, as a prefiguring of those activities in which human beings may engage when the curse of Adam is at last repealed. In this light the staff of the Center, having received prematurely, as it were, the gift of leisure, may be seen as proposing a model for the behavior of all of us when we have, as we surely shall, a guaranteed annual income and nothing to do.

✿ But the Center is still hypnotized by the Protestant Ethic, however anachronistic that may be. It could not think of justifying itself by a program so imprecise or so suspiciously egocentric. Its talk is oriented to action. It talks about what ought to be done. The Center Fellows come to the conference table in their capacity as citizens. The talk is about the common good.

✿ Since the Center is chartered as an educational corporation, it does not engage in political activity. It does not take positions about what ought to be done. It asserts only that the issues it is discussing deserve the attention of citizens. It attempts to show what the positions are that may be taken and what the consequences of taking one or another are likely to be. The Center tries to think about the things it thinks its

fellow-citizens ought to be thinking about. It tries to bring the issues into focus so that they may be clearly seen and intelligently debated.

✿ As in any self-respecting institution, the Center Fellows are free to take individually any public positions they like. They all avail themselves of this privilege, sometimes in violent opposition to one another. Where the staff is unanimous on any subject, as it is, with varying degrees of warmth, on the war in Vietnam, it earnestly tries to lure into its meetings representatives of a different point of view.

✿ This is harder than you might think. Though "dialogue" has become a tired word in the American vocabulary, a candid exchange of ideas and a willingness to learn from one another seem to be harder to obtain in our country than in any other in the West. We don't really want to talk about our differences: the process is unsettling and can lead God knows where. The safest thing is to look, act, and speak like everybody else.

✿ Americans like to make speeches, but, as the bland headnodding on television panel shows suggests, they prefer to talk past one another in accordance with the rule followed in my youth by college presidents. The rule was that the mental disturbance following their remarks should be almost as imperceptible as if the remarks had not been made. Those who disagree with you will not join in discussion with you because, they say, you are not impartial. This is a self-fulfilling prophecy, for if all those who disagree with you will not join in your discussions, their point of view will not be represented—the charge of partiality will be proved. The prophecy is not merely self-fulfilling; it is self-perpetuating.

✿ Yet it is evident that at all times in all countries questions have to be raised, if only because change is always occurring everywhere. In a country that aspires to be democratic the questions have to be discussed by as many of the citizens as possible. When change is going on at the present rate, discussion is a matter of life and death. We are now in the position of the little boy who asked Santa Claus for a volcano—and got it.

✿ For it is altogether likely that universal suffrage has strengthened the hands of ruling oligarchies throughout the world. It is possible that universal education has debased culture, for it has created a vast semi-literate market for debased cultural products. As a result of the successful demand for the reduction of working hours, great barren stretches have been opened in our lives. Because of our wealth, combined with our leisure, we are beginning to show those signs of juvenile and adult delinquency which the leisure class has exhibited throughout history. For the problem of disease we have substituted that of population. The conquest of nature has turned out to be in every sense explosive, for it has put every city in the world within shooting distance of every other and given us at the same time the means of destroying them all at one shot.

Self-determination, the goal we announced for Europeans during the first World War, has led, when taken over by Asians and Africans, to a global revolution that is just beginning and is certain to result in profound and continuous disorders for years to come.

✿ Thomas Jefferson based his hopes for American democracy on the proposition that we would not live in cities; that we would all be self-employed, that we would be so well educated that we could meet any new difficulties, and that we

would be trained in civic virtue through local government. Now we live in cities, we are all employed by others, our educational system is partly custodial and partly technical, thus unfitting us to meet new difficulties, and anybody who connected civic virtue with local government would be sent to a psychiatrist.

✿ None of the subjects that concern us most today is referred to in the Constitution of the United States. It does not mention cities, bureaucracy, technology, or education. It does not speak of political parties, corporations, the common defense, the power of the President to make war, and the relationship of church and state is primitive in the extreme. On the other hand, the problem with which the Constitution does deal, that of the organization of territory, has by virtue of urban development and technological change taken a shape of which the Founding Fathers could not have dreamed.

✿ I will venture the broad generalization that no existing theory of politics, economies, society, or international relations can explain or account for the facts of contemporary life. Our situation has changed too fast for our ideas. And so our ideas have degenerated into slogans — forms of words that pass through the mind without putting any strain on it and that cause only imperceptible mental disturbance, if any, in those who hear them. Nothing complimentary is intended by the phrase “Fourth-of-July oratory.”

✿ Most of us retain individualistic liberal ideals, but we live in a bureaucratic culture. It remains to be seen whether our ideals can be made applicable to our culture or whether we can make our culture conform to our ideals.

✿ Most of us retain an economic theory of the mindless mechanism of the market and a political theory of the nightwatchman state. Nobody has yet shown how either theory can work in an advanced industrial society.

✿ Most of us retain the conviction that economic freedom is maintained by the sovereignty of the consumer and that truth is arrived at through competition in the marketplace of ideas. Yet monopoly and advertising make the consumer sovereign in the way the Queen is sovereign in England — she is forced to accept what is offered her — and the state of the mass media is such that ideas can seldom clash, for they seldom appear.

✿ Most of us retain the notion that all technical change is progress, is necessarily good, and is in any event not subject to control. Yet uncontrolled technological development may lead to our being blown up, poisoned, suffocated, or trampled to death at any moment. If our enemies don't get us, our neighbors will.

✿ Most of us retain the belief that the individual is politically active, economically independent, and personally creative. But we have a society in which he is a consumer, job-holder, object of propaganda, and statistical unit. He no longer acts; he behaves. As Hannah Arendt has said, "The trouble with modern theories of behaviorism is not that they are wrong, but that they might become true."

✿ Although the view that education has something to do with the mind still lingers in small academic enclaves scattered here and there, we have built an educational system suitable to the production of consumers, job-holders, objects of propaganda, and statistical units, who will keep the industrial machine going.

✿ Under the leadership of a strange coalition of politicians and intellectuals, most of us have believed and still believe in a monolithic Communist conspiracy that must at all costs be combated, even at the cost of justice and freedom. We still make this theme central to our foreign policy, though the conspirators seem to think as little of one another as they do of us and though their destruction will involve our own.

✿ If our situation has changed too fast for our ideas, what we need is a new appraisal of our situation and our ideas. Perhaps we do not understand our situation. Perhaps we ought to revitalize our ideas. Perhaps we ought to get some new ones. We are not now in a very good position to make the appraisal.

✿ When standards of criticism are lacking, the practice of criticism must decline. The professions become pressure groups; the press becomes a medium of propaganda and entertainment; the university becomes the multiversity; and the church becomes an engine of togetherness.

✿ This atmosphere is not unfavorable to the pursuit of knowledge, which we now see as the path to power and prosperity, but it is hostile to the pursuit of understanding and wisdom. Wisdom requires knowledge, but is not synonymous with it and does not flow automatically from it.

✿ Knowledge is a great thing. Nobody should depreciate it. But knowledge is neutral. It may be used for good or evil purposes. It is men who have the purposes, and they may be just or unjust.

✿ The specialized pursuit of knowledge, as we know it today, must abort all efforts to bring an intellectual community to birth, and it must disrupt any that exists. I am inclined to think that over the long term this will have an

unfortunate effect upon the pursuit of knowledge; for I believe understanding is indispensable to continuing scientific advances and that understanding cannot be obtained except in an intellectual community in which the circle of knowledge can be drawn and everything can be seen in the light of everything else.

✿ It cannot be denied, however, that the specialized pursuit of knowledge as we know it today can produce the most dazzling short-term results. The society that does the best work of this kind will become, unless it makes some sad mistakes, the richest and most powerful in the world.

✿ My point is that unless a society can develop and maintain intellectual communities devoted to understanding and wisdom, unless it has centers of independent thought and criticism, it is bound to make some sad mistakes. A country with great knowledge factories, but without independent thought, systematic criticism, understanding, and wisdom, may be the richest and most powerful, but it will also be the most dangerous in the world. Or it will disintegrate, for justice is the cement that holds a political community together.

✿ Against this background it is easy to see why the Center is the only one there is and perhaps also why it is not very good. Uniqueness does not necessarily imply excellence; it may signify nothing but foolhardiness. Other people may simply have too much sense to attempt similar efforts. This may well be the verdict of history on the Center.

✿ When philosophy is in disrepute, the Center is committed to it. When standards of moral and political conduct are thought of as personal idiosyncrasies, the Center is struggling to find those which may be universal norms. When the pursuit of knowledge is in the ascendant,

the Center has no more interest in it than is necessary to the pursuit of understanding. When the dialogue is a joke, the Center takes it seriously. When questions about American policies and American culture are regarded as disruptive, if not unpatriotic, the Center insists on asking them.

✿ All this has to be done through men who are themselves products of American culture, who are themselves trained in the pursuit of knowledge, who have trouble, therefore, even in formulating a common vocabulary, who have to turn themselves from full-time specialists into full-time citizens.

✿ An examination of the history of the Center may explain difficulties further.

✿ The Fund for the Republic is the legal entity; the Center is its program. The Fund was established in 1952 to defend and advance the principles of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights, that is, to search for justice. Its terms of reference at once involved it in conflict with Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy and his adherents and with the white supremacists of the South. Its study of blacklisting in the entertainment industry, of loyalty procedures, and of the history of Communism in America, now generally accepted, were attacked at the time by the Right and by the Left, particularly by the Marxist or ex-Marxist part of it. Its support of those who availed themselves of their constitutional rights in resisting investigation into their past or the past of others was regarded as equally reprehensible. Its effort to keep the Southern Regional Council going and to get the churches to promote some sort of dialogue between whites and blacks won it the disapproval of southern politicians. Its study of race and housing, which anticipated by ten years

the troubles of today, did nothing to improve its standing with this group. Only where feeling did not run so high, as in the case of the American Indian, was the Fund able to advance the cause of justice without risking the charge of subversion. Perhaps this was because the Indians had a rather ancient claim to the name American.

☼ Those were rough days. Every time the then Chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee needed a headline he would announce that he was going to investigate the Fund for the Republic. He kept his favorite columnists and broadcasters supplied with ammunition — or rather with blank cartridges and Roman candles. One of them fired away over the radio every night for a year.

☼ But the Board of Directors of the Fund could not be intimidated. Since it was made up of eminent members of

both political parties, the Chairman of the HUAC never dared to make good his threats.

☼ The Fund maintained itself as a small island of sanity in a McCarthyite world and may perhaps take some small credit for the gradual decline of the hysteria the Senator had evoked. But it is sad to recall those days, for they were days in which the Fund had to satisfy itself of the political purity of everybody with whom it associated in order to minimize the charge that it was under orders from Moscow. The President of the Fund was thought to have committed a fatal error when he remarked that even Communists had a right to live and that he would have no objection to hiring a member of the Party, if he were qualified for the job.

☼ The fight was successful, but even success was depressing. For the question was, after the McCarthy period was over,



Harry S. Ashmore, Executive Vice President, and President Robert M. Hutchins

why we had had to suffer from it. What was going to save us from another like it? Nothing in the American character seemed to guarantee the protection of American ideals. If McCarthy had not made the mistake of tangling with the Army, he might have gone on from strength to strength without arousing the active opposition of the General who was at that time our President, or the opposition, for that matter, of any influential body of the General's constituents. The principles of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights were so little understood that it was next to impossible to defend them, to say nothing of advancing them. In fact the Chief Justice of the United States about this time conducted a little poll, in Madison, Wis., as I recall it, that showed that almost none of the citizens had any idea what the Bill of Rights was. And this in spite of the acres of time devoted to civics, or what is now called "Problems of Democracy," in the public schools.

✿ The Board of Directors concluded it would have to go deeper. It authorized what was called the Basic Issues Program in 1957. The program was started on the assumption that the situation of Americans had changed too fast for their ideas, and that the revitalization of those ideas, the demonstration of their relevance today, and where necessary their adaptation to contemporary conditions were indispensable steps to the defense and advancement of the principles of the Declaration, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights. The staff was instructed to identify and clarify the basic issues and to widen the circles of discussion concerning them. This became the sole program of the Fund when the Center was established in Santa Barbara in 1959.



Chief S. O. Adebo of Nigeria, a frequent Center visitor

✿ This effort has now been going on for ten years. It has commanded attention, not all of it sympathetic. Some of the unsympathetic attention is comprehensible, if not pardonable; the disclosures of the support of "liberal" organizations by the CIA make it reasonable to suppose that whatever anybody is doing is a part of some conspiracy or other. In this atmosphere it is hard to believe that the Center is doing just what it says it is doing, studying democratic institutions, and has never taken the Queen's shilling.

✿ The senior senator from Illinois, according to that newspaper which admits it is the greatest, recently blamed the "strange mood" of the country on "such organizations" as the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. The Center, he said, had given instruction to "revolutionaries such as Stokely Carmichael and financial support to movements such as the recent New Politics convention."

✿ The use of "such" is artful. But assuming the Senator used that word to achieve eloquent meaninglessness, such as that for which he is famous, and that he meant to refer to the Center, to Stokely Carmichael and the New Politics, I can say that his remarks are hilariously absurd. I am not acquainted with Mr. Carmichael, and he has never been at the Center. Anybody familiar with the balance sheet of the Center would allow himself a rueful smile at the thought of its financing New Politics or anything else.

✿ Perhaps one difficulty is that there are no such organizations as the Center. When something is like nothing else, it is hard to comprehend it. The Center is not a school, college, university, or research institute. What is it? Can it be that it is actually trying to understand

democratic institutions? Far more likely that something so mysterious is up to no good.

✿ On the whole, however, the Center cannot complain of its reception. In my view we have fared better than we deserve. I regarded our publication program when it started as a worthwhile but probably vain experiment. I opposed the distribution of the tape recordings of our discussions. I fought off for ten years the proposal that we should have a magazine. I was skeptical of the results of any mass appeal for financial support. I have been proved wrong on all counts.

✿ I underestimated the number of people in this country who share the concern of the staff of the Center, and I underestimated the depth of their concern. They are certainly a tiny minority of the population — but in absolute terms there are a great many of them. The Center expects to have 50,000 members by June, 1968. They are aware of the gap between American ideals and American policy and performance. They want to narrow it. They want to join the search for justice and understanding, and they do not believe they can look for much light from traditional sources, such as the church, the press, and the university. Inadequate as they must feel the Center is, they nevertheless appear grateful for the illumination that issues from it.

✿ This illumination, such as it is, has now been cast on the corporation, the labor union, church and state, the political process, free speech, bureaucracy, the multiversity, federalism, the city, technology, race, and peace.

✿ Determined though it is not to duplicate what others are doing and not to study questions dealt with sufficiently elsewhere, the Center, perhaps because of

a touch of megalomania, has been able to avoid few subjects that agitate our contemporaries. We decided to stay away from population and conservation on the ground that we had nothing to add to what others were doing. But I notice that every once in a while we yield to earnest friends who want to talk about these matters with us. The general rule is that we try to abstain unless we have some special contribution that we think we alone can make.

✿ An example is peace. Though there are thousands of organizations devoted to this subject, we took it up because of the special equipment of one of the members of the staff, Walter Millis, a leading military historian. His work has been related to the war system, disarmament, and world organization. The encyclical of John XXIII, *Pacem in Terris*, came out when we were in the midst of these labors. It seemed to us one of the great documents of modern times; to us it foreshadowed a program not merely of ending the Cold War, which for a while it did delay, but also of organizing the world. We felt that it was not receiving and would not receive the attention it ought to have unless we did something about it.

✿ We have therefore held two international convocations devoted to it. The first established that the Pope was correct in thinking dialogue was possible among men of different ideologies. The second, in spite of frustrations caused by the war in Vitenam and the crisis in the Middle East, confirmed the finding of the first and went on to identify and clarify the issues that must be settled without delay.

✿ More than 300 representatives of more than seventy countries reached consensus on eleven points. They were:



Two Episcopal Bishops on the Center staff, Edward Crowther and James A. Pike

1. The United Nations must be strengthened and made more independent.
2. Membership in the United Nations must be made universal.
3. The war in Vietnam is at best a mistake.
4. Southeast Asia must be neutralized.
5. The Cold War must be ended.
6. Racial discrimination is intolerable.
7. The developing countries must be assisted, and aid to them should be multilateral.
8. The terms of trade are intolerable for the developing countries; the ratio of industrial prices to those of primary products must receive the most earnest, explicit, and immediate attention.
9. No military solutions are adequate for the present day.
10. No national solutions are adequate for the present day.
11. Coexistence is a necessary but not sufficient condition of human life. Survival is not, perhaps, an ignoble aim, but it is not a noble one either. We must move onward and upward from coexistence to what Pope John called the universal common good. This is an aim worthy of humanity. It will require the organization of the world for continuous peaceful change and the revision of the status quo without war.

✱ The two *Pacem in Terris* convocations were successful in the sense that they accomplished their purposes. Success is not without its complicating by-products. If you learn to do something well that is only incidental to your main aim, you may find the pressure to turn the incidental into the

main aim overwhelming. This has been the experience of the American university with football. It is not the main aim of the Center to hold large international meetings on important topics. But, since it has become quite good at arranging such gatherings, it is constantly being asked to hold more. The subject is always fascinating, the opportunity always unique, and the appeal almost irresistible.

✱ Almost, but not quite. The time, effort, and money consumed by such enterprises is too much for a small, understaffed, and underfinanced organization. People who are supposed to be engaged in philosophical inquiry cannot spend their days on the long-distance telephone arguing with recalcitrant airlines, hotels, caterers, and governments. I will not say the Center will never hold another great convocation; but I will say I cannot now imagine any circumstances under which it would do so.

✱ Another by-product of success is even more embarrassing. In the last ten years the Center has formed relationships with many highly intelligent and highly placed individuals and groups throughout the world. This is very agreeable. The embarrassment sets in with the consequences of these connections. The world is one in which, as a result of the Cold War, all governmental positions tend to freeze. If, then, a dangerous situation arises in the world with which governments seem unable to cope, anything that can be done must be done by some private agency. What private agency? Of course, the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions.

✱ So at the second *Pacem in Terris* convocation the six Southeast Asian nations represented there decided they needed a conference to consider the basis

of cooperation among them. They felt that no one of them could call the meeting and that UN auspices were inappropriate. They therefore presented the following statement:

✿ "The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions has earned the respect of all parties to the major ideological controversies that divide the world, and, as a private organization without governmental ties, it has demonstrated its independence to the satisfaction of the small nations of the world. It is therefore suggested that the Center may find it possible to organize such a conference on neutral ground somewhere in Southeast Asia We hope the Center will initiate such a convocation without delay."

✿ What would you do with so flattering an invitation to so important a task? I lamely agreed to explore the matter. We have done so, and it may be that in this case through the cooperation of our friends in Japan we can perform some useful service without abandoning our work.

✿ By a similar route the Center became involved in Vietnam. Representatives of the 13 countries that came together to plan the second *Pacem in Terris* convocation agreed that the Convocation should not be overshadowed — or prevented — by the war in Vietnam. The only way to insure against that result was to settle the war. Since all governmental positions were frozen, some private agency would have to be turned to. What private agency? You know the answer.

✿ As it happened, something could be done; for the North Vietnamese agreed to discuss attendance at *Pacem in Terris* with representatives of the Center. The State Department appeared to welcome the chance to negotiate through those



Harry S. Ashmore reporting on his visit with



representatives with the North Vietnamese. The Department seemed charmed with the results and collaborated with our representatives in drawing up a reply. The only difficulty was that the President was at about the same time sending an official letter of more bellicose tenor to Ho Chi Minh. We came to the conclusion that the Department was either so inefficient that it could not execute a policy, or so dull that it did not have one, or so disingenuous that its statements could not be relied on.

✿ The affair is documented in Harry S. Ashmore's article in the first issue of *The Center Magazine*. I mention it only as illustrating the difficulties you can get into when you have been promised the fullest cooperation of a government and when your activities have been conducted at the request of and in concert with the government. This may be something governmental rather than something peculiarly American. We have not at all times felt that the Soviet government has been entirely candid with us. As for our own government's behavior, it brings us back to the study of democratic institutions. Our problem is how to make democracy work. Our experience with our government suggests that this is a real problem.

✿ The three questions that are always asked are: What do you do? Why do you do it? And what are the practical effects of it?


✿ The first two questions I have answered as best I can. Let me speak briefly to the third, the question of practical results. The question usually means, can you claim that the conduct of public affairs has in any way changed because of the Center?

✿ The question is improperly addressed to an educational institution. The sole object of the Center is to

shed light on what ought to be done. No meter has yet been devised to measure the intensity or range of this kind of illumination. And, as we saw in the case of Senator Dirksen, one man's light can be another man's darkness. In the past some value has been attached to the voice crying in the wilderness. The same value attaches, on a modest scale, to any center of independent thought. Over ten years the Center has suggested a good many topics that ought to be thought about. It pioneered in getting attention paid to the rate and significance of technological change. It began the dialogue among the churches. A good many ideas now current about the economy, the corporation, the labor union, bureaucracy, race, and the developing countries got into circulation through its efforts.

✿ I hesitate to go on to give a further answer to the improper question, what has been the effect of your work on the conduct of public affairs? When I was presiding over the University of Chicago I was careful not to take credit for the successes of our graduates because if I did I would have had to take the blame for those who went to the penitentiary. If I say, as I think I could, that some governmental policies have been affected by the Center, I would have to add that after each *Pacem in Terris* convocation the government escalated the war in Vietnam. If I say, as I could, that a steady stream of governmental officers, local, state, and federal, passes through the Center, I still could not prove that any one of them profited by the experience.

✿ President Lowell of Harvard used to say that Harvard must be a great reservoir of learning: everybody brought some to it, and nobody seemed to take much away. On this principle, the Center



Center Fellows gather daily around conference table for recorded dialogues on basic issues of the day

may have become a great reservoir of practical wisdom.

* I may report one instance that shows how many interpretations may be placed on the relationship of the Center to those who manage our affairs.

* The newly appointed head of a federal agency, saying he could make no sense of the field he was about to take charge of, asked if he could bring some members of his staff to Santa Barbara to talk about it. He came, stayed several days, went back to Washington, and resigned. This episode, you will agree, is loaded with ambiguity.

* The Center must ask to be judged in terms of its purpose. That purpose is educational. It is not to influence the day-to-day actions of those who run, or are supposed to run, our society. If those actions are affected, then the Center may permit itself a certain measure of gratification. But it ought not to be carried away and fancy itself as a behind-the-scenes formulator of governmental policy, a think-tank for public or corporate officials. Its object is to understand and to promote understanding of the basic issues that underlie the formulation of public policy.

* The Center's program is now under review. It is unlikely that the purpose will be changed. It is probable that in the coming years the Center will try to clarify issues of world development, multi-national corporations, conglomerate

mergers, philanthropic foundations, the control of science and technology, the role of the professions, the meaning of modern federalism, and the future of the city. As you can see, the tinge of megalomania is still present. The Center will continue to study the emerging Constitution under the leadership of Rexford Guy Tugwell. It will keep on with its revision of the world constitution that was proposed by a committee at the University of Chicago twenty years ago. These two constitutional studies bring into focus most of the issues with which the Center is concerned.

* What does it all add up to? Some frustration, a good deal of waste motion, a few false starts, several pleasant surprises, and a sense, after all, of a high calling to a great and necessary task.

* I began by repeating an ancient remark of mine. I will end with another.

* Some twenty-five years ago I proposed to the University of Chicago that it change its motto, which is translated to mean, "Let knowledge grow that life may be enriched." I thought the words "knowledge" and "enriched" were narrow and misleading. I recommended a new motto.

* Since the University of Chicago has been cool toward it, I may claim it for the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. It was a line from Walt Whitman: 'Solitary, singing in the West, I strike up for a new world.'

—Robert M. Hutchins



As Dean of Center Fellows, John R. Seeley is responsible for the Center's academic programs

19

THE ACADEMIC PROGRAM

✿ John R. Seeley was appointed to the newly created position of Dean in September, 1966. Seeley, who had paid protracted visits to the Center previously, most recently has been chairman of the sociology department at Brandeis University. A native of Canada, he received his basic education in England and Germany, and performed his undergraduate and graduate work in sociology at the University of Chicago.

✿ The appointment of a Dean, and the association with him of Hallock Hoffman as Coordinator of Studies, launched an intensive review of the continuing studies that are the core of the Center's intellectual activities. The permanent members of the Center, now designated as Fellows, meet regularly in furtherance of this effort.

FELLOWS OF THE CENTER



HARRY S. ASHMORE

A member of the Center's Board of Directors since 1954 and Chairman of its Executive Committee since 1959, Ashmore was elected Executive Vice President in 1966. While executive editor of the *Arkansas Gazette* in 1957, Ashmore and his newspaper won the first double Pulitzer Prizes in history, in the Little Rock integration controversy. He also has been editor of the *Charlotte (N.C.) News*. He was editor-in-chief of *Encyclopaedia Britannica* from 1960 to 1965, is editor of the *Britannica Perspectives* (1968) and author of *The Negro and the Schools*, *An Epitaph for Dixie*, *The Other Side of Jordan* and *The Man in the Middle*. He directed a survey of bi-racial education for the Fund for the Advancement of Education. Born in Greenville, S.C., he is a graduate of Clemson College and a Nieman Fellow of Harvard University. In World War II he rose in rank to lieutenant-colonel of infantry. He served as personal assistant to Adlai E. Stevenson in the 1955-56 presidential campaign.



STRINGFELLOW BARR

As President of St. John's College at Annapolis from 1937 to 1946, Barr was responsible for the complete reorganization of the curriculum of the institution. A Rhodes Scholar, he was educated at the University of Virginia, where he later taught history for twelve years and from 1930 to 1934 served as editor of the *Virginia Quarterly Review*. From 1948 to 1959, Barr was President of the Foundation for World Government. He was professor of humanities at Newark College of Rutgers University from 1955 to 1965, when he joined the staff of the Center. Barr originated the CBS radio program, "Invitation to Learning," and is the author of *Mazzini — Portrait of an Exile*, *Let's Join the Human Race* and *Citizen of the World*. His historical works include *The Pilgrimage of Western Man*, *The Will of Zeus* and *The Mask of Jove*.



ELISABETH MANN BORGESE

The daughter of Thomas Mann, Mrs. Borgese is the author of short stories and plays, essays and books on women and animals. The titles of her three books are *To Whom It May Concern*, *Ascent of Woman* and *The Language Barrier*. She has translated books on music, art and architecture and edited anthologies and magazines in several languages. Formerly executive secretary of the Board of Editors of *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, she was editor of *Common Cause* and of the English edition of *Diogenes* and the Italian edition of *Perspectives U.S.A.* Her main interests are intercultural and international relations. As a Center Fellow, she is working on a draft of a model constitution for the world.



SCOTT BUCHANAN

Dean of St. John's College at Annapolis from 1937 to 1947, Buchanan has been with the Center since its establishment in Santa Barbara in 1959. He is a graduate of Amherst College, was a Rhodes Scholar and received his doctor of philosophy degree from Harvard University. Later, he taught philosophy at Harvard, College of the City of New York, Fisk University and University of Virginia. Buchanan has served as the Assistant Director of the People's Institute of New York and Chairman of the Committee on Liberal Arts at the University of Chicago. He was a trustee of the Foundation for World Government from 1948 to 1958. His books include *Poetry and Mathematics*, *Symbolic Distance*, *The Doctrine of Signatures* and *Essay in Politics*. He also is the author of the Center Occasional Paper, *So Reason Can Rule: The Constitution Revisited*.



JOHN COGLEY

One of the first group of staff members of the Center, who has been involved in many of its major study projects, Cogley left the Center to become religious news editor of the *New York Times* in April, 1965.

Early in 1967, he resigned from the *Times* and rejoined the staff of the Center in Santa Barbara to become editor of *The Center Magazine*, which the Center publishes six times a year for its membership.

Cogley received his bachelor's degree from Loyola University, Chicago, and completed graduate studies at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland. He has contributed to some 20 books, and is the author of major articles in both *The Encyclopaedia Britannica Perspectives* and *The New Catholic Encyclopaedia*, and in publications ranging from *Look* and *McCalls* to the *Harvard Educational Review* and the *London Economist*. He was given the Annual Award of the Catholic Press Association for his coverage of the Vatican Council in 1965.

A member of John F. Kennedy's campaign staff in 1960, he was appointed by the President to the Foreign Service Selection Board and is a trustee of the John F. Kennedy Memorial Library.



C. EDWARD CROWTHER

As the Episcopal Bishop of Kimberley and Kuruman, South Africa, he was an outspoken opponent of the apartheid policies of the South African government. He was deported in 1967 as a result of his dramatic plea for brotherhood at the *Pacem in Terris II* convocation conducted in Geneva, Switzerland by the Center. Bishop Crowther joined the staff of the Center shortly after his deportation, and has since resigned from his church position in South Africa.

A naturalized American citizen born in England, he was educated at Leeds University and Oxford University, where he earned a master of laws degree. He trained for the priesthood at Exeter College, Oxford, where he taught criminal and constitutional law. Later, he served as chaplain at the University of California at Los Angeles. He was Dean of St. Cyprian's Cathedral in Kimberley before his appointment as bishop in 1965.



EDWARD ENGBERG

A reporter and editor for the United Press, *Chicago Daily News* and *Minneapolis Star*, he became an associate editor of *Fortune* magazine in 1951.

He was a member of the Fund for the Republic staff in 1954, conducting an investigation into black-listing in the entertainment industry. At the completion of that study, Engberg joined the staff of *Business International*, becoming managing editor. In 1959, he became editor of *Insider's Newsletter*. He also was a senior editor at Cowles Magazines and Broadcasting, Inc. and a political analyst for the Dreyfus Corporation. Educated at the College of St. Thomas, in St. Paul, he took graduate work at the University of Chicago.

Engberg has written for *Commonweal*, *The New Leader* and *The New Republic*. He is the author of *The Spy in the Corporate Structure*, a book-length essay on citizens' rights to privacy.



W. H. FERRY

A graduate of Dartmouth College, he has been a newspaper reporter and editor in Michigan, Texas, New Hampshire and Puerto Rico. After serving in 1944 as Director of Public Relations of the CIO Political Action Committee, he was for nine years a partner of Earl Newsom and Company, New York public relations counsel. Ferry was a contributor to the book, *The Corporation Take-Over*, and has written several Center studies, among which are *Caught on the Horn of Plenty*, *Farewell to Integration* and *Masscomm As Guru*. He is Vice President of the Center and one of its first staff members.



WILLIAM GORMAN

Gorman has been the general editor of the *Syntopicon for Great Books of the Western World*. He received a bachelor of arts degree from the University of Michigan and was the winner of the Avery Hopwood Award for Essays in Literary and Musical Criticism. A member of the faculty of the University of Chicago School of Law, he taught in a pilot college of liberal arts for pre-law students. Gorman also has been a Fellow of the Institute of Mediaeval Studies at the University of Toronto, a member of the faculty at St. John's College at Annapolis from 1937 to 1945, Associate Director of the Institute of Philosophical Research and while on leave from the Center he was a visiting professor at Wesleyan University in 1964 and 1965.



HALLOCK HOFFMAN

Hoffman is a graduate of Kenyon College with a bachelor of arts degree and is a former member of the staff of the American Friends Service Committee. One of the earliest members of the staff of the Center, he was from 1954 to 1957 the Assistant to the President of the Fund for the Republic, Inc., which is the corporate entity of the Center. In 1959, he directed the Center's study of the political process. Hoffman served for ten years as Secretary and Treasurer of the Center, until he resigned in 1967 to devote his full time to the academic activities of the Center. He is now Coordinator of Studies.



FRANK K. KELLY

Kelly, who is Vice President and Director of Continuing Education for the Center, has served as staff director of the Senate Majority Policy Committee.

A graduate of the University of Missouri, he later became a professor at Boston University, a novelist, a war correspondent, book critic, contributor to many publications, U.S. Director of the International Press Institute's Study of World News and a Nieman Fellow at Harvard University. In 1958 he served as a speechwriter for President Truman.

Kelly also is the author of *Your Freedoms: The Bill of Rights* and *The Martyred Presidents*, a study of political violence. He is a member of the board of the National Book Committee.



DONALD McDONALD

Dean of the Marquette University College of Journalism from 1962 to 1965, before becoming a Center Fellow, he is the author of a syndicated weekly column, "Essays in Our Day," for the Catholic press. Holder of a bachelor's and a master of arts degree in journalism from Marquette, he was a bomber pilot instructor during World War II. He was editor from 1949 to 1959 of *The Catholic Messenger*, the Davenport, Iowa, diocesan weekly. From 1959 to 1962, he was editor of *The Marquette University Magazine*. From 1964 to 1965, he served as director of the Center for the Study of the American Press, at Marquette. He wrote "Religion and Freedom," a report on the Fund for the Republic's 1958 seminar on "Religion in a Free Society," and later conducted a series of interviews for the Center's "Study of the American Character."



LINUS PAULING

Pauling twice has been awarded the Nobel Prize — first for his research in chemistry, in 1954 and then the Nobel Peace Prize in 1962 for his efforts on behalf of world peace.

Graduated from Oregon State University with a bachelor of science degree, he received a doctor of philosophy degree in 1925 from the California Institute of Technology, where he taught from 1922 to 1963.

He was George Eastman Professor at Oxford University in 1948, and has been a visiting professor at the University of California, Cornell University, University of Illinois, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard University and Princeton University, as well as others in Europe and Asia.

Author of more than 375 scientific papers and 100 articles on social and political issues, Pauling's books include *The Nature of the Chemical Bond* and *No More War!* He currently is on leave from the Center while teaching in the chemistry department at the University of California at San Diego, La Jolla.



JOHN L. PERRY

With a master of science degree in journalism from Northwestern University, he was an award-winning political writer and editor for the *Tampa Tribune* and *St. Petersburg Times* before joining the staff of Florida Governor LeRoy Collins. Assistant to the President of the National Association of Broadcasters, he was part of the effort to reform commercial broadcasting. A Washington and New York consultant in broadcasting, higher education, race relations, public administration and political organization, he was a presidential campaign aide to John F. Kennedy and a White House speechwriter for President Lyndon B. Johnson. As a founder of the federal Community Relations Service and as Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce, he served on presidential missions dealing with racial rioting. He came to the Center in 1966 as Director of Development, and was elected Secretary and Treasurer in 1967.



JAMES A. PIKE

Author of numerous books and articles on law, religion and ethics, Bishop Pike is held by many to be the most influential, and controversial, clergyman America has produced. After eight years as Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of California, he resigned his administrative duties to come to the Center in 1966. He received the degree of doctor of the science of law from Yale University, and a bachelor of divinity degree from Union Theological Seminary. A Navy veteran, before World War II, he was a senior trial attorney for the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. From 1949 to 1952, he was Chairman of the Department of Religion at Columbia University. Until 1958, he was Dean of the Cathedral of St. John the Divine, New York City, and Adjunct Professor at Columbia Law School. He is Chairman of the California State Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, having been first appointed to the Committee under the Eisenhower administration.



ROBERT M. HUTCHINS

President of the Center, he also is a director of *Encyclopaedia Britannica* and Chairman of its Board of Editors. Decorated in World War I with the Italian Croce di Guerra, he later became an Officer of the Legion of Honor. Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Yale University, he was Secretary of Yale, was graduated magna cum laude in 1925 from its law school and three years later became its Dean. In 1929, he became President of the University of Chicago, and then its Chancellor. He served 22 years as its chief executive, until 1951, when he became an associate director of the Ford Foundation. In 1954, he became President of the Fund for the Republic, Inc., the Center's corporate entity. His works include: *No Friendly Voice*; *The Higher Learning in America*; *Education for Freedom*; *St. Thomas and the World State*; *Morals, Religion and Higher Education*; *The Conflict in Education*; *The University of Utopia*; *The Democratic Dilemma*; *Some Questions About Education in North America*; *The Great Conversation*; *Freedom, Education and the Fund*; *Some Observations on American Education*, and *The Learning Society*.



EDWARD REED

A graduate of Princeton University, Reed has served as an editor of several magazines including *Theatre Arts Monthly*, *House and Garden* and *The Reporter*.

He also is the editor of several books, among which are *Challenges to Democracy: The Next Ten Years*, *Readings for Democrats* and *Pacem in Terris: Peace on Earth*.

A member of the staff of the Center since 1954, Reed is Director of Publications. Besides serving as executive editor of *The Center Magazine*, he is responsible for the new series of Center membership publications, "Center Occasional Papers," which appear on alternate months to the *Magazine*.



JOHN R. SEELEY

Before joining the Center in 1966 as Dean, Seeley had been professor of sociology and chairman of the department at Brandeis University and a sociologist in the medical department of Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Educated in England, in Germany and at the University of Chicago, he also taught at the College of the University of Chicago, in the departments of psychiatry and political economy at the University of Toronto, at York University in Toronto and at Brandeis.

A member of Phi Beta Kappa, he is a Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, American Sociological Association, Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences and American Association for Humanistic Psychology.

Associate Editor of *American Sociological Review*, Seeley is author or co-author of *Crestwood Heights*, *Community Chest*, *The Alcohol Language* and *The Americanization of the Unconscious*.



STANLEY K. SHEINBAUM

A graduate of Stanford University, where he also did his doctoral work in economics, Sheinbaum has taught economics on the faculties of Stanford, Michigan State University and the University of California at Santa Barbara.

From 1953 to 1955, he was a Fulbright Fellow in France. Sheinbaum was campus director of the Michigan State University Technical Assistance Project to the Republic of Vietnam from 1955 to 1959. He served as an economics consultant to the government of South Vietnam under President Ngo Dinh Diem.

Until 1966, Sheinbaum was a member of the California State Commission on Manpower, Automation and Technology. A consulting editor of *Ramparts*, Sheinbaum has also contributed articles to a number of other publications.



REXFORD GUY TUGWELL

Professor of economics at Columbia University when he came to the attention of Franklin D.

Roosevelt, he was appointed Assistant Secretary of Agriculture and became one of the "brains trust" helping to shape much of the New Deal programs.

He later became Under Secretary of Agriculture, Administrator of the Resettlement Administration, Chairman of the New York City Planning Commission, Chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico and, from 1941 to 1946, Governor of Puerto Rico.

Educated at the University of Pennsylvania, he was the recipient of the Woodrow Wilson Award of the American Political Science Association. He was also awarded the Silver Medal of the American Society of Planning Officials.

His books include *The Place of Planning in Society*, *The Democratic Roosevelt*, *The Art of Politics*, *The Enlargement of the Presidency* and *How They Became President*.

As a Center Fellow, Governor Tugwell is working on a draft of a model new constitution for the United States.



HARVEY WHEELER

Co-author of *Fail-Safe*, Wheeler is the author of "Democracy in a Revolutionary Era" of the 1968 *Encyclopaedia Britannica* Perspectives series.

Wheeler also is the author of several Center publications, including *Restoration of Politics*, *The Rise and Fall of Liberal Democracy* and *The Politics of Revolution*, and has contributed to many professional and polemical journals on the general topics of political and constitutional theory.

After obtaining a doctor of philosophy degree at Harvard University, Wheeler taught political science on the faculties at Harvard, Johns Hopkins and Washington and Lee Universities.

He has been a Center Fellow since 1961.




JOHN WILKINSON

Philosopher and physicist, Wilkinson received his master of science degree in physical chemistry from the University of Pennsylvania and his doctor of philosophy degree in the philosophy of science and mathematical logic from the University of Chicago. He later studied physics and philosophy of science at the Universities of Munich and Vienna.

Author of numerous papers on physics and philosophy of science, especially the philosophy of mathematics, he is the American translator of Jacques Ellul's *The Technological Society*.

Since coming to the Center he has edited and translated, besides Ellul, a new edition from the Greek of the pre-Socratic philosophers. He has served on the faculties of the University of Chicago, the University of Istanbul and the University of California at Santa Barbara.



EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

✿ Fellows of the Center regularly engage in the effort to widen the circles of discussion beyond their own dialogue. Sometimes this takes the form of an address by an individual Fellow; sometimes it is undertaken in Santa Barbara or elsewhere in collaboration with other institutions and organizations; and intermittently the Center initiates in its own right a major convocation or symposium away from its home base.

These occasions make possible a direct address to a substantial audience, and ordinarily they also attract much attention in the mass media here and abroad.

✿ In the period covered by this *President's Report* the Center organized two major convocations on international affairs, and one on higher education. These are described, along with a representative sampling of less ambitious projects in which Center Fellows played a major role.

Pacem in Terris I and II

✿ Inspired by the late Pope John XXIII's encyclical, *Pacem in Terris* (Peace on Earth), the Center held the first of two world-wide convocations in New York in February, 1965, "to examine the requirements of peace."

✿ Specifically, *Pacem in Terris I* sought a commonly acceptable definition of the term coexistence, which Pope John had recognized as the basis for a world in which conflicting ideologies could compete without raising the threat of nuclear destruction for all mankind.

✿ The Center originated and conducted that convocation to help bring to public light the life-or-death issues raised by the Papal encyclical. It had become persuaded that the only feasible auspices for such a gathering were those of a private educational enterprise not beholden to any national, religious or economic interests.

✿ *Pacem in Terris I* brought together in New York some 2,500 persons, including intellectuals and statesmen from the United States, Western Europe, the Soviet bloc nations, the Near East, and Asia—from the world at large, with the major exception of Communist China.

✿ It came at a time when normal diplomatic channels of communication were becoming frozen by a renewal of the Cold War. Its accomplishments are difficult to measure; its true value may have to be considered in terms of what would have happened had it not been held.

✿ There is no question, however, that the first *Pacem in Terris* convocation offered a revival of the dialogue of peace and was a major factor contributing to the decision of Pope Paul VI to

journey to New York to make his historic address to the United Nations on the subject of *Pacem in Terris*.

✿ The first convocation was accorded extensive news coverage around the world. Pocket Books published in paper-back form the edited proceedings. The National Educational Television Network carried the entire convocation via videotape. Center pamphlets using excerpts from addresses and commentaries during the convocation had wide circulation.

✿ In the months that followed, world events began to raise doubts that coexistence could insure survival, much less peace. The war in Vietnam was escalated. The People's Republic of China renewed its efforts toward nuclear capability. Unrest and violence erupted in Latin America and Africa.

✿ In the shadow of this deteriorating international situation, a small informal conference was held at the Center in Santa Barbara, in June, 1965, to evaluate *Pacem in Terris I* and to consider what useful steps might be taken to follow it up.

✿ Diplomats and international experts, including several ambassadors to the United Nations and three under secretaries of the international organization, urged the Center to consider holding a second convocation, this time outside the United States to insure even wider participation, possibly including that of mainland China.

✿ A year later, at a planning session at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, Switzerland, the decision was taken to undertake *Pacem in Terris II*. The second convocation would consider in more concrete terms the basic outlines for



Some 400 participants — leaders in private and public roles throughout the world — assemble in Geneva for the Center's second Pacem in Terris convocation

coexistence identified at *Pacem in Terris I*.

✿ Five main topics were selected: Threats to Coexistence; Intervention: The Case of Vietnam; Confrontation: The Case of Germany; Beyond Coexistence; and Interdependence.

✿ *Pacem in Terris II* was held May 28-31, 1967, in Geneva, with opening ceremonies in the United Nations European headquarters, the Palais des Nations. Secretary General U Thant addressed the group via Telstar satellite from the United Nations in New York.

✿ The convocation occurred at a period of new crisis in the Vietnam conflict, and on the eve of the outbreak of the Arab-Israel war. Despite these tensions, which produced last-minute failures to attend by officials of the United States, the Soviet Union, and North Vietnam, and the longstanding boycott by Communist China, more than 300 distinguished persons from 70 nations gathered to keep the dialogue of peace alive.

✿ The proceedings of *Pacem in Terris II* were digested in the first issue of *The Center Magazine* (Oct.-Nov. 1967), and the background was summarized by Harry S. Ashmore's article, "The Public Relations of Peace." A book-length version is now in preparation. Contemporary television and radio coverage in the United States and abroad was extensive, including an hour-long documentary on NBC-TV. Four half-hour films have been edited for educational and commercial television use here and abroad (with dubbed sound tracks from the foreign language translators). A similar distribution of audiotapes for radio broadcast is underway.

✿ *Pacem in Terris II* was summarized in this excerpt from an article by Robert



Former U.S. Ambassador to UNESCO James Roosevelt presiding as Secretary-General of *Pacem in Terris II* convocation

Lasch, editor of the editorial page of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*:

✿ "Its organizers never set out to pass a miracle of peacemaking. But if rational discourse has any relevance to the march of events, these three days of it at the foot of Mount Blanc may turn out to have made a contribution to peace.

A distinct consensus was reached.

Furthermore, two unexpected byproducts could have important consequences:

✿ "One, delegates from six Southeast Asian countries spontaneously got together and, resolving that their part of the world needs to 'resist all forms of external interference,' called upon the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, which sponsored this conference, to organize 'without delay' another to be attended exclusively

by citizens of the two Vietnams, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand.

✿ "Two, for the first time anywhere East Germans and West Germans sat down here to begin a dialogue looking toward an eventual settlement in Central Europe.

✿ "... The very fact that 300 persons of great ideological variety, citizens of more than 70 countries, could meet without the aid and comfort of their governments and reach a broad consensus on great issues of peace and war is significant and hopeful. Robert Hutchins and the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions at Santa Barbara deserve commendation for organizing the conference in the face of State Department hostility and suspicion."

32



Center convocation on requirements of peace attracts notable scholars, clergymen, lawyers, journalists and public officials from East and West

THE UNIVERSITY IN AMERICA

✿ On the domestic scene, the Center turned attention to the University in America and its contemporary crisis.

✿ The troubles are not new. What is new is the degree of urgency which is forcing the professional community and the public in general to reappraise what America's universities are and should be.

✿ To focus on the problem, the Center held a major convocation in Los Angeles in 1966.

✿ Donald McDonald organized the proceedings, which brought together for two days leading students and critics of higher education from throughout the nation and abroad, including representative student leaders from American campuses and members of the Center staff.

✿ Among those participating were:

Sir Eric Ashby, *Master of Clare College, Cambridge University*

Harry S. Ashmore, *Executive Vice-President of The Fund for the Republic, Inc.*

William C. Baggs, *Editor of The Miami News*

Stringfellow Barr, *former President of St. John's College, Annapolis*

Jacques Barzun, *Dean of Faculties and Provost of Columbia University*

Detlev Bronk, *President of the Rockefeller Institute*

Jacob Bronowski, *Associate Director of the Salk Institute for Biological Studies*

Harrison Brown, *professor of Geochemistry at California Institute of Technology*

J. Douglas Brown, *dean of the faculty, Princeton University*

Scott Buchanan, *former Dean of St. John's College, Annapolis*

Chester F. Carlson, *inventor of Xerography*

William O. Douglas, *Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court*

Clarence Faust, *then Vice-President of the Ford Foundation*

W. H. Ferry, *Vice-President of The Fund for the Republic, Inc.*

J. William Fulbright, *United States Senator from Arkansas*

Arnold Grant, *member of the Board of Visitors of Syracuse Law College and of the Board of Trustees of Syracuse University*

Robert M. Hutchins, *President of The Fund for the Republic, Inc.*

Edwin W. Janss, Jr., *chairman of the Janss Investment Corporation*

Martin Kenner, *graduate student in economics at the New School for Social Research in New York City*

Clark Kerr, *then President of the University of California*

Msgr. Francis J. Lally, *Editor of The Pilot*

Saul Landau, *graduate student at the University of California at Berkeley*

Margaret Levi, *student at Bryn Mawr College, majoring in political science*

Walter Lippmann, *author and political columnist*

Rosemary Park, *then President of Barnard College, now Vice-Chancellor of the University of California at Los Angeles*

Jubal R. Parten, *independent oil producer and rancher, Houston, Texas, former trustee, University of Texas*

Linus Pauling, *Nobel laureate in chemistry (1954) and in peace (1963)*

I. I. Rabi, *Nobel laureate in physics (1944)*

John R. Seeley, *then chairman of the department of sociology, Brandeis University*

Philip Selznick, *chairman of the department of sociology and of the Center for the Study of Law and Society, University of California at Berkeley*

Lyle M. Spencer, *President, Science Research Associates, Inc. and Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Roosevelt University*

Eleanor B. Stevenson, *member of the board of American University at Cairo*

John Sullivan, *then President of the Associated Students of the University of Southern California*

John Weiss, *associate professor of history, Wayne State University*

✿ The Center was under no illusion that a single conference could clarify, much less solve, the main issues confronting the university. But the impact which this convocation had—both within and outside the university communities—has led to a renewed concern with resolving those issues.

✿ The American Broadcasting Company television network carried an hour-long discussion program on "The University in America," utilizing

participants from the convocation. The daily proceedings were carried on a California-wide educational television live network, and excerpts were broadcast by educational stations around the country.


✿ The Center published an Occasional Paper, "The University in America," which included the major talks and discussions from the convocation. Senator J. William Fulbright's address was published in *Center Diary: 12*. A summary version of the convocation was carried in *Center Diary: 14*. Eight audio tapes edited from the proceedings are still in circulation.

✿ In 1967 the Center made another approach to the study of the university through a three-day seminar in Santa Barbara, to which were invited thirty student leaders from representative American campuses. Noting that one of the foremost complaints of student activists is that those "over 30" are not listening to their protests, the Center provided an opportunity for a full hearing.

✿ The views of the students, and, of Center staff members, frequently at odds during the seminar, were published as a Center Occasional Paper, "Students and Society," in December, 1967.



Representative student leaders and activists from universities across America attend Center conference to consider "Students and Society"



CONTINUING EDUCATION

✿ In 1966 Frank K. Kelly, a Vice-President of the Center, was given new responsibility for continuing education. As director of the program he has been charged with coordinating the Center's relationships with institutions and organizations pursuing related interests. This includes making available Center personnel and materials for discussion programs. Here is a sampling of 1967 activity in continuing education:

✿ In April of 1967, a conference was held at the Center to discuss the use of communications in the development of a world civilization, organized at the request of the World Association for Christian Broadcasting, an association of professional broadcasters with headquarters in London.

✿ Participants included Harry S. Ashmore, Bishop James A. Pike, W. H. Ferry, Hallock Hoffman, Donald McDonald, Linus Pauling, John Cogley, and Frank Kelly of the Center.

✿ Religious broadcasters who took part in the sessions included Edwin A. Robertson, *Executive Director of the Association, from London*; Keith Woollard, *Executive Director of Berkeley Studio, Toronto, Canada*; Pamela Ilott, *Director of Religious Programs, CBS News*; S. Franklin Mack, *Associate Director of the Office of Communication, United Church of Christ*; Arthur B. Hives of the *Anglican Church of Canada*; William F. Fore, *Executive Director of the Broadcasting and Film Commission of the National Council of Churches, U.S.A.*; Keith Donaldson, *Supervisor of Program Operations, National Broadcasting Company, New*

York; Robert E. A. Lee, *Executive Director of the Lutheran Film Associates*; Carl J. Hahn, Jr., *United Presbyterian Church, Sao Paulo, Brazil*; Doris Hess, *secretary for literature, Methodist Board of Missions*; Fred Essex, *Director of Radio and Television for the American Baptist Convention* and John O'Brien, *of the department of communication arts, Loyola College, Montreal, Canada.*

✿ When the American Association of University Women decided to study what is happening to ethics and values in an age of change, Center publications were provided dealing with four major questions related to the crisis on changing values: The Question of Revolution, the Question of Peace, the Question of Mass Society, and the Question of What to Value. These topics were first tested at Whittier College and are now being considered at other educational institutions.

✿ Two seminars in Palm Springs have been presented by the Center in cooperation with the University of California at Riverside. Topics included



Frank K. Kelly, Vice President and Director of Continuing Education

"Ending the Cold War," "Sharing the World's Riches," "Developing Better People," "Exploring the Outer Limits of the Mind," "Widening the Concepts of Religion," and "The Unitary Vision: Tying Everything Together." Speakers were W. H. Ferry, James A. Pike, Joseph P. Lyford, Harry S. Ashmore, Linus Pauling, and Robert M. Hutchins in the first seminar and Harvey Wheeler, Stanley Sheinbaum, Hallock Hoffman, John R. Seeley, John Cogley, and Robert M. Hutchins, in the second.

✿ A reading list consisting largely of Center publications was used.

Participants in panel discussions included the city manager, the director of innovations for the city school system, clergymen of several faiths, teachers, businessmen, lawyers, doctors, psychologists, newspapermen, broadcasters, and labor leaders. All of the sessions were videotaped and made available to University of California students through closed-circuit television instruction.

✿ The Extension Division of the University of California at Irvine also offered a seminar series in cooperation with the Center. The topics were: "Man and Morality," "The Spy in the Corporate Structure," "The Human Rights Revolution," "The Communications Revolution," "The Scientific Revolution," and "A New Look at a New World." Speakers were James A. Pike, Edward Engberg, John R. Seeley, Donald McDonald, Linus Pauling, and Robert M. Hutchins.

✿ The National University Extension Association of the National Committee on Discussion and Debate used Center pamphlets, *The Police* and *The Law*, in their forensic library. Arrangements were made to furnish the two Center publications as a set to students across

the country for use in high school and college debates on the topic: "Resolved: that Congress should establish uniform criminal investigation procedures."

Requests from students have come from many parts of the country.

✿ Co-sponsored by the Center and the Public Affairs Committee of the Jewish Center Association of Los Angeles, a seminar series was offered in the fall of 1967. Harry S. Ashmore spoke at the first session, on "Politics in the Revolutionary Age." Former Governor Edmund G. Brown was the moderator.

Topics of the other meetings were "Revolution in the City" with statements by Paul Jacobs and Dr. J. Alfred Canon of the UCLA School of Medicine, and "Revolution in Religion" with statements by Bishop Pike and John Cogley.

✿ The board of directors of the Rice University Alumni Association scheduled a conference on "The Purpose of the University" in Houston in March, 1968, using the Center pamphlets on "The University in America" as background material. Participants include Bishop Pike, W. H. Ferry and Frank Kelly from the Center; President Pitzer of Rice; President Hoffman of the University of Houston, and President Ransom of the University of Texas. Among the topics: "The Future of Teaching," "The Academic Bureaucracy," and "Proposals for Innovation, Experiment and Reform."

✿ The Associated Students at the University of California at Santa Barbara continue a relationship between the Center and the students that began several years ago. Groups of students come to the Center during the winter and spring months for informal meetings. Center staff members also meet with students and faculty members on the UCSB campus.

THE PUBLICATIONS PROGRAM

✿ From its inception, the Center has produced a variety of publications to disseminate the results of its deliberations. To date more than 7,000,000 copies of some 80 titles are in circulation here and abroad.

✿ For the past six years the Center has augmented its printed publications with audiotapes edited from the Center's continuing dialogue. These are finding increasing use by educational and commercial radio stations, in classrooms, and by adult education groups. Some 18,000 copies have been ordered to date.

✿ In 1962 the Center began experimenting with a periodical publication, carrying a diversity of materials, to supplement its series of intermittent, one-subject pamphlets. Originally entitled *The Center Diary*, this publication has been developed into a considerably expanded *Center Magazine*, to be published every other

month. In alternate months a one-topic *Occasional Paper* will be published, thus providing Center members with a regular channel of communication.

✿ As Editor of the new magazine, John Cogley rejoined the Center in early 1967 after two years as religious news editor of *The New York Times*. He had been executive editor of *Commonweal* before joining the original Fund for the Republic to carry out a notable study on blacklisting in the entertainment and broadcasting industries. As one of the original members of the Center, he was responsible for developing and supervising the basic issues programs on church and state and on the American character.

✿ Edward Reed continues as Director of Publications, and also serves as Executive Editor of *The Center Magazine*. Planning is going forward for the development

John Cogley, Editor of The Center Magazine



of additional Center publications to make full use of the intellectual resources provided by the continuing dialogue.

✿ Florence Mischel is responsible for the audiotape program, which has distributed more than 20,000 tapes on some 250 subjects discussed at the Center.

✿ In addition to its own publications, the Center continues its practice of making its materials available for reprint in appropriate books and periodicals published elsewhere. The following is a partial list of reprints since the beginning of the academic year 1966-67:

Patterns of Thinking (Wadsworth Publishing Co.) college freshman textbook: Diary article

Perspective in Sociology (Illinois Teachers College): eight Center papers

The Triple Revolution (Little, Brown & Co.), college textbook on social problems: "Cybernation: The Silent Conquest," "The Politics of Ecology," "Segregation, Subsidies, and Megalopolis"

Educational Research Information Center of the U.S. Office of Education: "The University in America," "France—The New Republic"

Advanced Management Council: "A Philosophy for Labor"

Darmstadter Blatter: "Looking Forward: The Abundant Society"

Social science textbook (Michigan State University Press): "A World Without War," "Community of Fear," Diary article

Recordings for the Blind: eighteen Center publications

World Affairs Council of Northern California: some of "Pacem in Terris I" material

The Automated State (Chilton Books): "Cybernation"

Colloquy (United Church of Christ): Diary article

Introductory Readings in the Foundations of American Education (Allyn & Bacon): "Cybernation"

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom: Diary article

Outlook (New York Department of Welfare): Diary article

National Institute of Public Affairs: "Two Faces of Federalism"

International Economics and Business: "Government and Business in International Trade"

Stanford University Daily: "The University in America"

Police Records and Communications: "Cybernation"

Los Angeles Times: "The University in America"

The Journalism Educator: "Mass Communications"

San Francisco State College: Diary article

Catholic University: Diary article

U.S. Army War College: "Cybernation"

The American Congress: "The Condition of Our National Political Parties"

Washington Star: Diary article

Unions, Management and the Public: "The Negro As an American"

Readings in Social Welfare: Center Bulletin

Faculty Forum (Methodist Board of Education): "Technology and Human Values"

American Friends Service Committee Peace Literature Service: Diary article

Freedom and Union: "Technology and Human Values," Diary article

Milwaukee Journal: Diary article

Christian Faith and Life Community: "Technology and Human Values"

VISTA: "Jobs, Machines and People," "The Negro As an American," Diary article

Information Service (National Council of Churches of Christ): Diary article

University of California at Los Angeles: Diary article

40



Edward Reed, Director of Publications



Florence Mischel, Director of Audiotape Program

U.S. Advisory Commission on
International Educational and Cultural
Affairs: Diary article

Social Progress (United Presbyterian
Church): "Individual Freedom
and Common Defense"

Violence and the Mass Media:
"Mass Communications"

*Critical Issues in Labor: A Book of
Readings* (Macmillan): "Cybernation,"
"Old Before Its Time"

*American History High School Teachers
Guide* (Suffolk County, N.Y.):
"Opinion Polls", interview with
George Gallup

Discovery in a Word, a book:
Diary article

Alberta (Canada) Medical Bulletin:
Diary article

The Presidency (Scholastic Book
Services), a reader: "The Constitution
and the Common Defense"

Crossroads (Westminster Press):
Diary article

State and Local Government (Scott,
Foresman), a textbook: "Segregation,
Subsidies, and Megalopolis"

Annals of America (Encyclopaedia
Britannica): "Caught on the Horn
of Plenty"

Center for Labor and Management
(University of Iowa): "Old Before
Its Time"

University of British Columbia Canadian
Indian Workshop: Diary article

Beginning Readings in Economics:
Diary articles

National Council of Jewish Women:
Diary articles

Imperial Valley College: Diary articles

Community (Friendship House,
Chicago): Diary article

Mayor and Manager: Diary article

A textbook on American government:
"The Rise and Fall of Liberal
Democracy," Diary article

American Association of University
Women Chapters: Diary article

American Education (McGraw Hill),
a textbook: Diary article

Reader for University of California
Extension: Diary articles

Management and Society, a reader: "The
Quantitative Society"

Reign of the Sacred Heart: "Civil
Disobedience"

Washington University graduate program
in *Business for Negroes*: Diary articles

Production Decisions and Controls,
a textbook: "Cybernation"

New American Radical Thought,
a book: "Cybernation"

Readings in American Government:
"Civil Disobedience"

Journal of Human Relations: "Consulting
the Romans"

Foreign Service Journal: Diary article

Contemporary Religious Issues
(Wadsworth), a textbook: "Technology
and Human Values," Diary article

A textbook on political problems:
Diary articles

Metropolis in Crisis, a book: Diary
article, "Segregation, Subsidies,
and Megalopolis"

Issues in Ethics and Society, a reader:
"To Live as Men"

Anthology on American government:
"First Things First," "The Elite and the
Electorate," "The Mazes of Modern
Government," "Consulting the Romans,"
"The Restoration of Politics," "Caught
on the Horn of Plenty," "Science and
Peace," Diary articles

World Student Christian Federation,
Switzerland: "The Churches and
the Public"

Junge Kirche, Germany: Diary article

*Contemporary Thought on Public
School Curriculum and Instruction*,
a book: Diary article

Methodist Church Board of Education:
"Capital Punishment," Diary article

THE MEMBERSHIP PROGRAM

✿ In 1967 John L. Perry, former Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce, was appointed Secretary and Treasurer of the Center, and charged with consolidating public relations and development with the membership program, which has become the institution's main reliance for financial support. The program embraces more than 400 Founding Members who have pledged \$1,000 a year or more, and thousands who pay annual fees ranging upward from the minimum \$10 membership fee.


✿ The membership program operates in close conjunction with the publications program. Each member receives *The Center Magazine* and its alternate *Occasional Paper*, and is informed of the availability of other Center publications and audiotapes.

✿ Seminars featuring Center Fellows

are conducted regularly for the members in Los Angeles and New York, and occasionally in Chicago and other major cities. Peter Tagger functions as Director of Membership Services, based in the Center's Los Angeles office.

Crane Haussamen is in charge of the New York office. Richard L. Gilbert serves as Perry's deputy in Santa Barbara.

✿ Stimulated by the advent of *The Center Magazine* and a related direct-mail campaign, the Center membership was 24,941 at the end of 1967, with a total of some 50,000 projected for June, 1968. Here is the progression during the period covered by this *President's Report*, compiled as of the end of the fiscal year, September 30: 1964, 4,325; 1965, 5,720; 1966, 7,441; 1967, 13,157. During the same period the Center's annual income from contributions rose from \$737,837 to \$1,813,022.



THE CONVOICATIONS' SUPPORTERS

✿ The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions maintains a staff of less than twenty-five senior members, has no permanent endowment, and receives no subsidy from governmental agencies. Undertakings on the scale of the two *Pacem in Terris* convocations are well beyond its regular budget and inherent capacities. The massive effort entailed in arranging these programs and assembling participants from all over the world was made possible by the support of a number of organizations and individuals.

✿ Major financing for *Pacem in Terris I* was provided by Time, Inc., the New York publishing house. Logistic support was arranged by the Center in association with the Johnson Foundation of Racine, Wisconsin. Interim operations, including a planning conference in

Geneva in June, 1966, were financed by a grant from the Francis Drown Foundation of Los Angeles.

✿ The principal underwriting for *Pacem in Terris II* was provided by the IOS Foundation, established at Geneva in 1961 by Investors Overseas Services, the mutual fund holding company headed by Bernard J. Cornfeld. In addition to generous financial support, the IOS organization made available one of its senior executives, former Ambassador James Roosevelt, to head the convocation secretariat. Colonel Gordon West, as deputy to Ambassador Roosevelt; Miss Gladis Solomon, director of the IOS Foundation; Thad Lovett; Jean de Muralt; James Zimmerman; John Schuyler, and many others in the IOS organization made an indispensable contribution of time and effort to the complex logistic support required by the Geneva meeting.

✿ Other major financial contributors to *Pacem in Terris II* included the Albert Parvin Foundation of Washington, D.C.; the Andrew Norman, Seniel and Dorothy Ostrow, and Richard S. Gunther Foundations of Los Angeles; the No Sutch Fund, Inc., the Arnold M. Grant Foundation of New York, and the Patrick and Anna M. Cudahy Foundation of Milwaukee. The following individuals are among the substantial contributors to *Pacem in Terris II*: Joseph Drown, Mrs. Joseph A. Field, Jr., Max Palevsky, and Harold Willens of Los Angeles; Mr. and Mrs. Jubal R. Parten of Dallas; Henry V. Broady of Houston; S. Herbert Meller of New York, and Col. Irving Salomon of San Diego.

✿ Support for the University in America Convocation was forthcoming from the Xerox Corporation, Patrick and Anna M. Cudahy Foundation, and George D. Pratt, Jr.

Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Fund Balance

September 30, 1967

ASSETS:

Cash (\$1,509,524 bearing interest at average rate of 5.3%)			\$1 635 375
Marketable securities, at cost or value at date of gift (at market quotation, \$526,545) (Note D)			435 484
Notes receivable (Note A)			482 349
Accrued interest and dividends			9 274
Accounts receivable, advances, and deposits			17 618
Real property, at cost:			
Land	\$120 625		
Structures	163 109		283 734
			<u>2 863 834</u>

LIABILITIES AND FUND BALANCE:

Demand note payable (Note D)			240 867
Accounts payable			55 071
Fund balance:			
Unexpected designated gifts and project appropriations (Note B)		35 234	
Unrestricted balance, September 30, 1966	\$2 827 628		
Excess of expenses over receipts for the year ended September 30, 1967	292 452		
	<u>2 535 176</u>		
Increase in designated gifts and project appropriations from September 30, 1966	2 514	2 532 662	2 567 896
			<u>\$2 863 834</u>

The accompanying notes are an integral part of this statement.

Statement of Receipts and Expenses

For the year ended September 30, 1967
(Note C)

RECEIPTS:

Contributions (Note B)	\$1 813 022
Interest and dividends	51 414
Royalties and sale of books and tapes	52 928
Gain on disposition of securities	46 804
Other	12 139
	<hr/> 1 976 307

EXPENSES:

Projects, schedule annexed	\$1 942 765	
Administrative expenses:		
Compensation and employee benefits	\$153 398	
Development	155 685	
Legal and account- ing fees	5 692	
Travel	1 875	
Rent	6 862	
Sundry	1 775	325 287
	<hr/>	
Investment expense	707	2 268 759
	<hr/>	
Excess of expenses over receipts		<hr/> <hr/> \$292 452

45

The accompanying notes are an integral part of this statement.

Schedule of Project Expenses

For the year ended September 30, 1967

	Project Expenses
Study of Basic Issues in Civil Liberties:	
The Center Discussion Program	\$4 013
The Center Studies	371 353
Fellows in Residence at the Center	408 253
The Publications Program of The Center	372 345
"Forces of Change" and other peace studies	7 261
Pacem in Terris II Convention	722 514
Pacem in Terris II Convention Follow-up	1 825
Pacem in Terris III Convention	9 288
The Technological Symposium	91
Basic Research in Science	27 241
The Study of the World Youth Movement	10 000
Study for Encyclopaedia Britannica	1 081
The Study of Southeast Asia	7 500
Net project expense	<u>\$1 942 765</u>

NOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

A. Notes Receivable:

Notes with collateral comprising deeds of trust on Santa Barbara residential property represent advances to staff members. The notes, bearing interest at 5% per annum, are due as follows:

August 8, 1968*	\$44 760	
June 10, 1968*	31 000	
August 26, 1968*	27 750	
April 9, 1968*	21 784	
May 15, 1968	17 500	
June 14, 1968	17 000	
March 11, 1968*	5 000	
		\$164 794

Note with collateral comprising deed of trust on Santa Barbara residential property represents an investment. The note, bearing interest at 9½% per annum, is due September 7, 1969 312 000

Other interest-bearing notes, without collateral, arising from advances to staff members, are due as follows:

September 8, 1968 5%	\$3 800	
August 1, 1968 5%	1 000	
March 31, 1968 7%	755	5 555
		\$482 349

B. Designated Gifts:

Contributions for designated purposes aggregating \$52,566 were received during the year. At September 30, 1967, the unexpended portion of such gifts amounted to \$29,512.

C. Receipts and Expenses:

Under provisions of an agreement with Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., the Fund for the Republic, Inc. has been reimbursed for costs incurred in behalf of Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. Reimbursements to the Fund, aggregating \$89,454, were received during the year.

D. Demand note payable, \$240,867, represents an obligation to Comac Corporation. Collateral comprises 2,540 shares of Comac Corporation \$100 par value, 6% preferred stock. The note, dated August 21, 1967, bears interest at the rate of 6% per annum from September 1, 1967.

*Extended for periods of one year from former maturity date.

47

REPORT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

To the Board of Directors of
The Fund for the Republic, Inc.

✿ We have examined the statement of assets, liabilities, and fund balance of The Fund for the Republic, Inc. as of September 30, 1967 and the related statement of receipts and expenses and statement of project expenses for the year then ended. Our examination was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and accordingly included such tests of the accounting records and such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.

✿ In our opinion, the accompanying statements present fairly the financial position of The Fund for the Republic, Inc. at September 30, 1967 and its receipts and expenses for the year then ended, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles applied on a basis consistent with that of the preceding year.

LYBRAND, ROSS BROS. & MONTGOMERY

Los Angeles, California
October 27, 1967

FELLOWS OF THE CENTER:

Harry S. Ashmore
Stringfellow Barr
Elisabeth Mann Borgese
Scott Buchanan
John Cogley
C. Edward Crowther
Edward Engberg
W. H. Ferry
William Gorman
Hallock Hoffman
Robert M. Hutchins
Frank K. Kelly
Donald McDonald
Linus Pauling
John L. Perry
James A. Pike
Edward Reed
John R. Seeley
Stanley K. Sheinbaum
Rexford Guy Tugwell
Harvey Wheeler
John Wilkinson

STAFF:

Robert M. Hutchins,
President
Harry S. Ashmore,
Executive Vice-President
W. H. Ferry,
Vice-President
Frank K. Kelly,
*Vice-President and
Director of Continuing
Education*
John L. Perry,
Secretary and Treasurer
John R. Seeley,
Dean
Hallock Hoffman,
Coordinator of Studies
Edward Reed,
Director of Publications
John Cogley,
*Editor of The Center
Magazine*
Florence Mischel,
*Director of the Audio
Tape Program*
Richard L. Gilbert,
*Director of Public
Relations*
Peter Tagger,
*Director of Membership
Services*

CONSULTANTS TO THE CENTER:

A. A. Berle, Jr.,
*former Assistant Secretary
of State and Ambassador
to Brazil*
William O. Douglas,
*Associate Justice, United
States Supreme Court*
Harrop A. Freeman,
*Professor of Law,
Cornell Law School*
Robert Gordis,
*Seminary Professor of
Bible, Jewish Theological
Seminary*
Gerald H. Gottlieb,
*former Attorney-General of
American Samoa*
N. N. Inozemtsev,
*Director, Institute of
World Economics and
International Relations,
Soviet Academy of Sciences*
Raghavan N. Iyer,
*Professor of Political
Philosophy, University of
California at Santa Barbara*
Paul Jacobs,
author
Clark Kerr,
*former President,
University of California*
Irving F. Laucks,
chemist and industrialist
Joseph P. Lyford,
*Professor of Journalism,
University of California
at Berkeley*
Milton Mayer,
author
Walter Millis,*
military historian
Fred Warner Neal,
*Professor of International
Relations and Government,
Claremont Graduate
School and University
Center*
Reinhold Niebuhr,
*Professor emeritus, Union
Theological Seminary*
Isidor I. Rabi,
*Professor emeritus,
Columbia University, and
Nobel laureate in physics*
George N. Shuster,
*Assistant to the President,
University of Notre Dame*
Carl F. Stover,
*President, National
Institute of Public Affairs*

THE FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC, INC.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS:

Paul G. Hoffman and
Elmo Roper,
Honorary Chairmen
William O. Douglas,
Chairman
J. R. Parten,
Vice-Chairman
Ralph E. Ablon
Harry S. Ashmore
William C. Baggs
Chester F. Carlson
Patrick F. Crowley
Joseph W. Drown
Arnold M. Grant
Crane Haussamen
Robert M. Hutchins
Edwin Janss, Jr.
Percy L. Julian
Francis J. Lally
Edward Lamb
Eulah C. Laucks
Morris L. Levinson
Stanley Marcus
J. Howard Marshall
Seniel Ostrow
Louis Schweitzer
Lyle M. Spencer
Eleanor B. Stevenson
Bernard Weissbourd
Harold Willens

*A consultant to the Center
since 1954, Mr. Millis
directed the studies on War
and a Democratic Society.
He died in New York
March 16, 1968.

100-391697-734

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

THE FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC, INC.

Box 4068, Santa Barbara, California 93103

NEW YORK OFFICE: 136 East 57th Street, New York, New York 10022


LOS ANGELES OFFICE: 205 South Beverly Drive, Beverly Hills, California 90212

A Center Occasional Paper

Published by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions

June 1971

**Elisabeth
Mann
Borgese**



**CAN/WILL
INDIA
SURVIVE?**

**Geographer
Norton Ginsburg
on the
Southeast Asia
Offshore
Oil Boom**

**Center

report**

**Rexford Tugwell
Looks at
Richard Nixon**

**THE VIEW FROM
POPOCATÉPETL:**

**An International
Dialogue in
Cuernavaca
with
Arnold Kuenzli
Friedrich Heer
Georges Casalis
Ivan Illich
Leopold Ungar
Wilfried Daim
and others**



Look Who Was Looking

Not long ago I had occasion to pay public tribute to Stanley Kramer, the motion picture producer-director with whom the Center joined forces more than ten years ago for the launching of *On The Beach*, the film which then spoke of the unspeakable. I recalled, in the course of my tribute, the roll call of Kramer's films, most of which provide a kind of history of public controversy in America: *Home of the Brave*, *The Defiant Ones*, *Inherit the Wind*, *Judgment at Nuremberg*, *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner*, and, of course, *On the Beach*. Of this record I went on to say:

"... across almost two decades Stanley Kramer has produced benchmark movies which confronted the mass of Americans with highly sensitive and extremely significant social and political issues — bringing them forth at critical moments when they could most effectively influence the prevailing American attitudes that are translated into dominant popular opinion.

"This is not a possible mission for the *avant garde*, which deals in what amounts to closet drama, and measures its success by the plaudits of those who accept alienation as a life style. This may be a source of high art, but I doubt that it will prove to have much relevance to the issues that have concerned Stanley Kramer, or to the actual conditions that still beset the deprived in our society.

"Now permissiveness has eliminated virtually all the restraints of official and *de facto* censorship with which all of us in mass communication once had to contend. Thus a new generation of movie-makers can employ techniques denied their predecessors — luring audiences with the titillation of raw language, nudity and simulated sex, and defending the effort as a means of shocking the public into new social awareness. But, noting the prurient teasers patched into many of these examples of the new wave, we also are reminded that the new freedom has provided no new immunity to the corruption of artistic integrity.

"It has been a long time since one of the leading citizens of Hollywood — I believe he was called Sam Apochrypha — pronounced the dictum that messages are for Western Union. Happily, Stanley Kramer didn't believe a word of it. He chose the ground on which he would do battle, and never asked for quarter. Motion pictures to him are popular art; his address is to the whole of the potential audience, to Middle America no less than off-Broadway. He has accepted the very real burdens this stance imposes and, it seems to me his rare combination of courage, perception, and artistic skill has enabled him to surmount them more often than not. . . ."

Stanley Kramer's latest film, *Bless the Beasts & Children*, and his latest generosity to the Center, are described on pages 20 and 21.

Contents

International Dialogue Committee Conference Arnold Kuenzli	3
World Press Institute	8
A New Kind of Multi-National Institution Adam Schaff	10
A Duologue on India William Rock, Barry Richman	11
Chicago Convocation	15
The Center Eclectics: Elisabeth Mann Borgese	16
World Preview of New Stanley Kramer Film Under Center Aegis	20
A New Dealer Looks at Nixon Rexford Guy Tugwell	22
The Coming Science: Kaleidoscopic, Kinetic, Evolutionary Alexander King	23
Women and Constitutional Rights Eulah Laucks	25
New Faces	26
Southeast Asia Offshore Oil Boom Norton Ginsburg	28
Short Takes Barry Richman, C. P. Waddington, John Wilkinson	30
The Sound of the Center: Mao Tse-Tung, Chou En-Lai, and The People's Republic of China	31
Photos: Nancy Andon, Jimmy Chen, Columbia Pictures, Eric Hayes, Peter Moeschlin, Photography Unlimited of Hinsdale, Martin Schaub, Donald Timm Editorial Assistants: Florence Givens, Myrtle Goodwin	



HARRY S. ASHMORE, President

The View From Popocatépetl

(ED. NOTE: *The formation of an International Committee for Dialogue on the Fundamental Issues Facing Mankind (I.D.C.) was completed in March, 1967, after continuing exchanges between the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions and the Vienna-based Center for Dialogue. Founded at a meeting at the Santa Barbara Center, the group is dedicated to the problems of the neo-Christian, neo-Marxist dialogue. The circulation of publications and papers since then has been complemented by private and public exchanges among the scholar-members. In 1968 a conference on the possibilities of converting the cold war between East and West Europe into a series of dialogues on fundamental issues was held at the Center in Santa Barbara. Six weeks ago, at the Center for Inter-Cultural Documentation in Cuernavaca, Mexico, Monsignor Ivan Illich acted as host to the I.D.C. conferees and several leading South American scholars at a conference, the topic of which was "Priorities for the Seventies in the Developed and Developing Nations." Senior Fellow John Wilkinson, organized and chaired the week-long conference. The following slightly abridged account of the meeting is by I.D.C.'s chairman, Arnold Kuenzli. It reflects the complexities of conducting dialogue between the overdeveloped countries and the underdeveloped.*)

What problem in the Seventies is most pressing according to Latin Americans, North Americans, and Western Europeans? This question was extensively discussed in Cuernavaca at the annual week-long conference of the International Dialogue Committee. That Mexico was chosen as the place of meeting almost preordained the question of greatest moment: The problem of Latin America, one all the more pressing since the conference was held at the "Anti-Institute" led by the dissenting priest Ivan Illich — an Institute concerned largely with the problems of Latin America, providing shelter, and often asylum, for a number of fugitive Latin American intellectuals and politicians. Not the least reason for choosing Cuernavaca was a gesture of solidarity with Ivan Illich and his creative struggle against all repressive institutions in Church, School, and State. Illich returned the compliment by being a most charming and enthusiastic host, solicitous to provide the maximum amount of contact between the participants, and, a wide and rich series of impressions and information for all. Cuernavaca's setting

in the lofty *Meseta Central*, its eternal spring, the splendor of its gardens, its subtropical vegetation and the backdrop of the snowcovered Popocatépetl provided the European with the impression that he had entered into another world.

Illich began discussion of the "Priorities of the Seventies" with the question whether the problem of technology does not take priority for us all. He believes that we are endangered in three ways by our mastery of technology: through the destruction of the natural environment; through the effects of technology on the whole life of our society, and through the resulting inability of the individual to satisfy his true needs, i.e., those which are not of a purely technical nature. These problems are not confined to the industrial societies but are felt increasingly in the "Third World" as well.

Misuse of Boons:

The theologian from Basel, Max Geiger, introduced the concept of Marcuse that research and technology as such do not present a danger, but on

the contrary represent *the* great vehicle of liberation. The danger consists in the misuse of these boons. According to the American political scientist Harvey Wheeler, this misuse has taken on such proportion today that the consequent environmental crisis demands revolutionary countermeasures, and this means a new form of revolution.

For the American scientist and philosopher John Wilkinson, who regards technology and its effects on the human environment as a problem of survival, what we have to contend with in dealing with the inability of Marcuse and almost everyone else is a problem of language. We must learn a new language in order to be able to take technology in hand. For Wilkinson, this must be a mathematical language, to be exact, the language of a general systems-theory which should enable us not only to plan our world rationally but also to reaffirm appropriately all our concepts of justice, authority, etc. so that they might be able to encompass the enforced novelty and reality of technology. This view was widely contested, especially by Guenther Nenning, editor of the Viennese review *Neues Forum*, for whom the proposed "linguistic" solution to the problem of technology could only mean a new and inadmissible ideology. Not language, he affirmed, but society, must first change the "infrastructure" and then language would change appropriately. Wilkinson held that only the kind of language he had in mind represented the true "concrete universal," in which infrastructure and superstructures are one, and that while Nenning was misassessing the world situation, technology was changing it without his noticing really revolutionary changes.

In a brilliant paper, "Dialogue and Underground," the Viennese historian Friedrich Heer attempted to show that the problem of language illuminates the real infracture-superstructure relation, and comes to decisive clarity in political dispute. The protestant theologian from Paris, Georges Casalis, took issue with Heer; language is only the expression of political, economic, and social structures which it is sufficient to analyse. Also for Max Geiger,

continued on page 6

Members, International Dialogue Committee

DR. ARNOLD KUENZLI,* chairman. A leading European political philosopher, he is president and one of the founders of the Philosophical Society of Basel and professor of political philosophy at the University there. He has written extensively on Karl Marx and Sören Kierkegaard.

DR. GUENTHER NENNING,* European secretary, is director of the Center for Dialogue in Vienna and editor of two monthlies, *Neues Forum* and *Dialog*.

DR. JOHN WILKINSON,* American secretary. Center senior fellow Wilkinson organized and chaired the recent I.D.C. conference at Cuernavaca. He is known for introducing the works of Jacques Ellul to America.

DR. HEINZ KLOPPENBURG, West German theologian, is editor of the monthly *Junge Kirche*. In 1937 he was dismissed as pastor at Wilhelmshaven because of his rejection of Nazi doctrines. From 1934-1945 he served as chairman of the Confessing Church in Oldenburg, against Gestapo regulations, and from 1947-1950 as secretary of the refugee department of the World Council of Churches. He is one of the founders of the Conference of European Churches, chairman of the German branch of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, and president of the Board for the protection of the rights of conscientious objectors in West Germany.

PROF. FRIEDRICH HEER* is professor of history, at the University of Vienna. He has written a number of historical works, including *The Medieval World*; *The Holy Roman Empire*; *God's First Love*; *The Fires of Faith*, and *The Intellectual History of Europe*.

PROF. GEORGES CASALIS,* Protestant theologian, is professor of practical theology, University of Paris, and assessor to the president of the Protestant Federation of France. Casalis also serves as vice-chairman of the Christian Peace Conference and as chief editor, *Christianisme Social*. He is author of *Paix sur la Terre*, *L'Evangile en Algerie*; *Karl Barth*, a *Portrait*; *Luther*

et L'Eglise Confessante; *Der Moderne Mensch und die Frohe Botschaft*; *Predication*, *Acte Politique*.

PROF. ROGER GARAUDY, has received doctorates from the Sorbonne and the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. He served as a member of the French Parliament and a senator from 1944-1958, and as vice-president of the National Assembly. Presently Garaudy is professor of aesthetics and future's research, University of Poitiers. Awarded the Croix de Guerre in 1939, he was eventually arrested and deported for having organized resistance groups during the period 1940-1943. Garaudy is author of twenty-five books, several of which have been translated into fourteen languages: *From Anathema to Dialogue*; *Realism without Frontiers*; *Marxism of the Twentieth Century*; *The Great Turning Point of Socialism*.

FATHER GIULIO GIRARDI, professor of theology at the Salesian University in Rome, is currently teaching at the Sorbonne. He is author of a four volume encyclopedia on Atheism.

THE REV. PAUL OESTREICHER was ordained in the Church of England in 1959, earlier was a Humboldt Research Fellow at the University of Bonn engaged in a special study on Christianity and Marxism. He is presently Vicar of the Church of the Ascension, London; honorary secretary of the East-West Relations Advisory Committee of the British Council of Churches, and an executive member of Amnesty International. He has written extensively on the relationship between politics and Christian theology; was joint editor of the book *What Kind of Revolution? A Christian-Marxist Dialogue*.

MONSIGNOR LEOPOLD UNGAR* is the director of the Austrian *Caritas* and political advisor to Cardinal Koenig of Vienna.

DR. NURI EREN, Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations, received degrees in economics from the Uni-

versity of Istanbul, the London School of Economics and the University of Luxembourg. He was founder and president of the Economic Research Foundation and the Social and Economic Studies Conference Board. He has served as counselor to NATO, a delegate to the Council of Europe, and Turkish director of NATO's Project for Economic Coöperation between Greece and Turkey. He has published articles in *Foreign Affairs Quarterly* and *Harper's Magazine*, and is author of *Turkey Today — And Tomorrow: An Experiment in Westernization*.

DR. NATHAN ROTENSTREICH, immediate past rector of the Hebrew University at Jerusalem, is presently professor of philosophy there, and an Associate Fellow of the Center.

PROF. J. M. LOCHMANN, formerly professor, Comenius Faculty, Prague, is successor to the Karl Barth Chair of Theology, University of Basel.

DR. WILFRIED DAIM,* psychoanalyst, Vienna, was initiator of the referendum for the abolition of the Austrian Army which is thought to have brought the Socialists into power in 1970. Daim is author of numerous books on revolutionary Catholicism.

PROF. ERNST FISCHER, former rector, University of Vienna is a political scientist and essayist. He was expelled from the Central Committee of the Austrian Communist Party in late 1969 for his protests against the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia.

MONSIGNOR IVAN ILLICH,* founder of the Center for Inter-Cultural Documentation in Cuernavaca, Mexico, was ordained in Rome. He was vice-chancellor of the Catholic University at San Juan, Puerto Rico. He has written *Celebration of Awareness: A Call for Institutional Revolution and De-Schooling Society*.

(In addition to the above, Center chairman Robert Hutchins and Fellows Harry Ashmore, Elisabeth Mann Borgese, and Harvey Wheeler are members of the I.D.C.)

*Indicates participation in the I.D.C. Cuernavaca Conference.



ARNOLD KUENZLI



HEINZ KLOPPENBURG



GUENTHER NENNING



GEORGES CASALIS



WILFRIED DAIM



IVAN ILICH



NURI EREN



PAUL OESTREICHER



ROGER GARAUDY



FRIEDRICH HEER

the essential question is one of a qualitatively new society which he discussed in terms of Herbert Marcuse's "Essay on Freedom." In the end, Marcuse's alternative is an aesthetic order; he sees in the might of beauty the true quality of freedom. Marcuse neglects to say, however, in which way authority, law, public service, etc. is to be conducted in his aesthetic order. Above all it is necessary to ask whether Marcuse, with his apocalyptic vision of a qualitatively new society, does not transgress the limitations of time and mortality that "legislate" man. According to Geiger's view, man is bound to build any new society within the confines of the human space of authority, law, guilt and death.

Aesthetics:

With this, the discussion turned to the social relevance of the beautiful. David Barkin, a young radical American political scientist currently teaching at the University of Mexico, referred to the extensive discussion presently taking place in Cuba which comes down to the question whether it would be sufficient that there be a material incentive for the proper organization of society, or whether a qualitatively new society could be created through non-material incentives, such as an appeal to solidarity. Were this latter to suffice, and were it possible to free oneself from the consumer economy with its principle of buying and selling, then and only then would one approach the aesthetic order in the Marcusean sense. The Chilean professor of literature, José Maria Búlne, an associate of Chile's president Salvador Allende, believes likewise in the power of the beautiful which he identifies with the "light of truth."

If, in this way, the aesthetic principle was saved by declared revolutionaries, likewise a violent reaction was provoked by Max Geiger's thesis that human society is thinkable only in the framework of authority, law, guilt and death. For example, Guenther Nennig maintained that insistence upon authority and law has always had an ideological character. The leftist Roman Catholic psychoanalyst Wilfried Daim seconded this idea; the thesis

that authority is always necessary has always been the self-justification of the conservative. Georges Casalis thought it an error to consider authority and law on the same level as guilt and death; and asked if it would not be better to limit the discussion within purely human bounds. To this, Max Geiger answered that he had learned in theology that individual problems of existence can never be isolated from societies, and that it is not possible to differentiate authority and law on the one hand in any fundamental way from guilt and death on the other. Harvey Wheeler gave support to Geiger: Authority and law, he believed, belong to the structure of human society, but we must develop today new forms of authority and law.

Revolution:

While none of this led to any consensus, it did, by means of the discussion that resulted, focus dialogue on the fundamental problem of a qualitatively new society; i.e., the question to what degree a utopian or eschatological revolution in Marcuse's sense which strictly refuses to recognize human limitations in effect either replaces power in the hands of reactionaries, since it only appears as an approximation to reality; or actually degenerates into reaction, in that it remains destructive and ineffectual. Thus the problem of revolution was projected. Wilfried Daim took up the subject and championed the thesis that the worlds of Western capitalism and Eastern "secondary capitalism" could be revolutionized if they were to de-tour through the Third World. As a Christian socialist, he gave expression to the hope that the breakthrough in Latin America might succeed with the aid of a Christian tradition. In turn, the Third World might react on the first and second worlds if it succeeded in avoiding the repetition of errors which have been made in the course of the development of both the other worlds, and could realize models with which the others had been unsuccessful. Above all, the Christians in the Third World, according to Daim, have the opportunity to establish precisely what has failed to emerge in the first — a *revolutionary* transformation of

society. In Latin America, the Christians might take a leading role in this development. The Encyclical "Populorum Progressio" is a sign that the church is moving from capitalism to socialism. In fact, conservatives estimate that the Encyclical is intended as a manifesto to the Third World; but at the same time, were the policies of the Vatican to conform to the Encyclical, "Populorum Progressio" could conceivably have long term reciprocal effects upon the first world.

Neocolonialism:

For the Viennese prelate Leopold Ungar the Vatican has no "strategy" as such, but rather follows a "tendency" to work out a *modus vivendi* with all powers. In general "Populorum Progressio" has had hardly any effect in the Third World, however it may have helped socialists in Austria. Georges Casalis suggested that the Papal trip to Bogotá was an "Anti-Populorum-Progressio" encyclical. Were Daim to compare the situation of the Third World today with that of Russia in the year 1917, it could be said that the great powers would do well to realize that the Third World is the "weakest link in their chain," and they ought to observe the Third World with the corresponding and necessary degree of attentiveness.

By means of neocolonialism, the great powers are being transformed; for example, there is the political independence of the African nations in economic dependence. A revolution in the French-dependent areas of Africa would lead to a direct intervention on the part of France. He also does not believe that the United States could long bear with Allende's regime in Chile. On the basis of technological control alone, the comparison with 1917 is invalid. He feared that the hope of a revolution in the Third World could provide an excuse by which we could justify our doing nothing. As long as there is no effective socialism in France, Casalis does not expect any revolution in Africa. In general, Christians, as proven by all experience, are "unhurried" as revolutionary leaders. Certainly they should engage in the struggle, but essentially with the purpose of being able

to take over the responsibility *after* the revolution.

Max Geiger quoted from the black poet James Baldwin, who at a session of the World Council of Churches, had violently attacked the Christian church. Someone asked him what can be done for the blacks, and he answered that the question was falsely put; "You don't need to help us: we need to help you — to become human beings." We whites have to learn what enormous efforts are demanded of us. David Barkin asked the question: When progressive Christians have failed to achieve anything at home, how do they expect to be able to bring about a revolution in the Third World? The Chilean, José Maria Búlnes further mused: Why should it be so difficult for the Third World to make a revolution today? The only countries which for a long time have been able to stick with a revolution to the end have been countries in the Third World; China and Cuba, for instance. And, furthermore, what relevance has the first to the third world? Before the French revolution the nobility also inquired as to how they might "help out" the Third Estate, but the French Revolution was in fact carried out by precisely this Third Estate. The term "Third World" has perhaps been coined in analogy to the concept of the "Third Estate." The "Third World" means simply the world of the revolution, and to this world too, one extends a helping hand. Of such "help" Búlnes himself wished to hear nothing. Casalis also warned against a revolutionary fetishism; in every revolution there are also counterrevolutionary elements — and vice versa. No revolution is charmed against this. A true revolution can only be a permanent one.

Marxist-Christian Dialogue:

Casalis, in a later discussion, gave top priority to the problem of theology in the seventies. Today, each of us faces the challenge of returning to his sources in order to recover his identity. He quoted Hromadka: In a society composed of half-Marxists and half-Christians, one is drawn into immobility. There is hope only where there are true Marxists and Christians. But the dialogue between Christians and

Marxists must open itself up to other dialogue partners. Theology must learn to conceive of itself as anthropology and as political event. To theology falls the responsibility of effecting a radical criticism of historical christianity, above all, the effects upon the church of possessions, inside knowledge and power. Until now, theology has been too concerned with the individual and Eternity; it must in the future recognize the human realities of community and history. There should be no more of the ivory tower; only a theology committed to the struggle for the liberation of all mankind who sacrificed to systemic repressions. In this struggle a Christian should never forget that he struggles not only against but also for his opponent.

Harvey Wheeler sought to develop a theory of revolution as the formation of two antithetical cities: Within the established order, the existing city, grows up a second, "underground" city. When the traditional means for handling the conflict between these two cities is no longer viable, there results a revolutionary crisis. Such a situation exists in the Third World, but Wheeler does not believe that the revolution can be carried out by the guerillas alone, since they must first align themselves with a new form of nationalism. The presupposition of this is an alliance of the second city with the leaders of the first, in simple terms of the guerillas with the army leaders. In the first world the problem of the revolution is to be seen above all in combination with the environmental crisis. Here is seen the necessity of a rapprochement of the political radical with the radical scientist.*

José Maria Búlnes shook his head: All of this for him seemed too idealistic. A revolution is not begun nor is one in it or not in it. The leaders of the establishment however cannot be "in," nor can they work together with revolutionaries. In general, freedom is no rational choice, but rather the beginning of some *novum*, of which one heretofore knows nothing of where it leads. Wheeler disagreed; for him this was nothing but prerevolutionary romanticism, and in this way one runs the danger of playing into the hands of the opposition.

Latent Volcano:

The European participants voiced the disappointment that more Latin American radicals had not appeared to take part in dialogue. There were several more present at the table in Cuernavaca, but they gave every sign of holding aloof. The Mexican economist Edmundo Flores did, however, present an economic plan for Mexican development basically devoted to the theme that development of a population soon to reach one hundred million must be dissociated from the "eccentric" economic policies of the United States. Mexico, he maintained, had to develop new policies for problems that were made at best *clichés* if they maintained the rhetoric of the Mexican Revolution. This *had* been successful in a way that, for example, Castro had not been. Friedrich Heer said jokingly that there was missing from the group one most special guest — Popocatepetl (the snow-capped volcano, a landmark of Mexico). Wilkinson said to Búlnes that "Popocatepetl had been invited, but had not accepted." With volcanoes, even extinct ones, it is apparently difficult to carry on a dialogue; and the question of priorities is with difficulty put to them. But they seem sufficient unto themselves and await only the right moment to erupt. And anyway, how does a volcano concern itself with a handful of supersophisticated European intellectuals who bring with them the heavy ballast of tradition and who have quite enough problems of their own at home to keep them busy?

Despite such aloofness, Latin America can hardly expect to build a Chinese wall around itself. It is on the way to finding its self-identity, and that is the most effective security against the rest of the world. But it is precisely this identity which demands dialogue, for it is difficult to see how identity is to be established except through a steady setting forth of itself with others. Sooner or later the dialogue with Latin America will come and it belongs to the indisputable priorities of the Seventies to prepare ourselves for it. The task will not be easy. ■

*ED. NOTE: Wheeler develops this thesis in his new book, *The Politics of Revolution* (Glendessary Press.)

Journalists From Thirteen Countries Join Center Deliberations

They were from Asia, Africa, Latin and Central America, and Europe — thirteen young working journalists selected by the World Press Institute to spend almost a year in the United States. Object: to investigate what they chose to investigate, file stories to their home countries, live and work with Americans.

They had already lived and studied in St. Paul, Minnesota (Macalester College there serves as headquarters for the sponsoring Institute); toured the South for five weeks; seen the Apollo 14 moon shot; and then scattered across the country to serve on the staffs of major newsgathering and broadcasting organizations.

At the Center they talked with the Fellows about the American political process and U.S. foreign policy under the present Constitution and the changes which could result from constitutional reform along the lines detailed in the Center's draft for a new constitution (the Tugwell model.) The press, radio, and television came under discussion in subsequent sessions. All of the journalists, after having worked alongside their American counterparts, had their own ideas for improvement of the mass media. The group was accompanied by James Toscano, director of the Institute.

The journalists looked ahead to three weeks of independent travel, with each completing research and writing on a project known as "Assignment U.S.A." Their findings on some specific aspect of contemporary America will later be shared with World Press Institute colleagues during an in-depth conference. Following this, each journalist will experience a period of "personal internship" spent in the offices of selected non-media organizations of particular interest to each.

MARCEL COHEN:

"We once thought television would cause people to become more involved. We now know that the overexposure provided by TV causes desensitization and less involvement." Cohen, of France, is assistant political editor of *Paris-Jour*. He is also a poet and novelist. U.S. work stint: *Boston Globe*.



GARRY LLOYD:

"Media is suffering from overkill." Lloyd, of the United Kingdom, is one of the six original members of the innovative London *Times* news team and has covered a number of foreign assignments. U.S. work stint: *Washington Post*.



FERNANDO AINSA:

"Democracy only functions for a small minority. We must find a substitute . . ." Ainsa, of Uruguay, is a political reporter for *El Diario*, Montevideo's largest morning daily. He holds a law degree and is an award-winning novelist. U.S. work stint: *Time* magazine.



MICHAEL KABUGUA, of Kenya, is chief parliamentary correspondent for the *Daily Nation* in Nairobi. Kabugua received a scholarship from *The Times* of India to study journalism in Bombay. U.S. work stint: *Minnesota Tribune*.



DUSAN KRAJCINOVIC:

"The trend in America toward one-newspaper cities is bad. There should be more competition." Krajcinovic, of Yugoslavia, is a reporter on Belgrade's daily *Politika*. His assignments have taken him to a dozen countries. U.S. work stint: *Los Angeles Times*.

ISAAC ANDOH:

"I am puzzled by the fact that the African nation regarded as having an ideal government by most Western nations has a one-party system." Andoh, of Ghana, is one of the editors of the Ghana News Agency in Accra. He was educated at St. Gregory's College in Lagos, Nigeria. U.S. work stint: United Press International.



RAZIA ISMAIL:

"Most of the old 'freedom fighter' newspapers have disappeared in India. The press was against Indira Gandhi. Her victory was due to her having stumped the country." Ismail is India's leading woman journalist, specializing in investigative reporting for New Delhi's *Indian Express*. U.S. Work stint: *Christian Science Monitor*.



MARIO ARATANHA, of Brazil, covers a variety of assignments on Brazil's *Jornal do Brasil*, a leading daily. He began his career as an Associated Press reporter in his country and Argentina. He is also a professional news photographer. U.S. work stint: Associated Press



MARIO SANDOVAL

is a general assignment reporter for *Prensa Libre*, Guatemala's leading daily. Trained in Guatemala, Sandoval also serves as a lecturer in journalism. U.S. work stint: *Worcester Telegram*.



KLAUS LIEDTKE, of Germany, specializes in youth and political affairs on the national weekly, *Stern*, published in Hamburg. Liedtke began his professional life as a businessman but switched to journalism in 1965. U.S. work stint: *Newsweek*.



KASEM ADCHASAI, of Thailand, is a political and economics reporter for *Siam Rath*, one of his country's most influential dailies. He took his degree in journalism at Thammasat University in Bangkok. U.S. work stint: United Press International.



ISAO MURAYA, of Japan serves on the makeup and assignment desk of the *Mainichi Shimbun*, one of Japan's largest dailies with a circulation of seven million. U.S. work stint: *Chicago Daily News*



JOHN PEMBERTON: "The current American malaise is due to the breaking down of old myths and the refusal to face today's reality." Pemberton, of Australia, is chief newsproducer for Australia's General Television Corporation. Its nightly news program has been first in audience ratings throughout his country for several years. U.S. work stint: NBC-TV News.

A New Kind of Multi-National Institution

"Man trembles on the brink of self-annihilation. Trembling, he stops to think. Thinking, he knows he must plan for the future. Planning, he develops more flexible institutions — in which every one finds more open paths of participation."

— Frank K. Kelly, Center vice president
[at a recent Center conference]

An indeed "flexible," if not a totally new kind of institution, the Vienna-based European Coordination Centre for Research and Documentation in the Social Sciences has broken the ideological barrier and put multi-disciplinary teams from thirty-three countries together on far-ranging studies of human behavior in the technological society.

The Centre's president, Dr. Adam Schaff, Polish philosopher and professor, and a Center Associate, recently came to the Center to tell the Fellows about it. He believes his Centre may provide a model for those seeking to exponentially speed up research leading to breakthroughs on problems common to mankind.

Launched by seed money and encouragement provided by UNESCO in 1962, the Centre is now autonomous, but maintains close touch with UNESCO's Department of Social Sciences. Its board of directors is elected by the International Social Science Council with an eye to maintaining a balance between countries with different political, economic and social systems and ensuring the full representation of the main fields of study. It currently includes professors from the University of Constance, Federal Republic of Germany; the Danish National Institute of Social Research, Copenhagen; the University of Ljubljana, Yugoslavia; the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prague; the Social Science Research Council, London; the Institute of Sociology, University of Vienna; the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow; the University of Florence, the University of Paris, and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Among the Centre's current multi-disciplinary, multi-national projects are these:



Juvenile Delinquency and Economic Development:

(Participating teams were provided by the Centre for Training and Research into Supervised Education, Vaucresson, France; the Institute of Juridical and Political Sciences, Academy of Sciences, Budapest; the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Academy of Sciences, Warsaw; and the Institute for Research in Criminology, Belgrade.)

The project is divided into three parts:

(1) *The statistical study.*

The collection of data in the participant countries has been completed. A synthesis of these reports is being prepared. It will allow analysis of various types and the extent of juvenile delinquency in different regions with different levels of development.

(2) *The case study.*

The impact of economic development on the primary groups in which juvenile delinquents participate is being analyzed with special focus on social

mobility and its consequences for the relationship of the delinquent with his parents and school.

(3) *The monographic study.*

This part of the project will be started after the completion of the other two.

The World in the Year 2000:

(Participating teams were provided by the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo; Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Academy of Sciences, Prague; Research Institute of Finland's University of Tampere; Institute of Polemology, Groningen, in the Netherlands; New Zealand's Victoria University at Wellington; India's Ghandian Institute for Studies at Varanasi; Sophia University at Tokyo; Poland's Academy of Sciences and University of Warsaw; the Spanish Institute of Public Opinion; Sweden's Institute of Sociology at the University of Lund; Britain's University of Essex, and the University of Ljubljana, Yugoslavia.)

The project aimed at finding out whether people of different countries and different social positions hold fundamentally different concepts of the future. On the assumption that the future state of the world will depend largely on what people want it to be, social scientists conducted thousands of in-depth interviews to discern the aspirations and predictions of people between the ages of fifteen and forty. They asked questions on international, domestic and individual evolution, and on war, peace and disarmament.

Automation and Industrial Workers:

Last year the Centre undertook its most ambitious project, proposed by a team of Soviet scientists. Participants from many nations include representatives from industry and labor. The comparative research is intended to furnish, in the form of a synthesis, an answer to the question on the progress, effects and prospects of automation in highly-developed societies. The first meeting of experts to exchange preliminary findings will take place in Moscow. A second will be held in Japan. The final assessment conference will be in the United States. ■

WILL/CAN INDIA SURVIVE?

(ED. NOTE: *The following conversation was taped at the Center shortly after India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi won a surprisingly decisive victory in the fifth general election in March. The "India watchers" were Visiting Fellow Barry M. Richman, professor of management at UCLA who has conducted firsthand studies of economic development in India, Mainland China, and the Soviet Union, and Center research assistant William Pennell Rock, Jr., a philosopher, who recently returned from two years in India where he worked as senior research fellow at the Centre For Advanced Study in Philosophy. Report's editor served as interlocutor.*)

Q: Why is India making little if no headway in solving her problems as a developing country?

RICHMAN: There's an almost endless list of barriers: the varying attitudes and beliefs and value systems within the country, ranging from the caste system and the lack of national unity, the lack of motivation, and an achievement orientation. In India's highly autocratic and hierarchical culture there's not much leeway for individual upward mobility on the basis of merit. Too, there are many serious educational, political, legal and economic constraints.

ROCK: What astonished me about India was its complex social structure. In Bhubaneswar there is a festival every year where an enormous juggernaut, literally a moving temple, is pushed down the street. I have always thought of this as the most accurate image of India. Like the juggernaut with its gravity-defying structure, India is a collection of superimposed social systems.

Q: Many people regard India's caste system as though it were comparable to the class system in England . . .

ROCK: This is not so at all. True, there is the caste system, but there is also the hierarchy from the Muslim period, that from the British Raj, and that which belongs to modern capitalist

India, separating the rich and poor. In India all that is past is still present, with the effect that it is incredibly cumbersome. I should have started out by saying I have to qualify anything I say about India. Indira Gandhi once told me in Benares that her father had said, "No statement about India can be wholly true."

RICHMAN: Then there is India's regionalism and all its languages and dialects. The stratified social structures, with their differential values, codes, and mores, are of such complexity that the life of any individual is finally determined by only one institution; the family. It is the large family rather than class, caste, or any other social form that selects its life and religion from this complex series of possibilities. The family determines, through its own history, what one is to value, how one is to cultivate oneself, whether one is a vegetarian, etc. It is for this reason that the social structure simply doesn't lend itself to any but the most superficial kind of analysis; the sort that satisfies the social scientist and no one else.

Q: It's obviously the most heterogeneous country in the world, even by United States standards.

RICHMAN: Much more heterogeneous. There are *some* common values and beliefs that bind a clear majority in the United States. In India, it's very

hard to talk about majorities or consensus or national identity.

Q: There's not much feeling of nationalism among Indians?

RICHMAN: They don't think of themselves as Indians first. They identify with their state or caste or community.

ROCK: It has to do with the stratification I mentioned. Each of these strata gives one a different point of view on a given matter, such as national unity. India, I must say, is the only country I've lived in where I felt I understood less about it in proportion to the length of my stay.

RICHMAN: India's political leadership has tried to create issues on which there will be consensus, but invariably splits ideologically. Even the ruling party, the Congress party, has maintained only a very fragile majority until recently. This political disarray is a reflection of the social structure. They may have to get very strong leadership and forget consensus. I must say, though, that I am somewhat more optimistic about India's future since Indira Gandhi's recent victory. She has a two-thirds majority which gives her great powers. If she acts wisely she can do much for India's development.

ROCK: What makes me pessimistic about India's long range future is its form of government. Cultures generate the form of government which is best for them. It's a very dubious project for a culture to adopt a form of government which belongs to an alien civilization, one not indigenous to the country. India has tried to impose upon itself a sort of *ersatz* British rule. They discovered it simply doesn't work.

RICHMAN: I don't think communism would work in India either. There isn't enough to bind together an effective communist movement. India's communists are not as idealistic as the Chinese. They're opportunists, they sway back and forth, they don't have the vision or basic principles or dedication that the Chinese Communist leaders have had.

ROCK: In Benares, I taught a course in which most of the students were Russian, and I got to know several of them quite well. They, too, were distressed by the kind of communists they saw in India. The Russians felt this incredible frustration when they went to meetings and met those teary-eyed idealistic Marxists who had no sense of the realities of revolution.

RICHMAN: Indian politicians, including the communists, are far removed from the needs of the people. They are very good at rhetoric. They are superimposing ideas and notions about society that the masses really can't identify with. Bengal, which had a communist government, had to be put under presidential rule twice because the communists fought so much among themselves.

ROCK: I have heard many wise Indians say that the only form of government that's going to work is some form of dictatorship.

RICHMAN: I've heard that too, and I agree. With Mrs. Ghandi's recent victory she can have many of the powers of a dictator if she is effective, without giving up India's democratic tradition.

Q: Is there a possibility of a military coup?

RICHMAN: No, India's military leaders don't seem to be inclined toward coups, they seem to be inclined toward supporting politicians in power. I think a military coup may be possible, but not in the short run. I'd be surprised to see one in India.

Q: Is it possible for westerners, with their Judeo-Christian ethic to understand the Indian approach to life? We tend to expect Indians to behave with compassion. Is it possible that they don't consider obliviousness to the needs of others wrong?

ROCK: Before I went to India I was told I would come back with an entirely different view of the nature of humanity. This is very true. India is more an exercise in self-knowledge than anything. One gets a real shock treatment in relativity because an



BARRY M. RICHMAN

awful lot that we take as absolutes are really relatives.

RICHMAN: I went to India with my specialty being economic development and industrial management and came away with a negative feeling. You went with a more humanistic orientation in terms of your areas of competence, philosophy and religion and you, too, came away with a negative feeling. I find that fascinating.

ROCK: I think it has to do with the fact that ninety-nine per cent of what is unfortunately called mysticism seems to be chicanery, and a particular kind of oppression. But out of every hundred Indian mystics, you meet one who really has something that you think you couldn't find anywhere else in the whole world. What shook me was the human misery that goes far beyond pure poverty.

RICHMAN: I went in with an open mind about cultural and religious matters,

“Like the juggernaut with its gravity-defying structure, India is a collection of superimposed social systems.”

having, of course, some preconceptions of what to expect in terms of the economy. I became quickly disillusioned by the fantastic amount of prejudice among the Indians, the exploitation, the corruption, man's inhumanity to man — it goes far beyond the caste system.

Q: And yet there were so many Indians who went along with Gandhi, and non-violence . . .

ROCK: I did meet a few of what I would call spiritual aristocrats.

Q: Would these people care about what was going on in the streets of Calcutta?

ROCK: To the Indians even tragedy makes sense. This is the fundamental idea of Karma — every creature is where and what it is because of choices that have been made before. You can't simply say it's determinism, because it's also free will. Every living thing can choose at the present to alter his course, to change his Karma, thus he is completely free. Even if one is a beggar dying on the street, there is a reason. It somehow belongs to the plan of the universe. Now, on top of this, compassion is valued, and is characteristic of one who has reached a certain high level of spiritual development, and is more and more free from his past life. There is an *idea* of compassion, but in India you don't find anything comparable to the Western idea that we must all imitate Jesus.

Q: What is being done to improve the lot of the peasants?

RICHMAN: The government now seems to be trying to do more for the rural people. The bank nationalization was in part a political decision to get more monies to the farmers so they wouldn't be exploited by the money lenders. They made some efforts toward land reform. However, the big landowners can still get the economies of scale and much higher incomes than the small farmers. They're benefiting by the “green revolution” — the new seed grains, the fertilizers, more modern technology. The small farmer can't or doesn't try to use modern methods.

He is locked into a joint family system that keeps dividing his land into smaller and smaller units. The green revolution is working against the small man, actually.

ROCK: I've heard it said that Indians are the most materialistic people on earth. I have also been asked by many Indians, "Why are these young hippies coming out here when they have all those cars and television sets and everything we wish we had, how can it possibly be that they're coming over here and living like us and even begging?" This is incomprehensible to them because somehow they've been caught up in the myth that consumer products bring joy. I was surprised to find this materialism so rife because India is reputedly so spiritual.

Q: Was the Gandhi movement partly responsible for this image?

ROCK: Ever since India has been known to the West it has had a mythological character in the minds of Westerners. Gandhi has probably shaped the image of India in this century more than any other single person.

Q: Do you think Gandhian non-violence was indigenous to India?

ROCK: Yes, it was already an important feature of Indian thought twenty-five hundred years ago.

Q: Then do you think there is hope for India in that that kind of thing sprang up in India? It could come out of India again . . .

ROCK: I think Gandhi was a beautiful man, I don't want to denigrate him at all, but one feels that there was an element of unreality about this man which created a very evil situation. It's almost as though one thing had given over into its opposite. Gandhi said that all his life he had been fighting for truth and nonviolence, and everywhere around him he saw dishonesty and violence. This was shortly before he died, when the whole country erupted into an orgy of dishonesty and violence.

RICHMAN: Gandhi's mission wasn't to



WILLIAM ROCK, JR.

administer, it was to gain independence. The Congress party was supposed, in effect, to terminate once India gained independence. They were only unified on the issue of getting rid of the British. They were Socialists, Communists, Spiritualists, religious men, with widely different ideologies in terms of how to run a country once you get it free. Gandhi was apparently willing to step down after independence so as to allow formation of new kinds of viable parties. Instead the Congress Party has remained in power for nearly twenty-five years. Much of the corruption in India is due to the fact that the same party has been in power so long. Gandhi had the good sense to see this when he declared that the mission of the party was to get independence and that it should be dismantled forthwith.

Q: What would Gandhi have done if he had lived?

RICHMAN: He had strong ideas about

"Ninety-nine per cent of what is unfortunately called mysticism seems to be chicanery."

the Gandhigrams (self-sufficient rural communities) and state-owned industry, but there's no indication that he would have definitely imposed his ideas on the country administratively. He would have possibly tried to sell them.

Q: Would they have worked?

RICHMAN: No, I don't think so because of the level of population in relation to India's natural resources. You need large scale industry and exports and so on to generate enough even for a subsistence level in a country with five hundred and fifty million people.

Q: Was the Gandhi-type agrarian reform comparable to what Mao has been doing?

RICHMAN: No. Mao is doing things with the communes, but he also wants to build a great industrial economy which Gandhi never wanted to do. He wanted to keep industry to a minimum. Also Gandhi really didn't have the notion of communes like Mao. He wanted communities in which each would own his own land, the Gandhigrams. A nice idea, philosophically, but it couldn't work in contemporary India.

Q: The stories I've heard about the distribution of aid sent by the United States are almost incredible . . .

ROCK: Everything in India is exaggerated beyond our comprehension. Corruption is much greater, the quality of violence is much greater . . .

RICHMAN: In a relative sense vis-à-vis the United States India is highly corrupted, but it's much less corrupt than many other countries. I would say the Philippines is definitely much more corrupt than India. Very little functions there without corruption. In India you do have the courts, a sense of justice. Its court system functions as a relatively impartial arbiter. There may be ways to buy off the court. I was impressed to find that there wasn't more corruption, given the economic needs of the country, the leeway for bribing, and so on.

ROCK: I once complained about the corruption to some of my colleagues at the University in Benares. One wise gentleman grew terribly impatient with my *naiveté*, and he said "Look, in this country, it is tacitly understood by everyone that a person who gets into a position of power receives the rewards of power." This means money which he gets, by our standards illegally. Corruption is almost accepted by the electorate. It is a kind of prerogative.

RICHMAN: But I've seen substantially more decisions made where there could have been corruption without corruption coming into the picture than decisions made with corruption coming into the picture.

ROCK: You might have been somewhat deceived. I was deceived for a long time until it was pointed out to me that people treated me in a special way because I was a Westerner. For example, no one ever tried to charge me any illegal duty when I went from one state to another. I was astonished to find that whenever my Indian friends went from one state to another and got off the train, the tax officer extracted illegal duties from them routinely. I did have a rather bad experience when I sent a servant of mine with a number of my possessions from Nepal back into India. He was put in prison because they wouldn't believe that he hadn't stolen the things, and he didn't have any money to pay an enormous bribe to get through. This servant was so honest it was almost heartbreaking. There were many times when he could so easily have cheated me or taken a bribe, and he never did. The integrity that comes in personal relationships counteracts a great deal of what we might call native dishonesty.

But on the other hand, I was amazed by the political corruption in the university in Benares. I never really got involved in it, but once in a while I used to hear about incredible things that were going on, people being framed and thrown out, people having all sorts of weird pressures put on them. I once mentioned to an Indian friend that this was absolutely astonishing to me, especially in a community of people who were supposed to

be above average in intelligence, and he said, "Look, you've never been in a situation where you'd starve if you lost your job, and practically everyone involved in this situation is in that predicament."

RICHMAN: Couldn't get another comparable job?

ROCK: The entire economic situation was so tight that they did face this; they're dealing with alternatives that I can't even comprehend.

RICHMAN: But, of course, in many cases the corruption has nothing to do with whether you starve or not, it's just greed. The corrupt businessmen are largely in the upper income brackets to begin with, economically. There are quite a few cases where it's a matter of starvation. But more often

"The sense of personal responsibility does not exist in India."

than not, it's beyond that. It's just materialism or greediness to get even more.

Q: About India's long range future: One of you talked yesterday about breaking it up into independent republics.

RICHMAN: I'm afraid it would mean a federation of certain progressive states including Maharashtra, the Punjab, Mysore. As a country they would probably do quite well economically. As it is now the poorer states pull all of them down. The more affluent states don't have the effect of raising the whole country. Behar and the UP, for example, are dragging the more economically efficient states down. There may be enough chauvinism in Bengal to have it independent even if it means starvation — that's how chauvinistic they are.

Q: Maybe they can attract enough Beatle types to come out there and buttress up the economy. You're talking about lumping together the wealthy states as an entity.

RICHMAN: They are also the states which have a different mentality and have achieved some social change.

Q: You're not talking about decentralization . . .

RICHMAN: No, they already have too much decentralization of power. That's why you have to have presidential rule every once in a while in states like Bengal. When you have highly ineffective decentralization of power, for example, you have cases where, rather than shifting excess food from Andra Pradesh to a poverty-stricken state, they'd rather let it rot. There are many cases of one state with a bumper crop refusing to let it go to another state in critically short supply.

ROCK: You just can't believe these stories . . .

RICHMAN: Yes, but they are documented. This over-decentralization has been negative, it has been ineffective. What India needs is more forceful and effective centralization.

ROCK: But one of the biggest evils in India was invented in the West and duly imported to India. Bureaucracy.

RICHMAN: They've taken the Western example of bureaucracy and brought it to the ultimate in inefficiency. Their bureaucracy functions much worse than bureaucracies in communist countries which are comprehensively planned economies. India is only a partially planned economy.

ROCK: Another great evil is that most Indians, I find, are incapable of taking personal responsibility (this is why I think that democracy is just hopeless for them). Any Indian that you talk to is full of his rights. The constitution is full of the rights of Indians, but there's no one talking about his responsibilities, there is no sense of responsibility because the responsibility has always been taken by the rulers. ■

NEITHER SNOW NOR SLEET

Although it was April, the Chicago weather was harsh. Braving it were more than one thousand Center members and their guests who participated actively during the six-hour Center symposium, "Prospects for a Learning Society." During the morning session they heard Harry S. Ashmore address himself to the topic, "The Political Process: Merchandising or Education?" and Arthur G. Anderson discuss "Education and Technology: How Much Can Machines Do?" Lively Q & A periods followed both presentations.

At the luncheon meeting, shown below, participants heard the Rev. Donald Harrington discuss "The Center's Impact on My View of Education." Harrington had just concluded a two months' stay at the Center as a Visiting Fellow.

The afternoon brought statements by George N. Shuster on "The Future of Liberal Education," F. Champion Ward on "What We Can Learn From Other Countries," and Robert M. Hutchins on "The Learning Society." Audience participation following these statements was spirited and informed.



GEORGE N. SHUSTER

Speakers and Moderators

ARTHUR G. ANDERSON, a Center Visiting Fellow, is vice president for research and development at IBM.

JOSEPH P. ANTONOW, an attorney, is active in Chicago civic groups and served as a member of the board of Roosevelt University.

HARRY S. ASHMORE, president of the Center, was formerly editor-in-chief of the Encyclopaedia Britannica.

JAMES H. DOUGLAS, a Chicago attorney, served as Deputy Secretary of Defense under Eisenhower. He is a member of the Center's Board.

DONALD HARRINGTON is pastor of the Community Church of New York



F. CHAMPION WARD

City, and chairman of the Liberal Party of New York State.

ROBERT M. HUTCHINS, chairman of the Center, was former chancellor of the University of Chicago.

GEORGE N. SHUSTER was president of Hunter College, New York City and is presently assistant to the president, Notre Dame University. He is a Center consultant.

F. CHAMPION WARD, a former dean at the University of Chicago, is now program advisor in education, international division, the Ford Foundation.

BERNARD WEISSBOURD, a Center director, is president of Metropolitan Structures, Inc. of Chicago.



Elisabeth Mann Borgese: "Any Life That's Fully Lived is Difficult."

Daughter of Thomas Mann, widow of G. A. Borgese, the exiled Italian philosopher, Senior Fellow Elisabeth Mann Borgese is a thoroughly international citizen. With homes in Italy and America, and coteries in Yugoslavia, Zurich, London and Paris, Mme. Borgese's gaze, beyond sovereignties, is toward synergies.

She writes fiction prolifically, as did her father. She argues powerfully for world order, as did her husband. Her draft statute for an ocean regime (The Ocean Regime, Center Occasional Paper, Vol. I, No. 5, October, 1968) conceives of the oceans as "the common heritage of mankind." Later this concept was adopted by the drafters of the official U.S. proposals for an international seabed treaty. Mme. Borgese organized the conferences preparatory to the first Pacem in Maribus Convocation at Malta last June, which she chaired.

Mme. Borgese is the mother of two daughters, both scientists, and grandmother of two pre-schoolers who live in Florence. Her most recent books are The Language Barrier: The Intelligence of Animals and The Ascent of Woman. The following interview was conducted by Frank K. Kelly, vice-president of the Center.

Q: There have been a number of theories about why children of famous parents have special problems in developing their own abilities. Do you have any general thoughts on the subject?

BORGESE: In the first place I would say that it is harder for a boy than for a girl to have a famous father, especially if he works in the same field. In our family I think it probably was hardest on my oldest brother who was a novelist. I personally did not feel at all repressed. On the contrary, I felt stimulated by the atmosphere.

Q: Your mother is quite a personage too...

BORGESE: I should say so. She grew up in a very intelligent family in Munich. Her father was a professor of mathematics. He was also one of the earlier patrons of Richard Wagner and so her girlhood home was full of first-rate people. My mother's standards were so terribly high that whenever any of us did not turn out to be a Bruno Walter in music, or a genius

in writing, he was just no good. We learned to live with this.

Q: Did you meet Richard Wagner or any of his family?

BORGESE: Yes, I knew his illegitimate grandson, Franz Beidler. He looked so much like Wagner that when we were kids we would put a beret on his head and look at him in profile. It was precisely Wagner's.

Q: You were born in Munich just after World War I and spent your first fourteen years there. Did your family suffer the unprecedented inflation in postwar Germany?

BORGESE: I didn't notice it much. The only thing I remember is that when we rode the rocking horse we would sing "the dollar rises, the dollar falls." Actually, my parents had a very tough time. But my mother was a good and thrifty housewife and she protected my father very effectively. For instance, my father was never aware of the fact that there was a sugar shortage. Once a guest came and com-

plained that there was no sugar, and father said, "Well, how come? I get all the sugar I want." It turned out that my mother was hoarding all our sugar rations, eight of them — six for the children and two for the parents — for my father who ate it all. We all went without sugar. I still don't eat any.

Q: When did you leave Germany?

BORGESE: In 1933. At first we wandered around a bit and then took a beautiful little house in southern France. In the fall we settled in Zurich and I went through the classic lycée and the conservatory of music there.

Q: And you never lived in Germany again?

BORGESE: No, my father had been fighting fascism since the late nineteen twenties in his writings and lectures. When Hitler came into power father was immediately so threatened that he couldn't even consider returning to Germany. He happened to be out of the country by chance on a lecture trip, and at first he thought his exile was a temporary thing, a question of but a few months, that the whole thing was much too crazy to go on for any length of time.

Q: In Zurich did you have teachers who made a great impact on your life?

BORGESE: No, I wouldn't say that. The lycée was a good school, but the teachers were not strong personalities. In the city, though, there were many people who had an influence on me. Zurich at that time was a very, very interesting place. It was full of exiles from Fascist Italy, from Nazi Germany, from Spain, all sorts of people.

Q: Who were some of these?

BORGESE: Old Ignazio Silone, for one. I was quite fascinated by some of the Italians at that time. Silone drew my attention to the work of G. A. Borgese. I was most impressed by his book on fascism, *Goliath*, published in 1936, I think. And then there was Hermann

Hesse, who has become so popular with today's youth. He was wonderful, he was indescribable, he was *sui generis*. He used to go skiing with me.

Q: His photographs show him as terribly stern, cold . . .

BORGESSE: No, he wasn't that at all, oh no. He was, you might say, very much wrapped up in himself. He was really apolitical. Perhaps that's why he's so popular today with the young people. He was very introspective, but he was not dull at all. He had a great sense of humor, too, and told us funny stories. But I would not say that his writing had a strong influence on me. As a writer I think I was more attracted by Kafka at the time. I read everything he wrote when I was in my late teens.

Q: Was there any other influence of that magnitude?

BORGESSE: Well, of course, Joyce. I read everything of his. And I devoured the Russians. Father too. He read Tolstoy, Dostoevski, again and again and again, until his old age.

Q: When did you first read Magic Mountain?

BORGESSE: When I was sixteen or so. I was very much taken by it . . .

Q: Did you gain a whole new feeling toward your father when you realized he could write that kind of masterpiece?

BORGESSE: No, no, no, I didn't. I was so raised in the atmosphere, you know, it didn't open any new vistas. I just admired and admired it.

Q: And when did you leave Switzerland?

BORGESSE: In 1938, just at the time of the Munich crisis. We were crossing the ocean and I remember that my parents were terribly depressed. When we arrived in Princeton my father went over to see Einstein and Einstein said that the day the Munich Pact was signed was the saddest day of his life. All this impressed me very much at



Giampaolo Sturmo

that age. Einstein felt that war was inevitable at that time. So did father. Einstein and my father and others differed from Bertrand Russell, who was against war under any circumstances.

Q: You must have gotten to know Einstein quite well . . .

BORGESSE: Oh, yes. He was a very simple and extremely charming person. Very easy to talk to and not overpowering and impressive at all. He had something almost childlike about him. And a wonderful sense of humor. He had so many nonscientific interests, ranging from music to politics that there was never any dearth of topics for conversation.

Q: How long did you live in Princeton?

BORGESSE: Not very long. Shortly after I arrived there I finally met Borgese. As I said, I had been interested in him ever since I had read his book *Goliath*. We met in the fall of 1938 and married in 1939. He was one of the political exiles on the faculty of the University of Chicago so I followed him there. Robert Hutchins was president, of course. It took some time to get to know Hutchins well. We became closer when we started to

do the work for the World Constitution. I served as a research associate for the Committee to Frame a World Constitution. The Committee was my husband's idea. It was his second collective endeavor to do something about world peace and world order. The first one, which also involved Mr. Hutchins, at the beginning at least, was a book called *The City of Man*. It was on this occasion, as a matter of fact, that Borgese came to Princeton to see my father, whose signature he wanted for the book. That was how I met him. Then, when the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, my husband felt that we could not wait any longer, that the only solution was to try to get rid, not of the bomb, but of war itself. This implied some sort of world organization, development of the United Nations into some sort of world government. The first person he approached was Mr. Hutchins and the second, I think, was Mortimer Adler. The committee got under way. We attempted to use as many educational talents as we could get hold of and to support organizations which were working in this direction. We didn't have any panacea, but Borgese's specific idea was that it was useless to discuss world government in vague terms. The main purpose of the world constitution model we finally drafted

was to spell out what world government might be in every detail. We didn't put much stock in the United Nations as it was actually set up because under the Charter, laws binding on all nations cannot be enforced. And Borgeese was certain that an enforcement agency was needed, one under political control. Otherwise what the world would get would be a police state. You had to have full-fledged world government. The difficulties are enormous, yet it's the only hope, it's the only solution.

Q: Can we turn for a moment to some of your own personal work?

BORGESE: What I really tried to be when I started was a musician. I studied music, the piano, composition and theory and the rest of it. I took my diploma. But I felt frustrated somehow. I blamed my feeling on the fact that I was a girl. There have been no great woman composers. This got me started very, very early when I was about twenty, on research for my book, *Ascent of Woman*. I worked on it for twenty years.

Q: Some say the last chapter of the book is strictly science fiction. Is it?

BORGESE: In a way, yes, it's a Utopia,

it's a fantasy. I took a collective trend and projected it on the individual. What happens when all the strain and stress between sexes that you find in a collective group impinge on an individual. I developed this character who starts neuter and becomes a woman, then becomes a man, then neuter again.

Q: Would you like to be able to do that, to go back and forth?

BORGESE: When I was young I definitely would have said, yes, because when I was a kid I was always waiting for the moment when I would turn into a man. I always thought that moment was bound to come. But now that I'm grown up I'd rather not have it come.

Q: Why did you choose to live part of your time in Florence? Do you prefer it over other European cities?

BORGESE: No, I wouldn't say so. It may come as a surprise to you but I'm a very lazy person. I sort of follow the law of inertia. Whenever I land somewhere I just stay and love it. I feel that I am not deciding what to do with myself, it's being decided for me. I gave up making plans long ago. You make plans and things turn

out completely different so I have abandoned making plans.

Q: Has your life been affected by certain accidental encounters and sudden changes?

BORGESE: I always have had the feeling that when I needed something or was ready for something that that thing came.

Q: It's as John Dewey put it, "leaning back on the breast of the universe." There's a certain internal preparation and then the moment comes.

BORGESE: I learned that when I was about eighteen. My parents sent me to an analyst in Zurich who was a very fine man. Instead of doing a routine analysis job he let me read Lao Tse. These readings made a tremendous impression on me at that time. What he said was what you said just now, that if you want a thing too much you don't get it anyway. So try not to want. Lao Tse has had a lasting influence on my whole way of thinking.

Q: Can we talk a bit about your work with dogs and chimpanzees?

BORGESE: I began eight years ago and

Oil and a Warless World

Q: It would seem logical to expect financial support for work toward world order, world peace, internationalization of the oceans, and the like, from corporate entities which stand to gain from a stable, warless world. Could you identify some of the corporations which would benefit most?

BORGESE: Among the main benefactors would be the oil companies. As long as you have lack of security of investment, political tensions, the danger of underwater warfare, you simply cannot fully develop these resources. The oil companies would certainly be the most directly benefited by the existence of an inter-

national ocean regime. And most of the world's mining and shipping companies as well.

Q: Have any such companies come to recognize this to the extent that they have contributed financially to the Center's on-going program to develop a model ocean regime satisfactory to all parties?

BORGESE: There are now a number of oil companies working with us. One of the strongest supporters is the national Italian oil company, ENI.

Q: Have any privately-owned petroleum companies here or abroad been of assistance?

BORGESE: It's beginning to look hope-

ful. For the first time, at the March conference in Naples, prior to the second Pacem in Maribus convocation, British Petroleum and Chevron representatives were present. These companies have not yet made financial contributions, but at least they are concerned. It's been tough going. Once the American Petroleum Institute took an official line in opposition, none of them deviated an inch.

Q: Will there be a review of that policy?

BORGESE: Eventually there will have to be because the official United States line has changed with the Nixon proposal for an international treaty declaring the oceans to be the common heritage of mankind.

have worked with a dog, a chimpanzee, and an elephant, teaching them to discriminate between forms, to associate sound and sign, sound and meaning, and then try to relate the three things together. With the method I have worked out I can teach any dog to "read and write." My dog, Arlecchino, a setter, used seventeen letters and typed under dictation about sixty different words, making few mistakes. He had a specially built typewriter which permitted him to press the keys with his nose. Last month he died of old age. Happily, by way of replacement his companion, Tada, presented me with nine puppies soon after.

Q: What are some of the messages that he typed?

BORGESE: Only what I dictated. He typed "good dog eat meat," "go car," and things like that. They were all short words, not more than four or five letters. He made up a few things of his own. In two cases I'm sure it was his intention. In the third case it might have been chance. The first time he was tired and simply typed his name and ran away, like a signature. The second case was when I asked him "where do you want to go?", he would often type "car" because he loved to ride in the car. But the third case was the most amusing. One day he didn't feel like typing at all, he didn't want to cooperate. I persisted in dictating, trying to lure him with little pieces of meat, but he didn't care to, he just stretched and yawned and lay down and wouldn't cooperate. Well, all of a sudden I saw him put his nose to the letter "a," and I thought "now I'll just let him type what he wants to type," so he went ahead, and without any prodding and placing all the spaces correctly, he typed, "a bad, bad dog." This started me on a new experiment, to let him do some spontaneous typing. He grew to love that, got very excited over it. And what came out were kind of hippie poems. He'd put together groups of three or four letters and then a space or a few spaces as he saw fit, and then a real word, and then went again on the sound combinations. I broke them up into lines and made

them look like poems. I assure you a lot of modern poems are not better.

Q: Perhaps a lot of modern poetry has been written by dogs. What about the work you're doing with the chimpanzee?

BORGESE: Well, I started the chimpanzee on exactly the same course of learning that I had worked out for the dog, to see, on the one hand, how this holds up, how the method holds up, and on the other hand, to try to measure the difference in intelligence and rate of learning between the two animals. It has been absolutely fascinating. I would say that the chimp learns at least six times as fast as the dog, so I do have hopes that we'll get the chimp to use this craft of typing meaningfully and actively, not only on dictation. I think if the chimp wants a banana, we'll get him to type banana.

Q: Chimps have more highly developed brains than dogs, haven't they?

BORGESE: Yes, and their way of reasoning and of combining manual dexterity with cerebral comprehension is so close to ours it's almost frightening.

Q: You've been criticized by some for what you're trying to do. What are the objections?

BORGESE: To answer that I'll tell you a little story. My grandmother was a very beautiful woman. She was an actress when she was young. She was just about as wicked as she was beautiful, very difficult to get along with. Whenever anybody told her anything, she would have one of two answers. Either she would say "I don't believe it," or she would say "Oh, this I know already." As I grew older I found out that the world at large is very much like my grandmother. When you say something, either the world doesn't believe it or the world knows it already. So when I started to make plans for this dog I had extensive correspondence with a number of scientists seeking advice. They told me it couldn't be done. And then when I outlined the steps

I would follow, they said, "Oh, you poor deluded lady, you know, it's much too complex, you won't get the dog to do that." Of course I went ahead and did it. So now they say, "Well, of course, it can be done."

Q: Mr. Hutchins puts it in a different way. He says there are no such things as good ideas or bad ideas, there are new ideas which are bad, and old ones which are good. Let me ask one final question. The title that you first wanted for your book on animal intelligence was The White Snake. Why did you want that title?

BORGESE: Well, I took it from a Grimm's fairytale, the tale about the king who was very powerful and very strong and owed these advantages to a secret; he had eaten bits of a white snake which enabled him to understand the animals, to speak their language, to communicate with them. And they all helped him. So since my book centers on communication with animals, I wanted that title.

Q: Have you eaten bits of the white snake?

BORGESE: Not yet. I am still looking for the white snake . . . ■

THE MALTA STORY

Publication of *Pacem in Maribus* (Dodd, Mead & Company) has been postponed until the fall so as to include proceedings of the second *Pacem in Maribus* Convocation at Malta (June 29 - July 5). Contents of the four hundred page volume, edited by Elisabeth Mann Borgese, include papers and commentary by lawyers, ecologists, historians, oceanographers, military experts, corporate officers and spokesmen for the developed and developing nations.

WORLD PREVIEW OF NEW STANLEY KRAMER FILM UNDER CENTER AEGIS

On June 23 at the new Alice Tully theatre in New York's Lincoln Center, an invitational world preview of "Bless the Beasts & Children," produced and directed by Stanley Kramer for Columbia Pictures, will play to an audience of Center directors, members, an assemblage of academicians, presidential contenders, senators and congressmen, cabinet officials, and leaders in the fields of conservation and ecology. Proceeds from the film's preview will go toward the Center's general academic program. Several years ago the Center joined forces with Stanley Kramer in presenting the world premiere of his film, "On the Beach," now a movie classic.

"Bless the Beasts & Children" is based on Glendon Swarthout's prize-winning novel of the same title. Its stars are six teen-age boys — five of whom had never faced a camera — and a herd of four hundred buffalo. Filming was done on location in Arizona and California.

In an interview with *Report's* editor, Stanley Kramer characterized his film as "a comment on the world scene," as many other of his works have been. "This time," Kramer said, "I am attempting to humiliate a segment of our society." "Bless the Beasts & Children" is the story of six cast-away teen-age sons of jet set parents. They meet at a summer camp in Ari-

zona which attracts campers by advertising: "Send us a boy. We'll send you a cowboy." The six boys in Kramer's film are "the bedwetters." The story revolves around what happens when these under-achievers learn of a macabre event held annually in Arizona, called "kill." Tickets are sold state-wide. The winners in the lottery may, for the sum of forty dollars, go to a state corral and shoot one buffalo. They are given the head, the heart and a quarter of the meat. The remains go to charitable institutions.

Amateur Killers:

"I was astounded and sickened by the barbarous way the buffalo were killed," Kramer told *Report*. "Often the shooters are amateurs and wound the animals in several places. They stagger, bleeding, around the corral until a sharpshooter finally delivers the fatal shot. All of the buffalo are driven to within one hundred yards of the shooters. If the buffalo try to move away they are driven back into close range by riders. Real hunters wouldn't



Producer-Director Stanley Kramer and Boy Cast

have deer driven to them by beaters. Cattle and hogs are killed humanely. But not these buffalo."

Midway through Kramer's film the boys set out to liberate the corralled buffalo. Clumsy on horses, lost in the mesas and rock formations of Arizona, they abandon their horses, steal a truck, elude the police, and are taunted by red neck bullies. The release of the animals from their intricate maze of pens is accomplished as a threatening mob moves on the boys.

Kramer told *Report* that he had outlined the elements of his film to the Governor of Arizona who responded with enthusiasm. The vast machinery of location film-making was then set into motion. Some weeks later Kramer was called in by the Arizona Fish and Game Commission, a body appointed by the Governor. It took a dim view of Kramer's filming the actual "shoot." "They told me," Kramer said, "that their shoot is necessary in order to 'weed out' the buffalo, for 'feed purposes.' They heard my argument, then asked me to leave the room while they

took a vote. In a minute I was called back into the room. The vote was negative." Thus Kramer's buffalo scenes had to be filmed on Catalina Island off the coast of Los Angeles where a herd, sired by a few bison brought to the island in 1925 for a film, "The Vanishing American," now lives in a wild state.

Dehumanized:

Center president Harry Ashmore was given a private screening of the film when it was in the last stages of editing. "I was impressed all over again," Ashmore said, "with Kramer's skill as a storyteller. The picture makes its points about the generally callous state of our society, and the peculiar horrors of the gun cult. It also provides," Ashmore added, "a splendid, suspenseful chase across some of the most spectacular Arizona landscape. The kids evoke laughter, as well as tears — and it may be that a good many of their elders will be on their way out of the theatre before all the irony sinks in. When it is released to the general pub-

lic late this summer, 'Bless the Beasts' may turn out to be the first movie to provide the junior-high group with its own generational heroes."

Producer-director Kramer will join Center Chairman Robert Hutchins, president Harry Ashmore, and Center Board members in hosting the Lincoln Center event. ■

Ticket Availability

Seating at the new Alice Tully Theatre where the world preview of "Bless the Beasts & Children" will be held on June 23 is limited to one thousand. Members wishing to purchase tax-deductible tickets for the event are advised to write or phone at least three weeks in advance. New York City office: 441 Lexington Avenue, New York 10017.

Telephone: 212:986-0652 or 0653.



A NEW DEALER LOOKS AT NIXON

(ED. NOTE: Center Fellow Rexford Tugwell served on President Roosevelt's Brains Trust, and was one of the architects of the New Deal. His latest book *Off Course* (Praeger, 1971) outlines the quick erosion of Roosevelt's global strategy in favor of the so-called "containment" policy under succeeding presidents. Tugwell now sees a world configuration in which President Nixon can take up where Roosevelt left off. Herewith excerpts:)

Nixon the politician understood the world more realistically than those who had watched his career had calculated. During the campaign there had been no hint of what was in his mind. . . .

Nixon, in fact, began a reversal of many policies without delay, seeing well enough where the weaknesses had been, and knowing that he had not been approved in 1968 so much as profited from his opponent's weaknesses. . . .

There would be new policies, he said; they would rest on "an evaluation of the world as it is, not as it was twenty-five years ago at the conclusion of World War II." He then announced the Nixon Doctrine. Henceforth the defense and the development of other nations would not be primarily an American undertaking. Help might be given but responsibility would not be assumed.

As for domestic policies, the Seventies should be a time for reforming — the welfare system, to begin with. Inflation must be stopped; the environment must be cleaned up. The main business of government must be to abolish hunger, provide minimum incomes, make better progress in providing educational and other facilities.

Like FDR:

That this was Nixon speaking — a Republican, a conservative — was incredible. He sounded, it was said, "almost like Roosevelt." The President, it was clear, was not only withdrawing from the quarter-century of mistaken strategies; he was pushing alternatives. Since Johnson had not

been able to find the funds needed for his war on poverty, deficit financing had become a regular resort. There had been no planning about all the new undertakings, and already there was acrimonious discussion of priorities. Between those who were encouraged in expectations that were never met, and those who turned sourly away from overseas obligations, Johnson's supporters had grown fewer and fewer. . . .

Another evidence of strategic failure, something Roosevelt's policy would have made unnecessary, and something Nixon could take advantage of, was the nearly three million American soldiers on duty in foreign lands: in Europe, 310,000; in Asia (including Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, and South Vietnam) 700,000; in Latin America 25,000; then there were the fleets, the Atlantic 255,000, the Pacific 400,000 (figures approximate and shifting.) How the containment policy had worked against American interests could be seen by noting that the Russians had no soldiers serving in overseas posts and only those abroad who were deployed in Eastern Europe.

If it may be supposed that coexistence could have succeeded, this immense force might have been reduced to a suitable number serving in an international peacekeeping operation — say half-a-million men and perhaps ten per cent of the ships and planes. This seemed outrageously fanciful in 1969. In 1970 it was the logical result of the Nixon reasoning. At the beginning of that year . . . a comprehensive statement of foreign policy for the

Seventies was issued. Nothing like this had ever been done before.

No Cold War:

In President Nixon's document on the state of the world, he used the phrase "era of negotiation," saying that it must be entered on as the only alternative to continued risk of destruction. These were other words for "coexistence," a recognition that, as Roosevelt had insisted, the world was in many respects, one, and that treating it as more than one might well be fatal. . . .

He said that the developments of two decades have "magnified the risks of intractable hostility." Thus, in a phrase, he repudiated the Dulles intention of maintaining an aggressive vigilance around the Russian borders. He elaborated:

"Twenty years ago the United States and what was then the Communist bloc could be resigned to the mutual hostility that flowed from deep-seated differences of ideology and national purpose . . .

"For us as well as our adversaries, in the nuclear age, the perils of using force are simply not in reasonable proportion to most of the objectives sought in many cases . . .

"We both have learned too that great powers may find their interests deeply involved in local conflict — risking confrontation — yet have precariously little influence over direction taken by local forces."

In addition . . . there would be "an appreciation of the context of negotiations," the central fact being "the interrelationship of international events . . . entwined in many complex ways."

How much more sophisticated this statement was than any made by American statesmen since the war! Gone were the threats and boasts, gone too the missionary determination to wrest the free world from wicked communists; gone the crocodile tears about small nations; and gone the proclamations of determination to man the walls of liberty. The iron curtain, a phrase coined by Churchill and accepted by Truman, was abolished as a controlling fiction. . . . Prospects of a viable coexistence were opened for the first time since 1945. ■

The Coming Science: Kaleidoscopic, Kinetic, Evolutionary

(ED. NOTE: *The director for scientific affairs, Organization for European Co-operation and Development, Britain's Alexander King, has received honors throughout the world for his scientific achievements. A Center Associate, King recently presented a paper to the Fellows on maintenance of the ecosystem and the need for new relationships among the interface sciences.*)

Because we face the pollution problem through a miasma of ignorance, much new and break-through research is required if serious progress is to be made. For example, separate geoscientific approaches are predicting on the one hand a serious heating up of our planet by the end of the century due to the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the upper atmosphere as a result of excessive combustion and a dwindling proportion of the earth's surface covered with chlorophyll-bearing plants to maintain the oxygen level; and on the other hand geophysicists, alarmed by the discovery of liquid water at the base of the antarctic ice cap, suggest that the ice will, before long, slide into the ocean, devastate the world with monstrous tidal waves and trigger off the next ice age. It may well be that both or neither of these movements are to be taken seriously, but it would be good to know the probabilities. It would be interesting to envisage a U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperative scheme for the use of atomic power to shave off the surface encrustments of ice in antarctica, for the survival of the race.

Much of the ignorance and prejudice which bedevils the environmental discussions stems from a lack of knowledge of the *cross-impacts of particular pollutants* on quite different activities and, vice versa. For example it is increasingly clear that the eutrophication of lakes and inland seas is due more to the run-off of soluble fertilizers than to industrial pollution, but agricultural policy, with its objective



of growing more food for expanding populations, seldom takes account of such matters. Then there is the notorious example of DDT, man's man-made enemy No. 1, now banned in many countries. Yet this chemical, which probably cut a year off the second world war, so far has probably saved about two hundred thousand lives for every individual it has even trivially harmed. This is, of course, not necessarily an argument for continuing its use, but if we are serious about the developing countries we should stop and think a little longer. It is easy to argue that the world would be better off without the millions of people now living as a result of DDT, but this is hardly an argument to appeal to the sentimental ecologists.

Zero Growth:

There is great need therefore for a better sense of proportion on these matters, and this can only be obtained through more knowledge and particularly knowledge as to how to manage large and complex systems. If the web of problems now facing our societies is caused by combined forces of affluence, high population density and technology, it seems reasonable to propose a control of population and city growth, putting a stop to economic growth and calling a halt to technology

and to the scientific research on which it depends. Hence the new flurry of seminars on zero-growth, calls for a moratorium on science, etc. These are clamors which are likely to become louder and which cannot be lightly dismissed. What is true is that the disruption of society and the body politic which would result from such action, as well as a new crop of enduring problems, would probably produce a chaos greater than the present. The noble savage is not such an easy concept when developed in terms of the inhabitants of megalopolis.

Firstly, the slowing down of growth at the present state, with its islands of poverty within the affluent world and the mass of subsistence misery in the greater world outside, would hardly be acceptable socially or politically. To the underprivileged in our own societies it would appear as economic treachery; to the third world it would seem a final abdication of responsibility on the part of the post colonialist industrial countries. It should be noted, that even now in some European countries obsessed by the "technological gap," the present U.S. policies of stressing the environment are seen as a political diversion from the apparently still necessary effort to increase growth through the industrial strength provided by the cornucopia of new technology. Eventually, of course, world needs to conserve natural resources will slow down economic growth — shortage of paper could be one of the earliest symptoms — but this is not for tomorrow. What is needed is a new attitude towards growth, clearer definition of national goals and an effort to use human wisdom and management skills towards their achievement.

Toward A Q.L.I.:

It is interesting to note that, even with the large growth rate expected for the next decade, social demand — especially for education, better cities and transportation — will mop up most of the economic gain, leaving little extra for the individual pay packet. Indeed it begins to appear that in a successful capitalistic system, the stage will be reached at which social costs will begin to dominate over individual profit. In preparing new growth policies it is

now imperative to devise an indicator *more suitable than the gross national product*, which will take into account quality and welfare aspects. Social accounting has become an essential need, but we appear to be far from achieving it. In general there is a need for a new socio-economic theory. Can our economists provide it?

If growth is to be maintained — as a means rather than an end — technology will be required to produce it. But this must not be the old exploitative technology with which we are familiar. Its control, and also the evaluation of its economic, social and cultural effects, will have to be guided by the socio-economic techniques we have mentioned. This in turn will require new attitudes on the part of industry. There are in fact signs that a few of the larger multinational firms are reassessing their functions, looking beyond the elementary one of profit making, responding to the signs of the times. However, long-term self-interest on the part of capitalist industry does seem to necessitate the adoption of a modicum of social responsibility.

Evaluation of the probable consequences of alternative technological decisions will inevitably become a national and, because it is a very costly business, international affair. There seems to be no reason why technology should not serve human ends, but these ends must be made explicit and the boundary conditions established.

Interface:

A case of particular promise and danger, now being unveiled by science, is to be found at the interface of biology, neurology, molecular biology, psychology and genetic engineering. The range of new possibilities represented by an understanding of how the cerebral mechanism operates and can be modified could lead to a man-made evolution towards a creature superior to man as we know him, or, alternatively, lacking the wisdom to play God. Man could employ these as a means for his destruction, finding them more subtle and more monstrous than his other plaything, the bomb.

Discussions on this subject recently at the Center remind us that together with the possibility of control and modification of the nervous system

comes influence over life and death, that is, control (as ever for good and evil) of human potentiality and achievement. The new biological knowledge is already beginning to have its influence on social problems. For example, if, as it appears, the irreversible biological process which determines a child's capacity for learning throughout his life is established *in the first few months of life*, present policies for equality of opportunity, for education, become a marginal and very expensive aberration.

The creation of new knowledge is an intrinsic human characteristic since the Garden of Eden, and any attempt to stop it would be futile. Last year the "Year 2000" group of the European Cultural Foundation, meeting at Bellagio, called for the creation of a European (and eventually World) Council to consider the consequences for humanity of the new biology. Such a Council is, no doubt, necessary but if, as is probable, it were to be constituted from clever and powerful rather than wise men, it could all too easily prove to be yet another vested interest group for *the manipulation of man*. All in all, it might be best if such a Council would give initial and perhaps unique support to genetic engineering applied to that delightful and clever creature the porpoise, as a possible replacement of man.

Cross-Impact:

It has been argued that the present cluster of multivariant, universal and interacting problems can no longer be attacked, with any hope of success, through the conventional mechanisms of our present social and political systems. To fight pollution and preserve our environment is a fine and worthy cause, but lacking a wider perspective of knowledge and method it can only remove a few superficial symptoms of a disease but hazily diagnosed and of origin unknown. The time is past when we have to deal with simple problems and hope for individual solutions. The size and complexity of society is now such, that changing a few variables as a consequence of a ponderous, ignorant and unrepresentative political process, is likely, through a readjustment of the internal forces of the system, to produce unexpected results in

quite other parts of the system, which will not easily be seen as resulting from the new policy.

Present structures of government and of learning are not geared to the new necessities. Government agencies are normally static, vertical structures, designed for the needs of earlier, simpler days. Together with such structural inadequacy, conceptual thinking for the future is still mainly of a linear projection type, quite unsuitable for a high inertia dynamic situation. Where in government is it possible to link and measure the cross-impact say of the rambling world monetary situation, world population increase, environmental deterioration, student unrest and the deepening alienation of city dwellers?

New Dynamics:

The growth of knowledge is similarly constrained within an equally rigid pattern of disciplines, appropriate enough a century ago. The significant advances in the natural sciences are, however, no longer in the classical categories such as chemistry, physics or geology. The interface subjects such as biochemistry, geophysics, molecular biology, cybernetics or neurophysiology have, through the vitality of their proponents and the evident importance of their discoveries, been accommodated, at least in the United States, within the traditional university structures, although old Europe still clings, in the main, to its outworn faculty system. Yet at the frontiers, knowledge is developing its own dynamics. The primary interface subjects are forging new relationships, producing new topics of possibly ephemeral, although of great immediate importance — temporary sciences, as it were, at points of concentration and cross-impact of different significant discoveries. Science then, is itself becoming a kaleidoscopic, kinetic evolutionary activity for which present attitudes and structures are archaic. This dynamic development does not stop at the frontiers of natural science; it pervades the social sciences and will influence the humanities producing that unity of knowledge which was science before the Anglo-Saxon heresy construed science narrowly in terms of natural philosophy. ■

Women and Constitutional Rights

(Center Board member, Eulah Laucks, delivered the following remarks at a recent Center-sponsored series on the constitutional crisis.)

Despite what you may hear about the lunatic fringe of the women's liberation movement, the women's revolution in America is no joke. It is not a fad or a fashion that will soon fade away. I believe that within twenty years those of us who live that long will be part of a society in which women will have as much to say and do about it as men will.

To substantiate this I might start by looking at what is happening in areas in higher education that in the past have been restricted to men. There is now at least one woman dean of a law school. In 1969 the California Institute of Technology hired its first woman professor and admitted women undergraduates. Yale University recently admitted rather a high percentage of women undergraduates. There are one hundred or more colleges and universities (among them Princeton, Cornell, Northwestern — and of course, Radcliffe and Bryn Mawr) that are offering a wide range of courses in female studies for full credit. Some, like San Diego State, have full formal programs on women, with ten or more courses. Some medical schools are allowing women to raise families while training, and are even providing day-care centers for children, to encourage more women to enter the field.

A Woman Justice?

Women are entering many formerly all-male job areas. There are now two hundred and fifty female air traffic controllers in the United States, and the Air Force is using their services frequently. We have a dozen or so women directors of major federal bureaus, and several women ambassadors. President Nixon is now being urged to name a woman to the Supreme Court. We already have women judges on state supreme courts and federal district courts.



In the masculine world of conducting symphonies, there is now a woman leading the American Symphony in New York's Lincoln Center, and an assistant female conductor at the New York Philharmonic orchestra. There is a woman crew member on a U.S. flag freighter and the first American woman scientist has been sent to conduct field studies in Antarctica. American women haven't made it yet in the atmospheric and space sciences, but they now comprise three per cent of the once strictly male earth and marine scientists.

In finance, several women have scaled the Wall Street citadel. One has a seat on the New York Stock Exchange, another is a member of the American Stock Exchange, a third is president of a major stock brokerage firm. The Chicago Board of Trade, world's largest commodities exchange, after one hundred and twenty years a male sanctum, admitted a woman last year. Women are now managing banks. One female president of a California national bank employs only women. A bank in St. Louis has a fifteen member women's advisory board of directors. There are at least two women at the head of large advertising agencies, who, by the way, are spending a good deal of time pressing for the elimination of moronic and insulting references in commercials and ads that portray women as simpletons.

And in spite of David Susskind, the proportion of serious programs and articles on women in the various media is steadily rising. As one writer put it: the entire communications industry is infiltrated by female Trojan horses and borers from within. There are indications that the men who run these media are listening with at least one ear.

Equal Opportunity Churches:

But what is happening to women in business and finance may have less impact in the long run for women's rights than what is happening to them in the Church. As an institution, the Church has practiced discrimination against women probably longer and more flagrantly than any institution in society. Now, there is a growing urgency in hierarchical discussions about finding ways to make it possible for women to take part in substantive Church affairs — even as priests and bishops. Theologians all over the world are reexamining scriptural sources and dogma for guide lines in formulating new policies on women that will in some degree accord with modern realities. Seventy denominations around the world now permit the ordination of women to the ministry, and almost all newly unified churches provide such rights for women. At the last Episcopal General Convention, a push for the ordination of women was defeated by only a narrow margin.

The Lutheran Church in America recently voted overwhelmingly to authorize ordination of women. Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists, the United Church of Christ, and others already have clergywomen. In practically all churches, women are now quietly acquiring the academic credentials for roles as ministers.

In the Roman Catholic Church there are now some spring-like shoots of awareness popping up to proclaim a thaw. Pope Paul startled the world recently by appointing five women to posts in the Curia. That is a little like letting women join the Trappist monks. Paul has also elevated two female saints to "Doctor of the Church" — a position formerly for males only.

In many Roman Catholic dioceses, women have gained a foothold at the altar gates as lectors, if not as occupants of the pulpit. And theologians of

a Roman Catholic commission on women's status in the Church declared a short time ago that there is no insurmountable Biblical or dogmatic obstacle to the ordination of women.

Test Cases:

Now, if I have at least partially convinced you that the women's revolution is a going thing, let me turn to some of the legal entanglements that will likely result in the years immediately ahead. Even though the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits job discrimination based on sex, as well as race; and even though twenty-five states have laws dictating equal pay for equal work, there still has been only limited enforcement of such rul-

ings. Also, forty-three states still have so-called "protective" legislation in effect which prohibits women from working overtime, thus giving men unfair advantage when applying for jobs that sometimes require overtime.

Until recently, women have scarcely been aware of the possibilities open to them for redress of some of these inequities. Now, complaints and suits are proliferating all over the country. Betty Friedan, probably the most prominent American feminist, predicts that, in coming months, case after case will be pushed to the Supreme Court. What all this means in terms of already overloaded court calendars, I'll leave to the constitutional lawyers. However, this may be a good reason for

hastening the passage of the proposed women's rights amendment. Clarification of the status of women by amendment to the Constitution should have the force of eliminating many of these contests.

Opening Pandora's Box:

If and when the amendment is passed, and people become fully aware of the significance of its being literally "on the books," we shall be facing some very fundamental changes. What will happen to property laws, under which now in some states a women's property and income are still under the control of her husband? In most states she cannot use her maiden name if her husband objects, and she can't main-

NEW FACES

Spring at the Center was a time of many arrivals and departures and wide-ranging discussion among men and women of many disciplines and reference frames.

JAMES P. GRANT, president, Overseas Development Council, outlined the dimensions of imminent global unemployment which he detailed in a monograph, *The Labor Force Explosion, a Challenge to the World*. Grant sought the thinking of Center fellows as to possible preventive and/or palliative measures.



MORRIS NEIBURGER, professor and former chairman, Department of Meteorology at UCLA, was president of the American Meteorological Society and is internationally regarded as one of the world's leading experts on air pollution. He led a Center discussion on *Social Motivation and the Physical Environment*.



PAUL NEWMAN, film producer, director, actor, and winner of many awards, has become a member of the Center's Board of Directors. He and his actress wife, Joanne Woodward, have long been active in public affairs. In 1969 they were honored as "Mother and Father of the Year For Peace" at the World Mother's Day Assembly.

ESSIE EDDINS came to the Center with her husband, philosopher Berkely Eddins. A graduate nurse, Mrs. Eddins went on to take her M.A. in sociology at the University of Denver, and is now a Ph.D. candidate at the State University of New York at Buffalo. Her dissertation, *Social Identity of Unmarried Minority Adolescent Pregnant Girls*, will be based on extensive testing and interviewing. While at the Center Mrs. Eddins completed part of her forthcoming book, *Changing Health Patterns and the Black Community*.



ALAN GEWIRTH, professor of philosophy, University of Chicago, offered a paper for Center discussion on *Civil Liberties as Effective Powers*. His articles in various philosophical journals include, *The Non-Trivializability of Universalizability*; *Must One Play the Moral Language Game?*; *The Justification of Egalitarian Justice*. He is now at work on a thirty thousand word monograph on Ethics for publication in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*.

tain a separate domicile for tax or voting purposes. What of inheritance laws? Will the present community property laws, for example, as they relate to inheritance, have to be completely overhauled?

How will legal individuality for women, in areas where formerly their rights inhered in their husbands, affect income tax laws and social security regulations? I am not very familiar with Social Security regulations; I understand there are inequities, especially for widows, and for divorced and single women in the latter. Certainly there are inequities now in income tax regulations relating to single persons. At any rate, when women are earning as much money as men are,

the whole Social Security and income tax structure, and a lot else, may have to be changed.

What will happen to child custody procedures in divorce cases? Who will get the children: Will the mother still be the parent given preference for physical custody? Will the legal responsibility for child support be shared? Suppose overpopulation becomes critical to the point that laws are passed limiting the number of children a family may have. What constitutional rights will a woman have over her own body if she elects to have more children than the limit prescribes?

To paraphrase Professor Leo Kano-witz, in his book, *Women and the Law*,

the basic rule that has been adhered to up to the present is that woman must yield her rights as an individual to the presumed needs of social stability, as interpreted by men. This attitude stems from the Adam syndrome, which presumes woman's God-directed inferiority to the male, and is rooted in English common law tradition, providing that the husband and wife are as one, and that one is the husband.

Since the passage of a women's rights amendment, and the greater activity of women in public life will require radical changes in this attitude, one can see why it will have taken almost fifty years to get the amendment out of Congressional cloak rooms! ■

WALTER ADAMS, professor of economics, served as acting president of Michigan State University in 1968. During a week at the Center he led two major discussions, the first on the intangibles and catalysts of campus uprisings. Adams's second presentation revolved around the not new government-industrial-labor complex, of which the military-industrial complex has grown as a powerful offshoot. Although Adams would like to see the country return to a marketplace economy, he was less than sanguine about the probability.



MAURICE N. WALSH, associate clinical professor of psychiatry, UCLA, authorized biographer of Ernest Jones, is author of over forty monographs, among them *The Case of Rudolph Hess, a Specimen Study of a Narcissistic Leader; Some Character Aspects of the Satirist; Notes on the Neurosis of Leonardo da Vinci*. Walsh was editor of the new anthology, *War and the Human Race* (Elsevier, 1970). He came to the Center to discuss the need for intensive research into the phenomenon of war, which he calls "recurrent mass homicide."



BETTY MUTHER JACOB, the new vice chancellor for development, University of the New World at Valais, Switzerland, collaborated with her political scientist husband, Philip E. Jacob, on a five year project, *International Studies of Values in Politics*, involving teams of researchers in Poland, Yugoslavia, the United States, and three different language states in India. She outlined the project at a recent Center symposium.

WILLIAM BENTON, former United States Senator from Connecticut, United States ambassador to UNESCO, is chairman of Encyclopaedia Britannica and the Encyclopaedia Britannica Educational Corporation. He came to the Center to discuss proposals for the founding of a Communications Media Council.



JOHN P. HUMPHREY, professor of law and political science, McGill University, Montreal, has served as president of the Canadian Commission, International Year for Human Rights, rapporteur of the I.L.A. Committee on Human Rights, and director, Division of Human Rights of the U.N. Secretariat. At the Center, Humphrey discussed the *Canadian Constitutional crisis*, and explained his dissenting view as a member of the Canadian Royal Commission on the Status of Women.

Southeast Asia Offshore Oil Boom

(ED. NOTE: Norton Ginsburg, recently arrived visiting fellow, professor of geography, the University of Chicago, president of the Association of American Geographers, is regarded as a world authority on Southeast Asia. In an interview with Report's editor he gave his view on some potential fuse points in that area.)

Q: You have recently said that all of Southeast Asia will become a commercial province of Japan. In view of this, do you agree that heavy American investment in offshore oil exploration and exploitation in the Gulf of Thailand and the South China sea could be, as one oil executive said, "the stupidest thing the oil industry has ever done"?

GINSBURG: I don't think that's the reason for saying such investment is stupid. If Southeast Asian countries will give concessions to American or American-dominated companies, that's their business. Japan will get its own concessions and will probably be willing to buy from American companies. But we don't yet know how much oil there is under the continental shelf that underlies the southern shallow part of the South China Sea. It is assumed that because the southern half of the South China Sea is an extension of the continent, and because there are extensive on-shore deposits already being tapped in Indonesia, that there ought to be oil offshore. But nobody knows this yet, and no drilling has yet taken place.

I don't mean to say that there isn't a big oil exploration rush going on out there because there is. Singapore is the major outfitting center for it. But it's only within the past year or so that photographic exploration has seriously taken place in the Gulf of Thailand off the coast of Cambodia and Vietnam. The probabilities are fairly high that there will be some oil there. But the probabilities are even higher that there will be large offshore oil deposits in those areas farthest removed from Vietnam and Cambodia in what are recognized to be the territorial or continental shelf waters of Indonesia and Malaysia. In fact, it's most likely



that offshore oil will be found south of Singapore and in the waters immediately west of Malaysian Borneo and the state of Brunei, and that crude would be attractively low in sulfur.

Q: If American interests go for oil in the waters of what you call China's "inner Asian zone" — what happens?

GINSBURG: The Mainland Chinese aren't going to care much about the Malaysian and Indonesian areas except for the fact that the Chinese lay claim to much of the South China Sea west of Borneo. But they will be concerned about any United States activity in the waters off the coasts of Thailand, Cambodia and South Vietnam. And they'll be even more interested in and most distressed about what happens in the waters around Taiwan and the islands directly to the north for which concessions are being let by the Nationalist Chinese.

This is an explosive situation. The Japanese are involved, the Nationalist Chinese are involved, the South Koreans are involved, and the Mainland Chinese are involved to the extent that the territorial and continental shelf waters off Taiwan are regarded by

them as *theirs*. The East China Sea is also continental shelf sea. The likelihood of oil there is considerable. If it is found, Peking will argue that the Taiwan government hasn't the right to let out the concessions. So will the South Koreans. At present exploration is being carried out by Americans and Japanese, under agreement with the Nationalists; but in view of the conflicting claims, the State Department has informed the Americans that their safety in those waters cannot be guaranteed. On the other hand, American companies, I understand, are likely to be favored by South Vietnam and Cambodia with respect to concessions in the Gulf of Thailand.

Q: Would it not be in the best interests of United States oil companies to see a stable, neutral, coalition government in Vietnam so that any concessions are less likely to be cancelled?

GINSBURG: I suspect that if there is a neutralist government in South Vietnam or if the whole Indochinese peninsula is neutralized — which is not a remote possibility — bids for concessions might be invited from a number of countries: Japan, the United States, Great Britain, Italy, even Romania, Poland and the U.S.S.R. All have the technology to carry out the needed exploration.

Q: Is it necessary to maintain a continuing United States presence in or around Indochina in order to give us a crack at this oil?

GINSBURG: I don't think so. Assertions that offshore oil is a major reason for our support of the South Vietnamese and Cambodian governments are really inappropriate. I'd be the last to deny that there are oil lobbyists in Washington pressing for an American presence that would protect their prospective interests, but that this is a major issue in the formulation of American foreign policy seems so improbable to me that I simply cannot accept it. The primary reason for our Southeast Asia presence is a continuation of the containment policy developed by John Foster Dulles, a policy which we are carrying out in a decreasingly enthusiastic way.

If our foreign policy were based on oil, our relations with Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia would be more important than with anybody else. Obviously, if the United States has no diplomatic relations with certain Southeast Asian governments, we wouldn't be able to compete with other countries in exploitation of oil. But that isn't the way it's going to be. We're going to have friendly representation and response in Indonesia and Malaysia and, for that matter, Thailand. Even if we withdraw from South Vietnam and the general balance of power in that area is modified, with China coming to exert a somewhat greater influence, and with Japan eventually economically dominating a number of Southeast Asian countries — none of this would mean that we'd be ruled out.

The simple fact is that the United States doesn't really need to resort to Southeast Asian petroleum reserves, in terms either of its own security or of the economic welfare of its oil companies. We don't need that oil for ourselves. We don't need it for international trade purposes. In strictly economic terms it might be advantageous if we had access to it and control over it, but it's hardly a basis for developing a policy contrary to that now evolving — which involves, among other things, a withdrawal of troops from the Indochinese peninsula and a generally lower profile of the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia.

From the Japanese point of view, Southeast Asia is a logical extension of

the Japanese cosmos. They are likely to take longer risks and lower profits than we would accept in moving into that area. The Chinese also may act that way. Until now they haven't had much capital to invest, but in due course they might begin to compete with Japan in that part of the world.

The major friction point between Japan and China is, as I said, Taiwan. The Japanese maintain relations with the Nationalist government and are doing substantial business with Taiwan. From the Chinese point of view — both the Nationalists and the Communists — the question of an independent Taiwan is not discussable. It's my forecast that if Peking were voted into the United Nations and given the Chinese seat on the Security Council, it would not take that seat if a seat in the General Assembly were reserved for Nationalist China.

Q: As a geographer how can you explain Peking's fixation on Taiwan?

GINSBURG: It certainly isn't because of Taiwan's great economic value, although it is prosperous. It's more than that; it's fundamentally political and psychological, rooted in the fact that Taiwan had no historical existence prior to its becoming Chinese toward the end of the Ming Dynasty. All Chinese agree to this, other than, perhaps, many Taiwanese themselves.

Q: When Chiang Kai-shek goes, is there a possibility of a deal between his successors and Peking; one which

would set Taiwan up as a special province; possibly something along the lines of the arrangement between the United States and Puerto Rico?

GINSBURG: Well, that's a thought. I haven't heard that proposed before. But there is some precedent in Chinese Communist relations with other peripheral parts of the country that bears on this problem. There are at least two major instances — one in Sinkiang and one in Tibet — when the Chinese Communists made deals with regional leaders. (We used to call them warlords.) These leaders weren't ideologically communist, but they controlled the apparatus of power in outlying areas. In effect the Communists eventually integrated them into the administrative apparatus of the country, kept them as governors or administrators, and gave them some kind of special Party status.

Something like that could conceivably happen to Taiwan. This would be abetted by the unrest of the ten million Taiwanese who are very unfriendly toward the three million Nationalist Chinese and their descendants, who came over as refugees from the Communists in 1947 and 1948 and proceeded to dominate the island. What the Japanese would like, in their turn, I believe, would be an independent Formosa which would not lay claim to Mainland China, and which the Peking government would recognize as independent, and which would become again, in effect, an economic province of Japan. ■

SENIOR FELLOWS: Robert M. Hutchins, Chairman, Harry S. Ashmore, Elisabeth Mann Borgese, John Cogley, Rexford G. Tugwell, Harvey Wheeler, John Wilkinson

VISITING FELLOWS: Arthur G. Anderson, Richard Eels, Norton Ginsburg, Ileana Marculescu, Donald Robinson, Robert Rosen, Kenneth Tollett, Jon M. Van Dyke

ASSOCIATES: Richard Bellman, Silviu Brucan, Alexander Comfort, Paul Ehrlich, Mircea Eliade, Neil H. Jacoby, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Alexander King, Fred Warner Neal, Raúl Prebisch, Karl H. Pribram, Lord Ritchie-Calder, Nathan Rotenstreich, Adam Schaff, Carl Friedrich von Weizsacker

CONSULTANTS TO THE CENTER: Chief S. O. Adebo, Robert Gordis, N. N. Inozemtsev, Clark Kerr, Joseph P. Lyford, Milton Mayer, Reinhold Niebuhr, Isidor I. Rabi, George N. Shuster
STAFF: Harry S. Ashmore, President; Frank K. Kelly, Vice-President and Director of Continuing Education; Gary M. Cadenhead, Secretary-Treasurer; Peter Tagger, Director of Promotion, Membership, and Development; Ruth Brooks Floyd, Assistant Treasurer; Wilda Osborn, Assistant Secretary
The Center Magazine: John Cogley, Editor; Donald McDonald, Executive Editor
Center Occasional Paper and Center Report: Mary Kersey Harvey, Editor

Book Publications: Clifton Fadiman, Consultant
Audio-Tape Program: Florence Mischel, Director
RESEARCH ASSISTANTS: Kenneth Falstrom, Michael Hathaway, William Pennell Rock, Jr., James Wood

THE FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC, INC.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS:

Robert M. Hutchins, Chairman; J. R. Parten, Vice-Chairman; Ralph E. Ablon, Joseph Antonow, Harry S. Ashmore, Patrick F. Crowley, Fagan Dickson, James H. Douglas, Jr., William O. Douglas, Joseph W. Drown, Arnold M. Grant, Francis J. Lally, Edward Lamb, Eulah C. Laucks, Morris L. Levinson, J. Howard Marshall, Frances McAllister, Stewart Mott, Paul Newman, Seniel Ostrow, Louis Schweitzer, Eleanor B. Stevenson, Bernard Weissbourd, Harold Willens

West Coast Office:
205 South Beverly Drive, Beverly Hills, California 90212

East Coast Office:
441 Lexington Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017

SHORT TAKES

The Managerial Type (in Mainland China)

The Communist Chinese industrial managers come close to professional American managers in many ways. It amazed me. Their notion of time, meeting schedules, systemization of operations, planning, integrating with other units and departments, setting up control systems to keep on target and to discern whether corrective action is needed — all this reminds me of the American approach. The Chinese Communist manager is much closer to the professional American manager than the Indian or Japanese.

— BARRY M. RICHMAN

■

A New Way to Handle Campus Crises?

A number of university administrators in America, in reflecting on recent campus disorders, have emphasized that there were no *identifiable crucial* issues, the solution of which would have brought the troubles to an end. Does this perhaps indicate that, in searching for "issues," one is applying a structurally inappropriate system of analysis?

It might be useful to think in terms of a concept introduced by the social anthropologist and psychologist, Gregory Bateson, that of "schismogenesis." (A schismogenesis is a process occurring between two — or occasionally more — interacting parties or tendencies. Its defining characteristic is that the process is of such a kind that one party provokes in the other behavior which will in turn provoke the first to still further provoke the second, and so on and on, usually to some grand climax or bust-up.)

Bateson distinguished two types of schismogenesis: *symmetrical*, in which each party is trying to outdo the other in some form of activity (an arms

race, a "man-on-the-moon" race, competition for "keeping up with the Joneses") or *complementary*, in which one party is trying to do the opposite of the other (a dominance-submission struggle, a freedom-possessiveness battle between spouses, "the law-and-order boys" against "democratic protesters" within a University). If one sees such situations as involving schismogenesis, then one is not so tempted to feel that if only the important issue can be identified and dealt with, the problem will be solved. Much more, one will ask the quite different question, how can one handle a schismogenesis?

I certainly have no sure-fire recipe. The only two types of tactics occurring to me are: the pessimistic, but perhaps more practical, is to let it rip up to its climax, but to try to limit the numbers affected by it, and the number of subsidiary issues sucked in to the vicious spiral; the other is to try to change the subject completely, to raise some other emotionally powerful issue which involves values completely *other* than, and incommensurable with, those about which the schismogenesis is occurring, as for instance, a couple which is running a schismogenesis about infidelity and possessiveness may lower their temperature on this if the question of bringing up a new baby crops up.

— C. P. WADDINGTON

■

What's So Top Secret?

At the Ballistic Laboratory at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds a study was made directly after World War II of the "classified" material in the files. It was found that empirical errors of measurement accounted for about thirty per cent of what was classified; meaningless and/or contradictory statements accounted for about sixty per cent, while about nine per cent was simply well-known materials, tables of logarithms, and the like. Less than one per cent of the classified matter appeared to be possibly accurate and potentially meaningful. But since there was no logical test for relevancy it was impossible to program a computer or anything else to make any sense out of even this one per cent.

I cite this to point out that the whole notion about whether there are scientific secrets or not, and if so whether they can be used for decision-making, is a shaky one.

Take the CIA. It operates by the scriptural injunction that the right hand shouldn't know what the left hand is doing. For everything in the CIA files there is something to the contrary. So you have a situation where almost everything hidden away tends to be contradicted within the same set of files. There is a law of logic which states that if you have a contradiction, then anything follows, so you can put anything you want into classified files and it will be true, and, I may add, also false. If you know that everything may be there, that any arbitrary statement can be put into the files, then you don't need the CIA in order to manufacture information.

Much of what is used in the courts as evidence has, on analysis, turned out not to have been gotten by wiretapping or other occult means, but was simply dreamed up by somebody. I'm frankly worried about the enormous amounts spent for agents and wiretappers and computers, etc., to produce what is essentially nonsense. It's the old doctrine: garbage in, garbage out.

What I'm talking about is what some philosophers call a pathetic fallacy. Social scientists are worried about restriction of free speech, and so on, which, in their view is a corollary of classification of information. But this is not really information from the semantic point of view. The great swindle put over on us by politicians, political scientists, lawyers, and the like, is that there is such a thing as relevant information, that it is actually used in decision-making, and that there somewhere exist wise men who know how to use it.

Further, if you have nonsense — "noise in the system" — public opinion doesn't mean anything. It's public whim, unstable, shifting. The Gallup poll is simply a feedback of this nonsense. It asks, for example, who are the world's ten most admired men? The public names the only men they ever heard of — Billy Graham, the Pope, and that type, year after year, no matter what.

— JOHN WILKINSON

Mao Tse-Tung, Chou En-Lai, and the People's Republic of China

■ PROF. JOHN G. GURLEY of Stanford University's Department of Economics traces the economic development of the People's Republic of China as an attempt to achieve socialism by building up the entire country simultaneously — over the ruins left by the Nationalists. Both peasants and workers, during the years since the ouster of Chiang Kai-shek, seem to have benefited by the effort to promote the sense of equal worth of all persons in Chinese society.

Title: *China: Economic Development in a Human Context*.

■ EDWIN O. REISCHAUER, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan and now professor of Far Eastern History at Harvard University, points out that if the United States cannot break free from the myths and fears underlying its foreign policy toward Mainland China it may not survive the twentieth century. Reischauer undertakes to review some of these myths and suggests how the United States might move in the direction of a new policy vis-à-vis Peking. Title: *The Myth of the China Menace*.

■ If U.S. policy on foreign aid is to succeed, more understanding of the nature of peasant revolutions is



EDWIN O. REISCHAUER

required. In this audio tape PAVEL EISLER, Czechoslovakian economist, and Center Fellow, HARVEY WHEELER, discuss the sharp differences between Soviet and Chinese economic development and why many developing nations prefer the Chinese model. Title: *The Green Revolutions*.

■ If we cannot break free from the nineteenth century myth underlying our foreign policy, we may not survive the twentieth century to enter the twenty-first. Nowhere is the danger more serious than in the foreign poli-



HARVEY WHEELER

cies of the United States and Japan toward Mainland China. Pulitzer prize-winner HARRY S. ASHMORE presents a brilliant summary of a three-day Center Conference in which Japanese leaders, and United States senators considered the steps necessary for normalizing relations with Peking. Masumi Ezaki, former Japanese Minister of Defense, presents the Japanese position. Title: *Considerations for the Twenty-First Century*.

Center audio tapes available at \$7.50 each. Write Box 4068, Santa Barbara, CA 93103.

Collector's Item

PEACE NOW



The words of the Buddhist monk *Thich Nhat Hanh*, and the American film star *Marsha Hunt* (now deceased), two early and passionate pleaders for an end to the war in Vietnam, qualify them as true prophets, as the fallacy of the Vietnam folly reaches mind-boggling proportions. Hanh, a poet, is heard here in prose. Marsha Hunt reads selections from Hanh's anti-war poems. Views of Center Fellows are also to be heard in this collectors' item taped five years ago.

Title: *A Buddhist Monk's View of Vietnam*.



Look for the Center Colophon on these New Books

USTINOV
BORGESE
GOULET
HUTCHINS
ASHMORE
MERTON
WILKINSON
others

THE TROUBLED
CONSCIENCE:
AMERICAN
SOCIAL ISSUES
Edited and with an
introduction by
Irving Louis Horowitz,
Department of Sociology,
Rutgers University.
395 pages. \$4.25

TOYNBEE
GOULET
NOVAK
OGLESBY
HARRINGTON
ASHMORE
CHURCH
others

TOWARD A NEW
PUBLIC POLICY
Edited and with an
introduction by
Harold E. Quinley,
professor of political
science, Brown University.
407 pages. \$4.25

SHUSTER
DOUGLAS
FULBRIGHT
FRANKEL
VAN DYKE
TUGWELL
HUTCHINS
others

DEMOCRACY,
LIBERALISM,
AND REVOLUTION
Edited and with an
introduction by
Karl A. Lamb, professor
of political science,
University of California
at Santa Cruz.
430 pages. \$4.25

R. G. TUGWELL

MODEL FOR A
NEW CONSTITUTION
Edited and with an
introduction by
Harry S. Ashmore,
president, The Center
for the Study of
Democratic Institutions.
Complete texts of Tugwell
model and present
U.S. Constitutions.
160 pages. \$2.45

These new paperbound anthologies are designed for all members of the learning society — students in armchair and on campus. Drawn from editions of *The Center Magazine*, material in each volume is as germane to today's issues as when originally published. Produced, in collaboration with the Center, by James E. Freel & Associates, Palo Alto, Calif.

Faculty Members interested in classroom adoption send inquiries to: Book Department, Box 4446, The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, California 93103.

Center Members may purchase individual copies at special membership discount price \$3.75. California residents add 5% sales tax. Send orders accompanied by checks to Book Department, Box 4446, The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, California 93103.

00-391697-734

THE CENTER MAGAZINE



Canal May 1971

The Lessons of Vietnam by Stephen A. Garrett

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

Box 4068, Santa Barbara, California 93103

SENIOR FELLOWS: Robert M. Hutchins, Chairman, Harry S. Ashmore, Elisabeth Mann Borgese, John Cogley, Rexford G. Tugwell, Harvey Wheeler, John Wilkinson

VISITING FELLOWS: Richard Eels, Norton Ginsburg, Eduard Goldstücker, Barry Richman, Donald Robinson, Michael Tigar, Kenneth Tollett

ASSOCIATES: Richard Bellman, Silviu Brucan, Alexander Comfort, Paul Ehrlich, Mircea Eliade, Ivan Illich, Neil H. Jacoby, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Alexander King, Fred Warner Neal, Raúl Prebisch, Karl H. Pribram, Lord Ritchie-Calder, Nathan Rotenstreich, Adam Schaff, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker

RESEARCH ASSISTANTS: Kenneth E. Falstrom, Michael Hathaway, William Pennell Rock, Jr., James Wood

CONSULTANTS TO THE CENTER: Chief S. O. Adebo, Robert Gordis, N. N. Inozemtsev, Clark Kerr, Joseph P. Lyford, Milton Mayer, Isidor I. Rabi, George N. Shuster

STAFF: Harry S. Ashmore, President; Frank K. Kelly, Vice-President and Director of Continuing Education; Gary M. Cadenhead, Secretary-Treasurer; Peter Tagger, Director of Promotion, Membership, and Development; *The Center Magazine:* John Cogley, Editor, Donald McDonald, Executive Editor; *Center Occasional Paper:* Mary Kersey Harvey, Editor; Book Publications: Clifton Fadiman, Consultant; Audio-Tape Program: Florence Mischel, Director; Wilda Osborn, Assistant Secretary; Ruth Brooks Floyd, Assistant Treasurer; William R. Bidner, Director, Western States Office; Clifford F. Welch, Director, Eastern States Office

THE FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC, INC.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS:

Robert M. Hutchins, Chairman; J. R. Parten, Vice-Chairman; Ralph E. Ablon, Joseph Antonow, Harry S. Ashmore, Patrick F. Crowley, Fagan Dickson, James H. Douglas, Jr., William O. Douglas, Joseph W. Drown, Arnold M. Grant, Francis J. Lally, Edward Lamb, Eulah C. Laucks, Morris L. Levinson, J. Howard Marshall, Frances McAllister, Stewart Mott, Paul Newman, Seniel Ostrow, Louis Schweitzer, Eleanor B. Stevenson, Bernard Weissbourd, Harold Willens

Eastern States Office: 441 Lexington Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10017

Western States Office: 205 South Beverly Drive, Beverly Hills, California 90212

THE CENTER MAGAZINE

A Publication of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions

Editor — John Cogley

Executive Editor — Donald McDonald



ELMO ROPER
1900-1971

Twenty years ago Elmo Roper put pressure on the officers of the Ford Foundation to do something about civil liberties and civil rights. The result was the Fund for the Republic. Elmo became one of its original directors. He served successively as member, chairman, and honorary chairman of the Board. He was influential in the establishment of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions.

His outstanding characteristics were courage and lucidity. He was never afraid to take a position, and he never left any doubt about what it was. The more unpopular the position, the more fearlessly and clearly he stated it. In the darkest days of McCarthyism he did not suggest compromise or retreat. The period of his chairmanship was one in which the Fund for the Republic fulfilled the hopes he had before it was founded.

We shall miss his counsel and his leadership.

— ROBERT M. HUTCHINS

JULY/AUGUST 1971

Without Consensus There Is No Consent	2
<i>Reinhold Niebuhr</i>	
The Lessons of Vietnam	10
<i>Stephen A. Garrett</i>	
The Laws of War	21
<i>Jon M. Van Dyke</i>	
Speculations/If I Were Pope	34
<i>C. Edward Crowther</i>	
What Is a Social Problem?	35
<i>Neil H. Jacoby</i>	
Speculations/Nowhere to Run	41
<i>Tom and Lucia Taylor</i>	
Toward a Learning Society: a Symposium	42
<i>Robert M. Hutchins, George N. Shuster, Jon M. Van Dyke, F. Champion Ward</i>	
Speculations/ On Charismatic Leaders	54
<i>Donald M. Gregory II</i>	
Second Edition/ The American Character	56
Topics & Comment	67
<i>J.C., John Humphrey, Susan Rosenblum</i>	
Aftermath: Letters to the Editors	74
Design	
<i>Lauri Provencher</i>	
Cover	
<i>Thomas Cornell</i>	

Erratum

The May/June, 1971, issue of The Center Magazine was erroneously identified as Volume III, Number 3. It should have been Volume IV, Number 3.

Without Consensus There



REINHOLD NIEBUHR (1892-1971)

Reinhold Niebuhr died at his home in Stockbridge, Massachusetts, on June 1, 1971, after a long illness.

Dr. Niebuhr, born in Wright City, Missouri, near the close of the nineteenth century, was unquestionably the most influential American

*theologian of the twentieth. Several books of his — especially the monumental *The Nature and Destiny of Man* and the politically percipient *Moral Man and Immoral Society* — were hailed*

as masterpieces throughout the Western world.

In addition to his scholarly work, Reinie (as he was affectionately known to thousands of admirers) was a brilliant preacher, an indefatigable journalist, and an incurable political activist.

The Center was fortunate enough to benefit directly from his extraordinary gifts. He served as a member of the board of consultants when the institution was still in the planning stage. Later he participated in many of the meetings and programs it sponsored. During a prolonged stay in the nineteen-sixties he resided in Santa Barbara as a Visiting Fellow.

This article formed the basis for the last Center dialogue at which he presided.

A democratic society is distinguished from the traditional societies of the ancient and medieval periods by at least three characteristics. First, it invites the free play of political opinion and social forces and arms its citizens with ultimate authority over the government by giving them the right to vote. This essential instrument of equality involves making a distinction between the authority of government per se, which has the implicit consent of all citizens, and particular governments established by the consent of

the majority, which fall when the explicit consent is withdrawn. The perils of anarchy in this competition between various political forces and parties which are seeking to make and unmake a particular government are obvious. The hazards prove that the unity of society must be based on a consensus which is deeper than the party conflicts.

Second, democratic societies do not, and cannot, compel cultural and religious uniformity. All Western democracies are culturally and religiously pluralistic.

Is No Consent

They are saved from anarchy and disunity by a political consensus which transcends their cultural and religious differences and by forms of social cohesion, geographic and ethnic, which might be defined as natural and organic.

Third, Western democracies allow free competition between economic forces on the theory that justice can be achieved through the free market. This freedom of competitive enterprise was originally based on the assumption that the market would level down all traditional inequalities, but in many instances it actually operated to accentuate the distinctions between strength and weakness, and thereby prompted the victims of the injustices of early industrialism to rebel under Marxist auspices. It was one of the achievements of Western democratic societies, however, to use the equality of political power as an instrument of justice against the inequalities of economic power, and to permit organized labor to establish a tolerable equilibrium of power in society. Thereby a consensus was created sufficient to guarantee unity against the divisive tendencies of rebellious classes who had lost confidence in the democratic process.

It is obvious that the differences existing within democratic societies will lead to the disunity of the community if a consensus does not express itself. A free society is no simple achievement. It is not possible if the democratic consensus is not thick

enough to guarantee the unity of the community so that there can be a free play of competitive ideas and forces.

Patriotism is the most obvious form of consensus. It is interesting to note in this connection that in democratic communities ideological differences have been most acute when one party was able to accuse the other of disloyalty. In our own nation however the differences between Jeffersonian "Republicans" and Hamiltonian "Federalists" were not disruptive because both sides could prove their loyalty to the federal union.

Closely related to patriotism is confidence in the government as a legitimate organ of the community. In the case of our Civil War, when the domestic peace of the community was imperiled by a lack of consensus, the government was forced to resort to military force in order to establish the unity of the community and to assert its prestige.

Another necessary form of consensus is expressed in the general attitude of confidence of the community toward the government as an instrument of justice. The proof of this is found in the history of revolutions against traditional governments, particularly the revolutions of seventeenth-century England, eighteenth-century France, and twentieth-century Russia.

In all these cases, the government lost its authority and the community became divided because a portion of the citizenry resented the injustices inflicted on them. These resentments arose significantly when classes in the community which were hitherto powerless obtained enough power to challenge the hierarchical organization of the community.

In a democratic society, the underlying consensus depends on having confidence that the free play of political forces will make for justice, at least in the long run. It expresses itself in the implicit consent with which the various factions allow particular governments to be established or overthrown. The source of this confidence and consent is belief in the ability of a government to preserve the stability of the community and establish justice.

But all these forms of confidence and consensus in a democratic community are not possible if there is not a measure of agreement operating within the free play of competitive and even contradictory social and political forces.

We are thus brought to the real issue of the prob-

Niebuhr on Science and Religion

Q: You have said that religion cannot solve our problems but also that our reason cannot, our intelligence cannot, science cannot. Why can't they, and what can?

NIEBUHR: Well, that brings us to the ultimate question, about the Biblical and the Christian and the Jewish interpretations of the meaning of human existence. When I say that those things cannot solve our problems, I do not say that they do not contribute, that you do not have to have science, a rational approach to the problems of life. The more complex the world situation becomes, the more scientific and rational analysis you have to have, and the less you can do with simple good will and sentiment. Nonetheless, I think the Christian faith is right as against simple forms of secularism in that it believes that there is in man a radical freedom. This freedom is creative but it is also destructive, and there is nothing to prevent it from being both creative and destructive.

That is why history is not an answer to our problem, because history complicates and enlarges every problem of human existence. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did not believe this but now we are living in the nuclear age, and the science that was supposed to work automatically for human welfare has be-

come a science that gives us nuclear weapons.

This is the ironic character of human history and human existence, which I can only explain, if I may say so, in Biblical terms, although I do not mean by this that I would accept every interpretation of Christianity that is derived from the Bible. Many people would not accept my interpretation, but that is what Christianity means for me. There is an ultimate answer in the true religious faith. It does not give you any immediate answers.

One of the young physicists at the Institute for Advanced Study said to me: "I know that there is a general religious frame which I accept, but does it give a particular answer?" And I said: "No, it doesn't give us a particular answer. You can't say, for example, that religion or irreligion will give us a particular answer to the nuclear dilemma."

I think I have one answer, which is partly religious and partly secular; and that is, we ought at least to recognize that we and the Russians are in the same predicament. That would be religious in the sense of "judge not lest you be not judged." We judge the Russians because they are living under despotism and we don't like it, but we have gotten into a fix now where we are living in a common predicament.

— From an interview published by the Center

lem of consensus in a democratic community. That problem concerns the measure of consensus operating within the very differences of opinion and interest that are allowed free play within society. Here is the core of the problem. For if the differences are too wide, the party conflict may become so acrimonious that each side will accuse the other of disloyalty to the common good. And if there is no consensus below the level of political conflict, contradictory moral and religious convictions may also destroy the unity of the community.

Only our own nation made freedom of religion one of the foundations of liberty. In Europe the idea had a more tortuous history. After the religious unity of European culture was destroyed by the Renaissance and Reformation, the religious wars were ended in the Treaty of Westphalia, which guaranteed the unity of the community through the principle of *cuius regio eius religio*: the faith of the prince determined the particular version of Christianity which could be

professed in the community. In France the religious wars of the sixteenth century proved that the principle could not contain the danger of civil strife. These dangers prompted Jean Bodin to accentuate the principle of monarchical absolutism, which he used to secure the unity of the community against the perils of religious strife.

In Great Britain religious pluralism was delayed because the Tudor monarchy used the quasi-Catholic Anglican establishment as an instrument of its unity. The war with Spain under Elizabeth's reign placed Catholics under suspicion of disloyalty to the nation, and the Puritan sects were suppressed because of their radical opposition to monarchy. But the Elizabethan settlement could not prevent the political and religious conflict of the Cromwellian revolution. The multitude of sects in the Cromwellian army made toleration necessary as an instrument of national unity, though only the Independents fervently believed in toleration. The Restoration under Charles

II reestablished the Anglican Church but did not snuff out religious toleration, which, like liberty, gradually "broadened down from precedent to precedent."

Religious toleration in the United States was originally prompted by the multiplicity of the sects in the Colonies and by the rational and theological theories of such men as Roger Williams, William Penn, and Thomas Jefferson. The toleration would not have been possible in the long run if the various religious traditions did not show that they shared a certain consensus in spite of their differences. Were this consensus lacking, the divisive possibilities of religion pluralism would have threatened the community.

The three main religious traditions of our nation share a consensus because they are all drawn from a common Biblical source. Their interpretations of Biblical teaching may vary greatly but their moral convictions are very close. The general community is, of course, particularly interested in a consensus which can serve as the basis for its political morality. The most obvious is the agreement on the institution of monogamy. This consensus is so solid that when the Mormons claimed the right to practice polygamy in the name of religious liberty, they were refuted by the Supreme Court, despite the fact that the Constitution did not explicitly ordain monogamy as a national standard.

Another important consensus shared by America's religious traditions is the conviction that man's life in history is meaningful. In this the Western religious traditions differ significantly from the mystic otherworldly religions of the Orient. The consensus furnishes a solid basis for the historical dynamism of the Western world, but it also makes for an unhappy by-product — fanaticism. For it has always proved to be difficult to relate historic tasks to the religious sense of an absolute good without confusing the absolute with historically conditioned values and historically proximate ends.

The Catholic form of the Christian faith from time to time has threatened to disturb the general consensus by its belief in an inflexible "natural law" which can be adjusted to historical contingencies only with great effort. Liberal Protestantism and secular liberalism imperil it by their utopianism, that is by the hope of establishing a reign of perfect justice on earth. In the case of liberal Protestantism and some forms of secular idealism, the utopianism is "soft," expressing itself in an unwillingness to participate in any of the morally ambiguous strategies of govern-

ment, property, and war by which we seek to establish a relative justice and tolerable security in a world of self-seeking men.

The fact that there has not been much difference between liberal Protestantism and secular humanism on the problem of utopianism, and that the Jacobin type of utopian fanaticism made democracy difficult in France, proves that we must also deal not only with the three great religious traditions but also with the secular humanism which arose in the Renaissance and had its impact upon our political institutions in the period of the Enlightenment.

Crane Brinton was quite correct in placing the Enlightenment in the general category of "Christian idealism." We needed the radical emphases of both sectarian Protestantism and secular idealism to challenge the traditional injustices of the old agrarian-monarchical societies, usually sanctified by complacent forms of religious faith, whether Catholic or Protestant; but we also had to guard against the utopian fanaticism of both these forms of faith, as expressed in both the Cromwellian and French Revolutions.

One of the virtues of the give and take of a free society is that it separates truth from error in all the traditions by the creative effect of common experience. Thomas Jefferson, for example, was in some respects as utopian as some of the French Jacobins, and some of his illusions about man and society were as soft as those of Locke. But in the party conflict of the new nation, Jefferson learned something from the "realism" of his arch foe, Hamilton. Hamilton did not in turn learn from Jefferson; but fortunately James Madison, who was basically in agreement with Jefferson but shared Hamilton's enthusiasm for the federal union, provided both a personal and constitutional consensus for these contradictory viewpoints.

These events in American history do not merely prove that contradictory viewpoints can actually enrich a consensus; they also prove that secular humanism must be regarded as a fourth basic tradition. Furthermore, they reveal that the problem of consensus deals with the question of how to establish a tolerable harmony as frequently as it does with the nature of the common good.

The problem of establishing a tolerable harmony in the community deals, not with the nature of the common good as some would have it, but with the limits and the possibilities of human benevolence and the necessity of handling the residual egoism found among even the most virtuous of men. On these questions orthodox Protestantism seems to run the danger of being tempted by its pessimism to espouse political

absolutism, while both sectarian Protestantism and the Enlightenment are always on the edge of utopianism of either the fanatic or the sentimental variety. Catholicism on the other hand has a balanced view of the nature of political man, but it is tempted to make a too absolute distinction between man's "eternal" and "temporal" destinies, the one guarded by the Church and the other expressed in the political order.

The most significant forms of political consensus on the problem of the human stuff with which politics must deal have undoubtedly embodied insights which have been drawn from all these religious and secular traditions, though radical Calvinism and the Enlightenment were the chief ingredients of the political philosophy which informed America's Founding Fathers.

A democratic society is distinguished by its willingness to allow competition between political parties expressing different and sometimes even contradictory views about the principles of justice which should apply in the community and the methods which should be used to arbitrate conflicting claims. Only confidence in the stability of the government makes it possible for various parties to challenge any ad-hoc solution to a problem of justice. Such confidence is inspired by the presence of at least a minimal consensus shared by the political parties. If the differences among them are too great, conflict will threaten the stability of the community. A comparison of the great Western democracies — France, Great Britain, and the United States — in regard to their residual consensus may be instructive.

France has been the most unstable of the three, partly because none of its governments, including two empires, one constitutional monarchy, and five republics, has existed long enough to secure the authority and prestige which is derived from the implicit consent of the whole people.

As in all European democracies, three general political movements expressed themselves in France. The first, drawn from the old aristocratic tradition, was based on landed wealth; the second was rooted in the interests of the rising business classes; and the third came from the industrial workers.

The peasant class of Europe played a varied role in the political struggles of European democracies. Sometimes they represented the conservative tradition. Sometimes their misery placed them on the

side of revolutionary parties. Sometimes they supported fascist tendencies in opposition to the collectivism of the workers. The middle classes of rising businessmen expressed themselves through a consistent laissez-faire doctrine of economic liberty. From the beginning of the modern era to this day the working classes were more collectivist and equalitarian.

Despite the violent elimination of the aristocratic force in politics, the ideological differences between the French parties were wider than those in England. The conservatism of the peasants prevented the organization of the stable government envisaged by the radicals who conceived the constitution; the abortive Paris Commune inspired the ideological

Niebuhr on Judging Others

Q: Do you think that because you are a Christian you are a more valuable man in our society, or more worthy in the eyes of God, than an atheist like Bertrand Russell?

NIEBUHR: I think I have already answered that. Certainly anybody who says "in the eyes of God" is pretentious. How do I know about God's judgment? One of the fundamental points about religious humility is that you say you don't know about the ultimate judgment. It is beyond your judgment. If you equate God's judgment with your judgment, you have a poor religion.

— From a Center Interview

rift between bourgeois and proletarian elements which prevented stable government not only in France but in other Western nations.

The French Revolution gave the competing economic political interests a clearer ideological color than either the English or American Revolution. The problem of consensus has therefore been more difficult in France than in the other democracies. In fact, the Revolution made ideological distinctions so precise that even the consensus of a common patriotism was easily obscured.

Ideological differences, rooted in economic interests, were also aggravated by the unresolved conflict between clericalism and anticlericalism, the consequence of a struggle in which the traditional medieval society was challenged by a completely secular revolutionary movement without the mediating influences of radical forms of religion, as in

Cromwellian England and the American Colonies.

The contradiction between clericalism and anti-clericalism was actually so great that even the emergence of a radical Catholic party after the Second World War, the M.R.P., did not create a left-of-center consensus between Catholics and secularists. The school issue above all prevented it.

Only De Gaulle found a tolerable solution for France by forcing the nation to accept a new constitution which provided for a strong executive power. Fortunately, he validated this choice, dangerous as it was, by combining dictatorial powers with democratic imagination in saving the nation from a civil war over the issue of Algeria.

De Gaulle revealed not only that a healthy democracy requires a minimal consensus within the parties in contest with each other, but also that a society which lacks this consensus can be saved from civil war only by a strong executive who can personally express a minimal consensus above the party conflict. The French experience proves that a minimal consensus makes a semi-dictatorial order a possibility, that the absence of any consensus creates the possibility of unmitigated despotism (as in Nazi Germany), and that only a great degree of consensus among the competitive political groups makes full democracy possible. Thus one must reach the conclusion that the degree of consensus establishes the degree of freedom which a community can afford. For, while freedom is a necessity of justice, it is obviously a luxury for communities heading toward chaos.



If the history of France illustrates the possibility of preserving a minimal degree of freedom in a nation which enjoys only a minimal degree of consensus among its competing political forces, Britain and the United States illustrate the possibility of increasing the consensus among competitive political forces.

Through a series of fortunate historical developments, Britain was able to draw aristocratic and middle-class interests into a democratic consensus and finally was even able to deflect the revolutionary impetus of the industrial classes into the same consensus. The Parliamentary Labour Party, composed of Trade Unionists and middle-class idealists, which developed in the early part of the century, had sufficient strength at the end of the Second World War to defeat Winston Churchill, the brilliant architect

of the Allied victory. The old semi-aristocratic tradition, on the other hand, had sufficient strength to take over the Labour Party's program of a "welfare state" but discard the more dogmatic socialist goal to nationalize all industry.

The gradual establishment of a national consensus with sufficient resiliency to accommodate the interests and the growing power, first of the middle classes and then of the industrial workers, was made possible in part by the traditional empirical spirit of the British, which dissolved the ideologies and dogmas of right and left. Partly the consensus is also the result of a deep tradition which lifted the monarchical symbol above party strife and made it the symbol of the most persistent and necessary consensus in society.

In America a consensus shared by capitalists and industrial workers was really more difficult for want of the tradition of noblesse oblige. The party struggle here took place between the individualism of the middle classes and the collectivism of the workers. The social mobility of the American community, however, prevented the collectivism of the workers from developing a consistent Marxist dogma inspired by class resentments. (It is significant that the "class struggle" seriously challenges the democratic consensus only when the inequalities of an industrial civilization are superimposed upon the class structure of a feudal society in which snobbishness causes resentments which no aristocratic sense of responsibility can overcome.)

American industrial workers never developed a party of their own, though since the New Deal the Democratic Party has been a vehicle of their interests. The party conflict from the early days of the Republic, despite acrimonious controversies between Federalists and "republicans," had an underlying "patriotic" consensus, the symbol of which was the equal devotion of Jefferson and Hamilton to the federal Constitution. The one great failure of the consensus to protect the unity of the nation was occasioned by the slavery issue, which separated the Southern agrarian interests from the Western and Northern agrarians and drove the isolated slave owners to desperation.

The victory of the North under a Republican President made Republicans the dominant party of the nation throughout most of the nineteenth century. It expressed the interests of the growing class of capitalists plus the land-hungry farmers. Thus the Republican Party united the individualism of both the capitalists and the agrarian individualists. The

Niebuhr on Atheism

Q: What is your personal attitude toward atheism? We have heard from certain atheists that the whole conception of God is unworthy of free men. They say that it is almost, in a sense, contemptible for a man to fall on his knees before God. What is your attitude toward atheists?

NIEBUHR: Well, you are asking two questions there. My personal attitude toward atheists is the same attitude I have toward Christians, and it is governed by a very orthodox text: "By their fruits shall ye know them."

I would not judge a man by the presuppositions of his life but by the fruits of his life. And the fruits — the relevant fruits — are, I would say, a sense of charity, a sense of proportion, a sense of justice. Whether the man is an atheist or a Christian, I judge him by his fruits, and I therefore have many agnostic friends.

The debate between atheists and Christians

is rather stale to me, because the Christians say, "You must be a Christian, or you must be a religious man, in order to be good," and the atheists will say — as you quoted one of them — "It is beneath the dignity of a free man to bow his knee to a god, as if he were a sinner."

The truth about man is that he has a curious kind of dignity but also a curious kind of misery, and that is what the various forms of agnosticism do not always understand. The eighteenth century always talked about the dignity of man, but I rather like Pascal's words: "The philosophers talk to you about the dignity of man, and they tempt you to pride, or they talk to you about the misery of man, and they tempt you to despair." And then, Pascal says — this was written in the Cartesian age — "Where, but in the simplicity of the Gospel, can you hear about both the dignity of man and the misery of man?" That is what I say to the atheists. On the other hand, I also say, it is significant that it is as difficult to get charity out of piety as to get reasonableness out of rationalism.

— From a Center Interview

presuppositions of these individualists contradicted those of the growing army of industrial workers who were the victims of dislocations in the increasingly intricate industrial complex of enterprises.

It is equally significant that this contradiction between individualistic and collectivist theories and between libertarian and equalitarian conceptions did not create the rift which it brought about in many parts of continental Europe.



The question still arises whether some underlying consensus transcending all differences will forever guard the unity of the nation or will fail as it already once did. Perhaps the open conflict of the Civil War was due to the fact that the disaffected minority of slave owners was geographically localized in the Southern states and that it was strengthened by the idea of states' rights. The loyalty of Robert E. Lee to the State of Virginia, though he hated slavery, may be symbolic of the importance of this factor in breaking the consensus of the nation.

But these unique circumstances in regard to the slavery issue do not explain why our industrial workers, suffering from injustices of early capitalism, did not become as rebellious as many of their Euro-

pean brethren did, and why they did not even elaborate a mild form of revolutionary politics to express their resentments. What elements of consensus operated to persuade them that they had more to lose than their chains?

One part of the answer reveals a basic element in any democratic consensus: the confidence that the system of government will in the long run make for justice, even though in the short run a portion of the population may feel itself defrauded. The social mobility of the nation, the opportunity of any member of the working class to move up in the economic and social hierarchy, the myth of the section hand becoming a railroad president, with its political counterpart of "from log cabin to White House," expressed the confidence in a long-run justice through individual opportunity.

The increasing political and economic power of workers and the gradual concessions of the managerial class has contributed to a deepening consensus in all Western democracies; both groups accepted the compromise of the welfare state and a mixed economy until the points at issue became very few. At the same time, common experience diluted the dogmas of each side. Each side came to recognize the inevitable ideological bias of both sides. The result is that modern democracies are

now prepared to incorporate in their consensus the knowledge that contradictory emphases about the nature of justice and about methods of achieving it are necessary if true justice is to be achieved.

Of the undemocratic nations of the past, Russia and Germany offer the most interesting examples of the breakdown of traditional governments. Both were absolute monarchies, with quasi-constitutional parliaments "granted" by the monarch as a concession to the rising middle class but lacking real authority; in both nations, the military power was allied with the monarchical power. Both governments broke down under the exertions of the First World War.

The immediate cause of their collapse is a reminder that one must add to the source of prestige of a government not only efficiency but the ability to defend the nation against its foes. Order without justice breeds resentments; but resentments do not become vocal until obvious inefficiency and military defeat lower the prestige of the state.

In both these cases a nontraditional government was formed — in Germany a democracy and in Russia a communist dictatorship.

The Weimar Republic offers an instructive example of the failure of the democratic government to gain sufficient consensus to insure the stability of the community. The Republic was studiously democratic with proportionate voting, etc. But the multiplicity of parties made for lack of stability; and the increasing dependence of the government upon an undemocratic army for its stability plus its failure to assert its authority over the army further debased its prestige. Democracy was thus incapable of dealing with the severe consequences of the worldwide depression and the desperation of a defeated nation.

The parliamentary regime fell victim to the Nazi tyranny, which came to power by "legitimate" means through the conspiracies of a disloyal army, abetted by an army hero in his dotage, President Hindenburg.

Hindenburg was ironically elected to heal the breach between the traditional and the new regime. Consciously loyal to democracy but bound to military traditions, he proved to be the avenue along which a fanatically undemocratic movement could penetrate the bastions of a democracy.

The final defeat of this fanatically nationalist movement in the Second World War is a matter of history and does not concern us here. But the new Bonn democracy, arising from the ruins of this defeat and achieving a more genuine health than the Weimar Republic, is instructive. The complete col-

lapse of the aristocratic-military tradition eliminated one factor which prevented an adequate consensus in the Weimar Republic. The economic health, contrasted with the economic crisis of the Weimar Republic, increased its prestige. But, above all, it was able to establish a consensus shared by the middle classes and the industrial workers through a mixed economy and welfare-state norms. Thus Marxist rebellion was liquidated in the nation in which the Marxist rebellion was first conceived.

In Russia the breakdown of the traditional order led to a new form of undemocratic society under the dictatorship of one party, ostensibly serving as a surrogate for the messianic "proletarian" class of the Marxist apocalypse. It would be idle to speak of this dictatorship if it were not for the fact that Soviet society now reveals some promise of developing, not into a free society, but into something quite different from Nazi despotism.

This development, which refutes our simple categories of "free" and "totalitarian" governments, was caused by three factors. The first was the technical competence of the new society, giving the government prestige and something like "implicit" consent for its rule, and putting it in a slightly different category from those governments which are ruled by sheer power. The second was the educational revolution which offers all children the opportunity to advance in accordance with their intellectual capacity. This revolution assures the consent of the younger generation to its rule and incidentally creates classes of technically competent citizens, who may not be immediately politically critical but in the long run will change the despotism into something quite different.

The third factor is the remnant of democracy in the Communist Party itself. It was destroyed by Stalinist despotism, but, after Stalin's death, the fact that Khrushchev triumphed by appealing successfully from the Presidium to the Central Committee of the Party gave the observer reason to speculate hopefully that the communist system may be at about the same stage as English democracy was at the beginning of the eighteenth century, when Sir Robert Walpole artfully managed the aristocratic oligarchy which ruled Britain.

Perhaps it is not too hazardous to mention a fourth factor making for a more democratic consensus. It consists in the agreement of the various oligarchies of Russia — political, military, and managerial — that they will not again be ruled by terror. Even the rivalries among these various oligarchies, then, may contribute to a more "open" society. 20

The Lessons of Vietnam

When future historians attempt to arrive at some sort of verdict on the quality and meaning of the American experience during the nineteen-sixties, it seems inevitable that the great public debate which arose over the American intervention in Vietnam will occupy a place of prime importance. Perhaps above all else that debate will be seen as representing a profound *crise de conscience* within American society, a general conviction that the war was essentially a moral problem raising questions not only about the ethical complexion of international relations itself but also about the character of a liberal democratic society like the United States. The furor over My Lai may come to stand as its symbol.

In one sense it is hardly surprising that the Vietnam debate should have been waged in moral terms. As George Kennan has pointed out, Americans traditionally have had a predilection for regarding foreign policy in a "legalistic-moralistic" framework. And, quite aside from natural instinct, the rhetorical usefulness in affecting an air of moral certitude has proved tempting for many engaged in defending their position on Vietnam. This strategy of course has not been confined to those outside the halls of government. Many of the policy-makers who were instrumental in the original American intervention explained the decision largely in ethical terms, perhaps

partly because they felt only such a tack would be compelling with the general public. Former President Lyndon Johnson established the precedent in his famous speech at Johns Hopkins University in April, 1965, when he maintained that "because we fight for values and we fight for principles, rather than territory or colonies, our patience and our determination are unending."

Yet it would be a serious mistake to dismiss the moral concerns in the Vietnam debate as simply a result of tactical expediency or of underlying public naïveté about the power-political character of international relations. There seems to be some tendency to do so. Henry Kissinger, for one, maintained in late 1969 that the problem of Vietnam was not of "sufficient magnitude" to pose a genuine ethical dilemma. Nevertheless the war in Vietnam has raised fundamental normative questions for millions of Americans. To ignore this fact amounts to an undue cynicism about public attitudes in a democracy. Moreover politics generally — both domestic and foreign — is essentially nothing more than the attempt to realize values held by the society.

For both these reasons, then, a serious assessment of the moral issues involved in the debate over Vietnam would seem imperative. Yet to a surprising extent it has been absent so far. And "assessment" is

The question now — what have we learned and what effect will it have on the diplomacy of the future?

used here to mean not another verdict on whether the war has in fact been "moral" or "immoral" but rather an analysis of what Vietnam reveals about the nature of the moral problem in foreign policy.

The effort, in short, would try to cut through the emotion and clamor of the debate and establish the real terms of the argument about morality, defining in the process the principal alternative approaches evident in the debate on the moral issues involved. Whether such a task is really possible at this point in time is open to question, since historical detachment and perspective are not yet available. Still it seems necessary at least to make the attempt, in the hope of elucidating the lessons which Vietnam has to offer concerning the relationship between moral concerns and the future of American diplomacy.



The controversy over the ethics of the Vietnam war has taken several different forms. At one level George Kennan's dictum about the "legalistic" instincts of the American people has been reflected in a continuing argument over the legality of the war. In part, this has involved the American constitutional system itself, in particular the right of Congress to issue declarations of war and the nature of the authority

that was actually granted to President Johnson under the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of August, 1964. But American obligations under international law have also been introduced into this part of the debate, not only in terms of the general principles of international law but more specifically with respect to American rights and duties under both the United Nations Charter and the Geneva Accords of 1954, which ended the first Indochina war.

All these issues have involved important moral and social commitments. The assumption that American policy must be in pursuance of formal legal norms is implicit in many of the arguments, for example; otherwise the policy loses its moral justification. In a more general sense, a theory about the relationship between ethics and international law is at stake: international law is held to be the primary mode by which principles of justice and morality come to restrict the raw power behavior of states. And the debate over the constitutional foundations of the war is also in part symptomatic of a more basic concern about the current direction of American political institutions, especially the tendency toward Executive dominance in policy initiatives and the consequent dangers to the system of checks and balances.

Yet in examining the debate over morality and the Vietnam war, it is hard to escape the conviction that the legal problems involved in it in themselves have been subordinate to the more fundamental ethical dilemmas. For it seems clear that the legal debate has involved hair-splitting and false distinctions, with both supporters and opponents of the war amassing impressive briefs, replete with learned footnotes, in order to prove their respective cases. This is not to say that the broader legal issues are meaningless; they are not. The point rather is that this importance has essentially been of a metaphorical, rather than literal, nature.

The core of the moral problem presented by Vietnam, then, may be found not in legal quibblings but in basic attitudes toward the ethical framework and moral justification of war. And it is instructive and indeed necessary to consider it in the context of the historical shifts in attitudes toward war which have occurred in the West over the past several centuries.

The concept of total war was accepted during the great religious struggles of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. War was conceived as a conflict between differing social and ideological systems, and the distinction between active combatant and civilian did not obtain. As a result great areas were laid waste as a legitimate expression of fighting be-

tween whole peoples rather than states. (The population of Germany, for example, was reduced by approximately one-third between 1618 and 1648.)

Following the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, however, there was a shift in attitudes. Not only was there a revulsion against the excesses of an earlier period, but the basic cause of those excesses, religious antagonism, was superseded by dynastic competition among the principal European states. Total war was abandoned in favor of limited conflicts between professional armies which intruded only marginally on the lives of the mass of the population. Such wars were designed to maintain the European balance of power and perhaps to result in territorial concessions, but they were manifestly not meant to destroy the entire social and political system of the losing side. Indeed the maintenance of the viability of the principal units in the system was accepted as necessary. Both for humane and for practical political reasons, then, the practice of war generally operated within restricted boundaries in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with the possible exception of the Napoleonic era.

However, another basic shift in Western attitudes toward these boundaries took place in the twentieth century — a reversion to the earlier concept of total war, in practice if not in theory. Partly this was due to technological progress: developments in modern weaponry, especially with regard to air power, gave “opportunities” to the modern age which had not previously existed. But more important, war once again became ideological in nature. From Woodrow Wilson’s “war to make the world safe for democracy” to the unconditional surrender demand imposed on Germany in World War II, international conflict reverted back to a struggle between whole systems which was total and uncompromising in character. The fire-bombings of Hamburg and Dresden, the incineration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were among the gloomy sacrifices offered up to Mars.

In many ways the Vietnam war has represented the culmination of another great shift in Western thinking on the tolerable scope of warfare. Since 1945, there has been a revival of the previous theory of limited war. The initial impetus for this change once again was both practical and ethical. That is to say, in the nuclear era total war seemed to lose its political relevance. It could no longer fulfill the function Clausewitz assigned to it of being a continuation of policy by other means; rather it appeared likely to represent the end of policy. And even if one side should emerge the “winner” in a general nuclear ex-

change, the price in human suffering on both sides would be inherently disproportionate.

Much of the discussion on Vietnam as a consequence has simply been a logical extension of this post-1945 pattern, but with its own emphasis. Debate has tended to be focused not on the “practical” or strategic requisites in modern warfare but rather on possible extensions in the ethical standards by which such warfare must be waged. In short, the pragmatic necessity for keeping Vietnam a limited conflict has been more or less accepted; what has been at issue, however, is whether merely keeping a conflict localized and non-nuclear is enough to make it truly limited and tolerable in the moral sense.

Two factors have been involved here. On the one hand, nuclear weapons are not the only manifestation of a morally disproportionate advance in war technology. The use of conventional weapons, particularly the massive employment of air power and artillery, is so awesome that it can easily acquire some of the apocalyptic quality of nuclear arms themselves and perhaps become inherently disproportionate in the same way. After all, Hamburg and Dresden (and Coventry) were destroyed by conventional bombs.

Closely related to this point is the old problem of the legitimate distinction between combatants and civilians. In the traditional theory of limited war, such a distinction was a crucial part of the moral framework of conflict. However, it is clear that in Vietnam such discriminations have rarely been made. This is not simply the fault of the warring parties; it is inherent in the nature of guerrilla warfare. Yet it is also inherent in wars fought for ideological purpose, as was true in the sixteenth century, and this is perhaps the more crucial point. How can the distinction be maintained if war is looked upon as a struggle between differing ways of life and national philosophies? It will be recalled that war became limited when such motivations faded in the latter part of the seventeenth century. It may be equally necessary for this generation to eschew “moral crusades” if the new trend toward putting ethical limits on warfare is to become meaningful.



The question of what ends warrant the resort to violence has historically been one of the stickiest problems in the relationship between morality and foreign policy. Under the classical definition of a “just war,” two general types of goals were at various times cited as justifying recourse to arms: self-de-

fense, and the protection of the weak against a powerful tyrant or aggressor. As the Vietnam debate has unfolded, it has been clear that virtually all of the debaters regard at least the first end as still being a valid reason for going into battle. Yet bitter moral controversy has remained even after such a rationale has been commonly accepted.

This paradox may be traced to the very nature of international politics today. The basic problem is that the definition of what is a war of "self-defense" has become highly uncertain. For one thing, international politics has been "globalized." In the traditional system, what counted were the power relations among a small group of nations concentrated in the geographical setting of Europe. Within recent decades, however, the number of significant international "actors," especially in the non-Western world, has expanded rapidly, and this has been accompanied by such impressive advances in technology and communications that a true world political system may now be said to exist. Under these circumstances, a great power like the United States almost inevitably has global security interests, however these may be expressed in terms of specific policy ventures. The problem thus arises as to what can be considered the legitimate scope of "defensive" wars. In this sense Vietnam evidently has *some* relationship to American security, but it is obviously a more indirect and subtle one than the massing of hostile armies on one's frontiers.

Yet the fact that a contemporary security threat is "indirect" does not necessarily make it any less compelling. Not only has international politics become globalized, but modern weapon systems are so devastating that an enormous new emphasis has been laid on what might be called the "psychological imperative" in world politics. This involves not only the necessity of perceiving an opponent's potential action but also, in the case of great powers like the United States, the effect of the nation's behavior in any part of the world on the over-all "image" which her major antagonists have of her. For example, in June, 1967, the Israeli air strike was based on the assumption that the initiation of hostilities by the Arab states, certainly a potential if not an actual decision, would *in itself* prove fatal to Israeli security because of the nature of modern warfare. And with regard to Vietnam, there is at least a legitimate question to be asked about what the effects of an American withdrawal from the area in the early nineteen-sixties would have had on Soviet and Chinese calculations about over-all American strategy and purpose, involving potentially

the American commitment to Western Europe and the Pacific basin and even the continued credibility of the United States's nuclear deterrent.

Many of those denouncing the war as "unjust," of course, have tended to reject such considerations out of hand, but this hardly seems justified. After all, there is substantial evidence that Khrushchev was encouraged in his forward policy in Cuba in 1962 not only by Kennedy's early vacillation at the Bay of



ILLUSTRATIONS: THOMAS CORNELL

Pigs in April, 1961, but also by the President's seemingly "weak" and conciliatory performance at the Vienna meeting with Khrushchev in 1961.

The conclusion seems inescapable, then, that "preventive wars" cannot be a priori eliminated from the legitimate range of measures for "self-defense" in contemporary world politics. And by "preventive wars" we do not imply presumptive nuclear strikes — indeed we have acknowledged that resort to such action is properly rejected by statesmen on both rational and moral grounds. Nor do we condone in

this term the actual initiation of conventional hostilities. Rather a preventive war in the sense used here implies an intervention in a local conflict which is already in progress, not for purposes of actually fending off the tiger at the gates but rather in the interests of preventing alterations in the world power balance and changes in the image of American firmness, which ultimately would provide an intolerable challenge to American security.

Whether Vietnam could be said to fall under this permissible mandate for preventive war is of course subject to dispute. But the point simply is that moral attitudes toward the war, i.e., views on the just cause of armed conflict, cannot be divorced from analytical conclusions about current military and political realities: the geopolitical foundations of American security, the internal structure and goals of the world communist movement, the actual psychological effects which Vietnam has or has not had on other states in the international system. Only when an individual has made his views clear on these matters can his moral position be logically defended, if it be assumed that he accepts, at least in theory, self-defense as a legitimate cause for resort to warfare. And in this connection it seems likely that part of the debate over Vietnam has not been over "just cause" itself but over differing analytical conclusions about the necessary scope of "self-defense" in present circumstances.

Yet if self-defense is regarded by all as a legitimate reason for resort to war, and the problem is to define what a "defensive" war is, the moral controversy surrounding "just cause" and Vietnam is not exhausted. For the Vietnam intervention has been defended by many not only as a war of self-defense but also as a "war of righteousness," that is, a defense of the freedom and independence of the South Vietnamese as a legitimate end in itself. And we do not find even the limited consensus about this second type of just cause which prevailed with regard to self-defense.

In the early years of the Republic, and continuing up to the Spanish-American War, the official stance of most American policy-makers was against intervention abroad for the sake simply of defending freedom, self-determination, etc. In a famous Fourth of July address in 1821 John Quincy Adams expressed the essence of this position when he said that although America's "heart, benedictions, and prayers" would go out to any area where "the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled," nevertheless the United States "goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher

to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own." Adams was arguing against American assistance to the Greeks in their war against the Ottoman Empire.



However there was always a powerful popular instinct in the United States for such interventions — indeed it was to restrain this instinct that Adams felt compelled to speak — and these public passions finally were reflected in official policy at the turn of the century. Under the inspiration of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, two men very different in other respects, the leaders of the new American utopia accepted the standard established by Sir Thomas More for his mythical kingdom — it was perfectly legitimate "out of good nature or in compassion to assist an oppressed nation in shaking off the yoke of tyranny." The mantle of Roosevelt and Wilson was subsequently donned by virtually every American President and Secretary of State in the present century. Even the tough-minded Dean Acheson proclaimed at Amherst College in 1964 that "the very conception of morality seems to me to involve a duty to preserve values outside the contour of our own skins, and at the expense of foregoing much that is desired and pleasant, including — it may be — our own fortune and lives."

In important respects, then, the debate over Vietnam has represented a renewed confrontation between these two historical patterns in American thought. Two basic issues have been involved. On the one hand, there is the root question of whether a policy of defending the freedom of the South Vietnamese by military intervention was in itself justifiable. Among those who have regarded Vietnam as basically a moral problem, there have been many on *both* sides of this issue. The case of those defending American policy in Vietnam on altruistic grounds has really flowed out of the basic premises of the whole Wilsonian approach in American policy. The very definition of "morality" requires us not to be indifferent to the freedom of others but extend tangible power to protect and even expand it. Moreover, our national character, not even to mention the fate of others, would wither spiritually if American policy were to turn inward. And, as a practical matter, the world is far different from what it was in Adams's day. As President Johnson said in his speech at Johns Hopkins, the universal acceptance of the principle of self-determination is not only desirable in itself but

we should realize that "only in such a world will our own freedom be finally secure." Self-interest and idealism thus reinforce each other in the globalized system of contemporary world politics.

Yet those opposing a "war of righteousness" in Vietnam have often done so with a moral fervor equal to if not greater than that of the Wilsonians. In part this is because they see the altruistic pretensions of the United States or indeed of any nation-state as hypocrisy. They agree with the English historian Herbert Butterfield that states are constitutionally incapable of sustained moral commitment but are selfish entities, interested only in their relative power position; at best they use moral pretensions to cloak these primordial impulses. Moreover, when states sally forth to do good, inevitably they make a "fatal impact" on the recipient culture. Even if the crusading nation acts with good intentions, it so disrupts and shatters the equilibrium of the area it is "protecting" that more harm than good is done. Mary McCarthy, the novelist, visited Vietnam and grieved that "before the Americans came, there would have been no rusty Coca-Cola and beer cans or empty whisky bottles. They had brought them. It was this indestructible mass-production garbage floating in swamps and creeks, lying about in fields and along the roadside that made the country, which must once have been beautiful, hideous."

Finally, in an ironic reversion of one of the arguments of the Wilsonians, what Walter Lippmann has called the "Jacobin spirit", ultimately produces a fanaticism and moral corruption in those who assume it. John Quincy Adams himself worried that with ideological crusades the "fundamental maxims" of American policy "would insensibly change from liberty to force. She might become dictatress of the world. She would no longer be ruler of her own spirit."

In sum, the moral controversy over Vietnam has in part been simply a rejoining of the debate over the fundamental principles which should guide American action in the world. Yet this does not end the matter, for it has been a striking phenomenon of the Vietnam debate that some of the most bitter discussion has been among those who share the Wilsonian instinct. Indeed an abstract commitment to the Wilsonian ideal seems to have been shared by a majority of the debaters.

The great difficulty, however, is in defining precisely what freedom is and consequently what types of systems and peoples deserve American support. The varying responses to this question have seriously

divided those who otherwise agree that America has ideological duties abroad. Specifically, then, many of those who questioned the morality of America's defending "freedom" in Vietnam did not do so because they believe freedom ought not to be defended; rather they did not believe the Saigon regime was a free one, at least in the sense which would justify American support. Some of the members of this group even felt that a communist take-over would represent a relative increase in the freedom of the people in South Vietnam.

There are in fact several identifiable approaches to the definition of freedom, each of which has figured in the Vietnam debate. There are those who consider freedom basically in terms of social and economic egalitarianism. Thus, reformist governments of the left are inherently viewed with greater favor than the status-quo regimes of the right, even if political power should be equally authoritarian in both. Logically enough, this group regards communism, for all its faults, as superior to, say, Nazism, since, as Senator Fulbright once put it, the former is basically "a doctrine of social justice." A second school of thought, however, defines freedom basically in terms of political and civil liberties: freedom of speech and press, legal right of participation in the political process through parties, interest groups, etc. From this point of view, then, both communism and fascism are equally unfree. For example, the late Bernard Fall, who was perhaps the leading expert on Vietnam, claimed that "there can be no genuine comparison between the Berlin Wall and the seventeenth parallel: in Berlin the barrier separates a total dictatorship from a true working democracy; in Vietnam, it separates two systems practicing virtually the same rituals but invoking different deities." A final group, however, disagrees with Fall. They see freedom in the contemporary world as basically the absence of communism. The late Senator Thomas Dodd, a leading hawk on Vietnam, proclaimed at one point that "even at their worst, the political autocracies that exist in certain free Asian countries are a thousand times better than communism from the standpoint of how they treat their own people." Such autocracies, then, are not ideal, but compared to communist societies, they are free and consequently deserve American support.

This typology has had an impact on the Vietnam debate in determining which individuals might sup-

port the American intervention on altruistic grounds. In general most of those who adhere to the first or second definitions of freedom have rejected such a rationale for the Vietnam conflict, while those who are committed to the third definition have accepted it, if they also felt that the United States had a duty to defend freedom abroad. The anti-Wilsonians, of course, would not favor helping Saigon on this basis even if they agreed with Senator Dodd's definition of freedom. (However, this has not precluded any of these individuals from supporting the Vietnam intervention as a war of self-defense.)

There may be important differences about the nature of freedom then, but what is perhaps ultimately at stake in opposing views on altruism and foreign policy is a philosophical conception of the nature of man and of human experience. There is a root conflict between the pessimistic view of life, where the opportunities for molding human institutions and improving the quality of existence are seen as limited by the essential tragedy of the human condition, and the optimistic view that men and nations are "perfectible," or at least that they are capable of significant improvement, and that American action can make a significant contribution to this process. The question in short is not only whether I am my brother's keeper, but whether I really can hope to play that role.



If one's moral judgment on Vietnam has thus necessarily derived from personal conclusions about the legitimacy of stated American goals there, that judgment has also depended crucially on one's attitude toward the means employed in Vietnam to gain American objectives. Consequently it is important to note that a great many people who gave initial approval to American goals in Vietnam were later calling the war immoral. Their basic objection was not against our intervening in Vietnam; rather the way in which this intervention came to be implemented alienated them. One example of this sort of shift came in 1966, when Harrison Salisbury of *The New York Times* was allowed to inspect the damage caused in North Vietnam by American bombing. He reported that, contrary to statements made by the Johnson Administration, the bombing had caused a great deal of civilian suffering. The Administration subsequently attacked Salisbury. As long as the bombing was seen as an "antiseptic" device aimed at bridges, railroads, and military barracks, the moral

sensitivities of many Americans were appeased — and support for American policy was equivalently solid. As soon as this image was erased, however, it became increasingly difficult for many to accept the legitimacy not only of the bombing but also of the American goals in Vietnam which the bombing was designed to achieve.

The development of a moral stance toward the means employed by the United States in Vietnam has ultimately involved two considerations: how important were American goals in Vietnam, and what level of violence was justified to achieve such goals? These two factors are mutually interacting. Thus the greater the priority assigned to American interests in Vietnam, the greater the level of violence which an individual may tolerate to achieve them. Even the most acerbic moral critics of the war, for example, generally supported the much greater suffering involved in World War II because the object of that conflict, i.e., defeating Hitler, was believed to be of fundamental importance. Yet it is also true that certain policy goals which are considered valid and even necessary in the abstract will be rejected because the level or type of violence needed to attain them seems morally intolerable.

A major objective of all the Allied Powers in World War II was to prevent a resurgence of German militarism after the war. At the Teheran Conference in 1943 Stalin suggested to Churchill that this could only be done by shooting fifty thousand members of the German Officer Corps on the day of Nazi surrender. No doubt this would have been a very effective way, at least in the short run, to guard against further German aggression. Yet Churchill denounced the proposal in ringing terms, saying that it would be a "blot" on the honor of the British people. Of course the cynic might say that Churchill could safely reject Stalin's proposal because he was convinced that less violent means could be found to restrain the Germans after 1945. Still the dilemma between ends and means is a fundamental part of the moral problem in foreign policy, and in a number of cases the decision must involve either accepting or rejecting a given policy goal rather than simply looking for alternative means to achieve it.

Some additional comments on the relationship between the importance of an objective and the means tolerated to achieve it are in order. In the first place, it is evident that the priority assigned to a specific policy venture will depend in part on analytical conclusions as to how necessary that objective is for the attainment of the long-range goals of the state, i.e.,

security, defense of freedom, etc. Thus we are once again confronted with the fact that a moral position on any policy question like Vietnam inevitably rests in part on a factual assessment about the real nature of the situation under discussion. On the other hand, it is evident that these "long-range goals" are themselves ranked in importance. Thus most people consider national security inherently more compelling than defense of freedom abroad. Consequently a greater benefit of the doubt is extended to those

objectives which are thought to be necessary to security than is the case with defense of freedom.

This latter point has been clearly observable in the Vietnam debate. Initially the Administration tended to stress the altruistic factors in the American intervention in Vietnam, whether or not this accorded with the private motivations of the decision-makers themselves. As the suffering in Vietnam increased, however, this rationale seemed inadequate for many and consequently support for the war began to diminish.



In response the Johnson Administration came increasingly to emphasize the relevance of Vietnam to American security, on the logical assumption that such an approach might produce a relatively greater tolerance by the public of the growing violence in Vietnam.

For instance, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in October, 1967, spoke of a "billion Chinese armed with nuclear weapons." Of course this type of maneuver is not without its perils, as Rusk discovered when he found himself accused of reviving the old "Yellow Peril" menace. This sort of criticism seemed hardly justified, yet the basic problem was that Rusk's grim picture of the Chinese threat to American security represented a somewhat jarring contrast to the altruistic image of American goals in Vietnam which had previously been nurtured. (There is an obvious question here as to whether the Administration might not have had firmer long-range support for its Vietnam policy if it had put greater stress on the security theme from the beginning, even though this would have necessitated a more sophisticated explanation of the war than simply the "defense of freedom and self-determination.")

It should be stressed that even though the goal of national security generally ranks foremost in the popular scale of priorities, this does not mean that such a goal overrides all considerations of "proportionality" in the use of violence. To put it another way, a diminution of national security will at times be accepted on strictly moral grounds. The example of Churchill's behavior at Teheran is one instance, if it be assumed that objectively the end of the German Officer Corps would have helped British security. And the American antipathy toward a preventive nuclear strike against China is at least partly based on the consideration that such a policy would be morally intolerable even if the elimination of Peking's nuclear capability might be important to long-range American security interests.

The great difficulty naturally is to determine what are the morally "proportionate" means to achieve a specific goal, even after its relative priority is established. In particular, at what point do the evils attendant on the use of violence come to outweigh any possible benefits of a given armed conflict? A personal decision about this "balancing point" necessarily involves both quantitative and qualitative considerations, i.e., how much suffering is there, and of what kind?

On the first point, a very real information problem has existed within the Vietnam debate, although the

moral passions evident in the discussion have tended to obscure this fact. The problem has been to determine with precision what the level of death and destruction in Vietnam has actually been. American casualty rates have been well-documented, but those of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese and even of the South Vietnamese have been far less certain. Moreover, the actual effect of the American intervention on the social and economic structure of South Vietnam, involving such matters as the rate of inflation and even the level of prostitution, has not been clear. And the level of civilian deaths has been particularly subject to dispute. Senator Edward Kennedy estimated that it exceeded two hundred thousand as of late 1969; officials of the Nixon Administration said this was a gross exaggeration. Yet the truth in these matters is obviously crucial to any attempt at establishing a coherent attitude toward proportionality.

But the degree of suffering in Vietnam, however open to dispute it might be, has not been the only factor in the moral equation. There is also the qualitative question. In part this involves the problem of whether certain types of weapons are inherently disproportionate—the B-52 raids and the use of napalm, for example. Of perhaps greater urgency is the distinction between combatant and civilian in warfare.

The core of the moral attack on the Vietnam war in many respects has centered around the undeniable fact that large numbers of civilians have lost their lives in the course of the military struggle and that the mechanistic and technological emphasis of the American effort has tended toward making no discriminations between enemy soldier and innocent civilian. That this makes the war clearly disproportionate, however, has been denied by those who claim that civilian suffering is an inevitable, though regrettable, aspect of guerrilla conflict, and that to eschew such encounters because of possible loss to civilians is to ignore the fact that guerrilla warfare will likely comprise a continuing challenge to American security and even altruistic interests in the coming years. In this sense it would be a "disproportionate" sacrifice of legitimate American policy objectives to reject flatly future anti-insurgency measures because civilians tend to suffer in such conflicts.

Implicit in the latter sort of reasoning is another aspect of the moral determination of proportionality in warfare, that is, how much suffering should be tolerated now in order to prevent possible future suffering of a much larger scope? Many supporters of the war, for example, have argued that the current

miseries of the South Vietnamese people must be seen in the light of what a communist success in the country would mean for the lives of many, ranging from outright elimination to various forms of oppression. On a larger scale, it has been asked whether it was not preferable to have a limited war in Vietnam rather than the apocalypse of a global war, which would perhaps have been encouraged by an American disengagement from Vietnam in the early nineteen-sixties.

Of course many of those opposing the war reject these considerations as absurd, and they may be right, both on the nature of a future communist regime in South Vietnam and on Vietnam's relationship to the deterrence of World War III. Yet not at least to recognize the dilemma here and make some attempt to analyze its elements seems to be unwise. After all, in retrospect, few would deny that a preventive war against Germany in 1936, however distasteful, would have been preferable to the subsequent events. And in fact many moral critics of the Vietnam war actually do subscribe to the fundamental principle of "suffering to prevent suffering." Not only do they defend the legitimacy of domestic insurgency against oppressive right-wing regimes, but significant elements of the New Left in the United States have recently expressed their sympathy for the violent activities of the Palestinian commando forces — in this case because they consider such activities preferable to the continued "oppression" of the Palestinian people by Israel.



There has been a final factor in the determination of Vietnam's proportionality. This has involved a judgment on how much blood and treasure — and national purpose — it was legitimate to expend in Vietnam when other objectives awaited American effort. In practical terms, this has emerged in the Vietnam debate as a weighing of the objectives of security and/or freedom in Vietnam with that of domestic welfare in the United States.

Three important questions have arisen. First, what was the importance of Vietnam to, say, national security? In some circumstances, almost any debater would be willing at least to postpone the resolution of domestic problems if he felt there was an overwhelming security threat at hand. On the other hand, a great many feel that American security eventually rests on a firm home base, and to postpone its development, except in the most extreme circumstances, is actually

self-defeating from the point of view of national security. Secondly, there is again the matter of priorities. A given individual may simply put greater value on achieving social and economic progress at home than in defending freedom, however defined, in other parts of the world. Others, however, may value this latter goal at least equally with internal progress, and this can obviously affect their definition of proportionality in Vietnam.

The final problem in this area has been the determination of just how much Vietnam has in fact detracted from domestic improvement. The Johnson Administration based much of its defense of the war on the argument that there was no necessary antipathy between the simultaneous achievement of American objectives both in Vietnam and at home. In a more cynical vein, it has been argued that Vietnam has not detracted from the home front because the resources expended there would in fact not have been put into domestic improvement if there had been no war — the American people would have demanded a tax cut rather than an expansion of the war on poverty.

In determining the actual effect of Vietnam on other national objectives, part of the emphasis has of course been simply material, that is to say, the availability of funds for given programs. Yet the analysis has been complicated by the fact that many stressed not only the increasing material costs of the war, but the spiritual damage Vietnam wreaked on American purpose. The argument here is that the war occasioned an exhaustion in spirit as much as in resources, and that the former was actually more debilitating to the need for concentrated efforts on internal reforms. This type of argument, of course, is extremely difficult to assess objectively. That is why the whole problem of proportioning American resources has proved so contentious.

There have really been two basic types of moral criticism of the war. Our discussion on proportionality in Vietnam actually is relevant mainly to those who accept that American objectives in Vietnam had at least some initial validity but turned against the war because in their view it became disproportionate. Others, however, started from an assumption of the initial illegitimacy of American goals in Vietnam. Consequently, even though these people have spent a great deal of time focusing on the civilian suffering in Vietnam, the undermining of social programs in the United States, etc., such assertions have really been irrelevant to their moral condemnation of the war. No matter how the war had been fought, such

individuals would still have considered it immoral. Zero justification balanced against even extremely limited means still results in a lack of proportionality. The contrast between this approach and that of the previous one, then, is ample evidence that the seemingly united front of moral criticism of Vietnam has actually concealed important differences in assumption and reasoning.



We said at the beginning that our purpose was not to arrive at any final moral verdict on Vietnam, and it is clear that we have not. Instead, our purpose has been essentially twofold: to dissect the nature and elements of the moral debate over the war, on the assumption that the basic issues of contention have often been subject to confusion and even distortion; and in the process to attempt to identify broad alternative approaches within the debate. Perhaps more importantly, we have striven to suggest certain guidelines for the future consideration of the proper role of moral concerns within American foreign policy. This latter task, the assessment of the "moral lessons" of Vietnam, seems to be particularly urgent and also possible of achievement now, even though the war has still not run its course.

Two general conclusions seem to emerge. One is that any serious effort at developing a moral position on the Vietnam war is far more complicated than might seem apparent from the easy defenses or condemnations of the war which have characterized the public debate during recent years. Either implicitly or explicitly, such a position must embrace not only complicated analyses of political reality in contemporary international politics, but also two different types of value judgments. What are the ends which national policy should pursue, both internally and externally, and what relative weight should be attached to the achievement of each of these goals? How much cost,

both in treasure and — if need be — in blood, is it legitimate to expend on any given end? The inordinate difficulty of arriving at really conclusive and defensible judgments on these matters is such that a generous amount of both humility and tolerance would seem appropriate for those debating the moral significance of Vietnam.

Yet it does seem inescapable that the moral furor over Vietnam is representative of a fundamental pattern in contemporary Western societies, particularly the United States. In John Kenneth Galbraith's biting term, the "conventional wisdom" of not only the Cold War period itself but of the whole pattern of nation-state action in the twentieth century is under challenge. The comfortable assumptions that the state is the basic repository of human needs and loyalties, that in particular one's own nation is inevitably the chief defense of right and justice in the world, and that indeed high-sounding abstractions such as "right" and "justice" warrant the most stupendous excesses in national behavior — all these may well be the victims of the conflict in Vietnam.

In a sense, then, the conclusion is tragic. The optimism about the inevitable improvement of the human condition, especially through the mode of nationalistic self-determination, which figured strongly at the beginning of the century, has given way to a sober realization of the irony and pathos in these glib assessments. Still there is a glimmer of light in these shadows. For it is indisputable that the assumptions of 1900 have produced in their own way a century of despair. If they can finally be put to rest, the result may be not the millennium but at least the possibility of more fully realizing the potentiality for progress and brotherhood which does exist in life within the limitations established by the fixed conditions of an imperfect world.

Mr. Garrett is an assistant professor of political studies at the American University of Beirut in Lebanon.

Can They Ever Be Enforced?

THE LAWS OF WAR

The trial and conviction of Lieutenant William L. Calley has caused America to rethink its attitudes toward the laws of war. Almost everyone seems to be unhappy with the decision. Those who support the war in Southeast Asia think that no one should be punished for participation in My Lai, an operation intimately connected with that war. Those who oppose the war think that the real criminals are the men who planned the policies of the war and that Lieutenant Calley is being used as a scapegoat. Virtually no one believes that Lieutenant Calley alone should suffer.

Some commentators have said that the only noble thing to do after the Calley trial is to leave Vietnam. Some congressmen have called for a complete investigation of all war crimes. President Nixon stepped in and announced that he would make the final determination on the fate of Lieutenant Calley. This action prompted worldwide disapproval, with the Sunday Telegraph (of London) saying that the President's action was a "cave-in" amounting "in effect, to the triumph of mob rule;" and with the Sunday Times (of London) stating: "That the Calley trial took place is a credit to the United States. But the President has now destroyed what good the trial has done."

The controversy within the United States over what should be done seems to prove that it is impossible for a government waging a war to supervise properly its own conduct of that war. Only an international body can have the necessary objectivity, and even at the international level the political pressures are difficult to eliminate. The laws of war are, however, so important that the pursuit of ways of enforcing them should not end merely because of our present failure to find the appropriate way to deal with persons who violate them. — J.V.D.

In ancient times there was no thought of treating an enemy any better after the battle than during it, or of sparing noncombatants connected with the losing army. All captives were usually killed, including the women, children, and elders of the defeated tribe or nation.

Later, in the Greek era, victors motivated by economic self-interest began enslaving their captives. During the Peloponnesian Wars, in the fifth century B.C., most victorious forces continued to slaughter vanquished soldiers, but they occasionally spared the women and children and sold them into slavery. The democracy and civilization at Athens was dependent on slaves who were captured in cities defeated in previous wars. The Romans also viewed their enemies as property to be used in any way they desired. Men and women from defeated Eastern lands were branded with hot irons and herded like cattle to serve their Roman masters.

The Christians returned to the earlier pattern in their religious wars and slaughtered all captured enemies because they were nonbelievers. During the Middle Ages the practice of ransoming prisoners — especially captured leaders — developed. The most famous example was King Richard the Lion-Hearted who was captured by Leopold of Austria in 1192 on his way back to England from the Crusades and released only after England agreed to pay one hundred and fifty thousand marks to Austria.

In the seventeenth century some scholars began suggesting that war captives ought to be treated as innocent victims rather than as criminals. The Thirty Years War, which began in central Europe in 1618 and became a byword for cruelty and misery, prompted debate on whether it was possible to limit the ravages of war. Hugo Grotius, the great legal

scholar of that time, included the following passage in the prolegomenon to his treatise, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, written in 1625:

"Fully convinced by the considerations which I have advanced that there is a common law among nations, which is valid alike for war and in war, I have had many weighty reasons for undertaking to write upon this subject. Throughout the Christian world I observed a lack of restraint in relation to war, such as even barbarous races should be ashamed of; I observed that men rush to arms for slight causes, or no cause at all, and that when arms have once been taken up there is no longer any respect for law, divine or human; it is as if, in accordance with a general decree, frenzy had openly been let loose for committing of all crimes."

The idea that warfare should be brought under the rule of law was not accepted — even in principle — by politicians and generals, however, until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In the American Revolution, for instance, the British continued to punish captured Americans harshly and the Americans reciprocated with equal brutality.

After American independence, we began including the idea of humane treatment for prisoners in treaties, and during our Civil War a rather sophisticated document regulating the treatment of prisoners was drawn up. This draft, written by Francis Lieber in 1863, called for the establishment of formal prisoner-of-war camps and for humane treatment at these camps. The actual treatment of Civil War prisoners remained relatively brutal, however.

In 1874, fifteen European nations met in Brussels to attempt to draft regulations that would civilize the treatment of prisoners. This was followed by conferences in The Hague in 1899 and 1907, and in Geneva in 1929 and 1949. Again and again, diplomats tried to refine the rules that would provide humane treatment for prisoners. But the goal of civilized treatment for prisoners and civilians in the midst of increasingly brutal wars remains elusive.

American troops in the Philippines to suppress the nationalist forces of Emilio Aguinaldo between 1899 and 1902 slaughtered many civilians, herded others into concentration camps, and tortured still others. One brigadier general ordered his troops to take no prisoners, shoot all males over the age of ten, and make the island of Samar "a howling wilderness" in retaliation for the bloody ambush of an American company. This general was court-martialed but received as punishment only a reprimand and an early retirement.

In World War I, there were continual charges by both sides that the other side was violating the law. In World War II, twenty-seven per cent of those in Japanese prison camps died during captivity, and many American veterans remember that our treatment of captives in Asia was significantly less humane than it should have been. The most famous example of brutality was the Bataan death march in 1942 in the Philippines when the Japanese marched hundreds of American prisoners to their death. In Europe, the Germans accorded particularly harsh treatment to the Russians, and the Russians in turn refused to allow open inspection of their prisoner-of-war camps.

In Korea, too, both sides engaged in dubious practices of interrogation and indoctrination, proving once again that the goal of humane treatment is almost always subordinated to the particular political and military goals of the moment.

The development of law in other aspects of warfare has also been excruciatingly slow. The regulations controlling the use of weapons seem, in fact, to have become even less strict. The Hague Convention in 1907 limited in some detail the use of weapons during warfare. But since 1907 no international agreement has been drawn up or signed that significantly regulates new weapons of mass destruction. Almost all nations have been reluctant to enter into new agreements that would limit their right to wage war. But despite this reluctance to talk about specifics, almost all nations now recognize at least that there ought to be laws of war, not only to reduce the suffering inherent in warfare, but also because such limitations make sense in pragmatic terms.



The United States Supreme Court in 1946, in the case of *In Re Yamashita*, which affirmed the conviction of a Japanese commander sentenced to death for failing to restrain his troops from committing war crimes against civilians, said the purpose of the laws of war was "to protect civilian populations and prisoners of war from brutality." That is the noble way of stating the purpose. The practical purposes of the laws of war can be summarized as follows:

Most nations want their soldiers to be treated humanely when captured and want their civilians to be spared when they fall into the hands of the enemy. If one warring nation does not provide at least minimal humane treatment for the soldiers and civilians it captures, the opposing forces will respond with acts of reprisal.

A series of events that occurred early in the Vietnam war illustrates how this desire for reciprocity and fear of reprisal works to enforce the laws of war. The Saigon government captured a terrorist who had thrown a bomb in 1965, and, after a show trial, they executed him. The Saigon government felt this terrorist did not have to be given the protection of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War because he acted in a clandestine fashion without uniform and without carrying arms openly. Before and during the trial, the Vietcong made it quite clear that if the terrorist were executed they would respond by killing prisoners they held. After the terrorist was executed, the Vietcong announced that they had killed an American prisoner of war as a reprisal. Three months later the same thing occurred. Three Vietcong terrorists were executed by the Saigon government in Da Nang despite efforts by the Vietcong to deter this action by threatening reprisals. After these executions the Vietcong again responded, this time by killing two American prisoners. Washington denounced the Vietcong action as "senseless murder," but in the context of this war, the action by the Vietcong made perfectly good sense.

The Vietcong sought to end the execution of their soldiers, and they accomplished this by executing our prisoners and threatening to continue this practice. Since the 1965 executions, the Saigon government — under pressure from the United States — has refrained from executing any Vietcong, terrorists or otherwise. The mere hint of reprisals during the 1968 Tet offensive was enough to persuade Saigon's leaders to remove the execution posts set up in the capital's principal market.

A second pragmatic reason for obeying the laws of war is to encourage enemy soldiers to surrender in battle rather than fighting to the bitter end. Soldiers who feel that they will be killed or tortured when captured are not likely to submit to captivity. They will continue fighting until the death, continue killing soldiers of the more powerful force while resisting capture.

A third practical reason for adhering to the laws of war is to encourage support for the war on the home front and preserve the sanity and moral structure of the soldiers fighting in the war. Most governments try to persuade their people that their wars are noble, that they are fought to defeat warlike peoples, to preserve "freedom" and "democracy," and to prevent future wars. But a government using military tactics that its own people view as immoral would find it difficult to sustain that argument.

A final reason why nations find it in their interest to obey the laws of war is that they want to achieve stature in the world community as just and humane powers. All the participants in the Vietnam war have presented legal and moral arguments to the world community in order to gain support. The United States, for instance, argues that the forces of the Saigon government are resisting an *illegal* take-over by communist forces and that the United States is assisting in this collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) argues that its military actions are legally justified because the provisions of the Geneva Accords of 1954 were violated when the Saigon government, with U.S. approval, refused to hold elections to unify the two Vietnams. Because these arguments are based on legal foundations, each nation should also feel obliged to use military tactics that conform to the laws of war.

The actual content of the laws of war is still evolving. A thorough analysis of the present international standards would be difficult to provide; these standards can become clearer only when more tribunals and more investigating bodies examine the actual practices of war. It may be useful, however, to indicate the range of viewpoints on what the laws of war are and to give some examples of the activities these laws might cover.

Perhaps the narrowest definition of the laws of war is that given by Professor Myres McDougal of the Yale Law School, who says that the "fundamental policy" of the laws of war is to "minimize the unnecessary destruction of values." According to Professor McDougal, as long as a military activity is undertaken for the purpose of limiting destruction, it is justified. Only actions that lead to needless death and serve no military purpose violate the laws of war. This formula gives great latitude to the military commander in the field. Most military officers think that their actions, over all, limit destruction. Few officers, even in the heat of battle, act only to increase pain and suffering. Indeed, had Professor McDougal's approach been accepted at Nuremberg, many fewer persons would have been convicted because it is virtually impossible to prove the criminal intent he demands.

Professor McDougal's test is one of reasonableness. He states that whenever a military action seems

reasonable at the time it can be justified in accordance with the laws of war. The opposing view is that the laws of war are more than flexible tests of reasonableness, that they are firm guidelines regulating military actions and absolutely prohibiting certain tactics, even if in the opinion of the military commander the use of such tactics would minimize destruction. Under this latter view, the laws of war are comparable to the firm proscriptions of the Bill of Rights. There are freedoms that according to the Bill of Rights are fundamental. They cannot be balanced against other interests when it is "reasonable" to do so. Similarly, although the laws of war no doubt seem highly unreasonable to military leaders in battle or to political leaders planning strategy, the laws fulfill the important role of drawing lines between permissible and impermissible conduct and stand as international standards that cannot be manipulated because of perceived military necessity.

An example of how far the laws of war might reach was provided by the North Vietnamese threat to try captured American pilots in the summer of 1966. The North Vietnamese never spelled out their legal theories in any detail, but they seemed to argue that pilots violated both North Vietnamese law and international law as enunciated in the International Military Tribunal Charter that guided the trials at Nuremberg. Although North Vietnam never drew up formal charges, the United States government took North Vietnam's threat seriously and set up a task force of military and civilian lawyers to prepare arguments that might be used against North Vietnam's indictment. Pham Van Bach, president of North Vietnam's Supreme Court and vice-president of the Vietnam Jurists' Association, stated the case as follows:

"As is well known, the U.S. government is waging a brazen, undeclared war of aggression in South Vietnam and a war of destruction against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, a sovereign and independent state, a member of the socialist camp. This was in itself a crime, a crime against peace, a violation of the fundamental rights of the peoples, a crime against mankind. The U.S. government has daily launched indiscriminate air raids on hospitals, schools, and densely populated areas, resorting even to B-52's, napalm, phosphorus bombs, poison gas, toxic chemicals, etc., to massacre the Vietnamese people in a most atrocious manner and with a character of extermination. In so doing, it has most seriously violated its international pledges, the 1954

Geneva Agreements on Vietnam, the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the protection of victims of war, and the norms of international law. The war crimes it is committing now in Vietnam are comparable to the crimes perpetrated in the past by the Hitlerite fascist ringleaders who have been condemned by the Nuremberg International Court.

"For this reason, the U.S. pilots captured in North Vietnam who, carrying out the U.S. government's orders, have attacked our country and perpetrated numerous crimes here are air pirates; we regard them as criminals and will try them in accordance with the laws of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam."

The legal argument seemed to be that Article 6(a) of the Nuremberg Charter covered the acts of individual pilots. Article 6(a) condemns:

"(a) **CRIMES AGAINST PEACE:** namely, planning, preparation, initiation, or waging a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances. . . ."

Although Articles 6(b) and 6(c), defining War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, were used against individual soldiers who participated in acts of unnecessary brutality, 6(a) was applied only against the leaders of Germany and Japan who planned and executed their wars. Nonetheless, the North Vietnamese seemed to argue that this provision should apply to individual pilots.

This somewhat dubious argument is further weakened by the failure of the Nuremberg prosecutors to accuse anyone of a crime of aerial warfare. Both sides in World War II bombed indiscriminately, and the Allies could not think of any aerial tactic used by the Germans or Japanese that had not been similarly used by their own pilots and air crews.

There are, however, ways North Vietnam might have used the Nuremberg experience effectively to try American pilots. The Nuremberg indictment does mention destruction of dikes, specifically the dynamiting of dikes by the Reich Commissioner for Occupied Netherlands:

"(b) Wanton destruction of cities, towns, and villages, and devastation not justified by military necessity. . . ."


"In Holland there was most widespread and extensive destruction, not justified by military necessity, including the destruction of harbors, locks, dikes, and bridges; immense devastation was also caused

by inundations which equally were not justified by military necessity."

The dike destruction referred to is that of the Wieringer Polder, planned on April 9, 1945, and completed April 17. Two parts of the dike were destroyed by dynamite up to a height somewhat lower than the surface of the water of the IJsselmeer. Twenty thousand hectares of land were inundated. The French Deputy Chief Prosecutor Charles Dubost charged that only eight and one-half or nine hours of warning was given to the population, and that "defeat was already a fact as far as the German Army was concerned."

The person charged with the crime of destroying this dike was Arthur Seyss-Inquart, an Austrian attorney who was appointed Reich Commissioner

for Occupied Netherlands on May 18, 1940, and who held that position throughout the war. In his defense, Seyss-Inquart said that he had received a "scorched-earth" order from Martin Bormann, the secretary to the Führer, when the German Army began moving out of Holland, but that he refused to carry out this order. If the order had been carried out, with explosions in fourteen or sixteen different places along the dikes, then all of western Holland would have been flooded. The floods that did occur, said Seyss-Inquart, were "battle" floodings needed because of the danger of Allied troop landings from the air that would outflank the Dutch defense front. Seyss-Inquart further defended his action by saying that on April 30, 1945, after the battle floodings had occurred, he was told by General Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, that "what has



WORLD WAR II — WARSAW GHETTO

been flooded so far can be justified from the military point of view; if you flood any more now, it is no longer justifiable." After April 30, there were no further floodings.

The Nuremberg tribunal concluded that Seyss-Inquart did oppose the extreme measures that his superiors requested, "as when he was largely successful in preventing the army from carrying out a scorched-earth policy." The judgment does not mention the flooding at all, indicating that the tribunal accepted the assertion that the prevention of troop landing is a valid reason to destroy a dike and flood an area. Seyss-Inquart, however, was given the death sentence for other crimes. The case is an ambiguous precedent at best, but if the North Vietnamese could show that American pilots bombed dikes without military justification they could argue that the pilots should be held individually responsible, even if they were carrying out orders.

The United States has always insisted that its pilots have never hit dikes, but the North Vietnamese insist that the reverse is true, and many visitors to North Vietnam have reported seeing bomb craters on or near dikes. An analysis of U.S. strategy makes it difficult to believe U.S. denials of hitting the dikes. The United States has admitted that more than seventy-five per cent of the inland waterways has been freely attacked, and it is virtually impossible to hit these waterways, especially with floating mines, without also damaging the locks, dikes, and dams that are interlocked within the inland waterway system.

The indictment and prosecution of Japanese war criminals at the Far East Tribunal in Tokyo give the North Vietnamese additional arguments that they might have used against American pilots. The prosecutor's staff at the Far East Tribunal attempted to create a new crime, the crime of murder resulting from an attack on a populated area without the warning provided by a declaration of war. Only cabinet-level officials and not individual pilots were accused of committing this crime, but the prosecutors emphasized that they regarded these attacks as separate crimes. The indictment separately listed attacks on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, among other places, and stated that these attacks violated the laws of war because they were made before Japan had issued a formal declaration of war.

The tribunal's judgment was somewhat ambiguous on the crime of unannounced attacks. Most of the defendants were convicted of committing crimes against peace and it may have seemed unnecessary to convict them also of an additional crime difficult of

definition. The tribunal explained its refusal to deal with the counts listing the unannounced attacks as follows:

"Counts 39 to 52 inclusive (omitting Count 44 already discussed) contain charges of murder. In all these counts the charge in effect is that killing resulted from the unlawful waging of war at the places and upon the dates set out. In some of the counts the date is that upon which hostilities commenced at the place named, in others the date is that upon which the place was attacked in the course of an alleged illegal war already proceeding. In all cases the killing is alleged as arising from the unlawful waging of war, unlawful in respect that there had been no declaration of war prior to the killings (Counts 39 to 43, 51 and 52) or unlawful because the wars in the course of which killings occurred were commenced in violation of certain specified Treaty Articles (Counts 45 to 50). If, in any case, the finding be that the war was not unlawful then the charge of murder will fall with the charge of waging unlawful war. If, on the other hand, the war, in any particular case, is held to have been unlawful then this involves unlawful killings not only upon the dates and at the places stated in these counts but at all places in the theater of war and at all times throughout the period of the war. No good purpose is to be served, in our view, in dealing with these parts of the offenses by way of counts for murder when the whole offense of waging those wars unlawfully is put in issue upon the counts charging the waging of such wars."

The court thus intimated that if a war is unlawful, all killings which take place in that war are crimes. Although this is only dicta, it could have been used by the North Vietnamese.

The tribunal accepted the prosecutor's analysis of the planning and waging of war process and did not discuss what sort of individual responsibility would be necessary to hold a person liable for an air attack or whether a pilot following orders could be held liable. The tribunal does state some limits on liability with regard to ill-treatment of prisoners of war, however, which might be applicable by analogy: "It is the duty of all those on whom responsibility rests to secure proper treatment of prisoners and to prevent their ill-treatment by establishing and securing the continuous and efficient working of a system appropriate for these purposes. Such persons fail in this duty and become responsible for ill-treatment of prisoners if:

- (1) They fail to establish such a system.
- (2) If, having established such a system, they fail to secure its continued and efficient working.

"Each of such persons has a duty to ascertain that the system is working and if he neglects to do so he is responsible. He does not discharge his duty by merely instituting an appropriate system and thereafter neglecting to learn of its application. An Army Commander for a Minister of War, for example, must be at the same pains to insure obedience to his orders in this respect as he would in respect of other orders he has issued on matters of the first importance.

"Nevertheless, such persons are not responsible if a proper system and its continuous efficient functioning be provided for and conventional war crimes be committed unless:

"(1) They had knowledge that such crimes were being committed, and having such knowledge they failed to take such steps as were within their power to prevent the commission of such crimes in the future, or

"(2) They are at fault in having failed to acquire such knowledge. . . .

"Departmental officials having knowledge of ill-treatment of prisoners are not responsible by reason of their failure to resign; but [they are responsible] if their functions included the administration of the system of protection of prisoners and if they had or should have had knowledge of crimes and did nothing effective, to the extent of their powers, to prevent their occurrence in the future."

There is one other section of the judgment that North Vietnam could have used against American pilots — the discussion of the Japanese trials of captured American pilots. The Japanese tried a number of American pilots who participated in the Doolittle raid early in the war, charging them with air attacks: (1) upon ordinary people; (2) upon private property of a nonmilitary nature; (3) against other than military objectives; and with (4) "violations of wartime international law." In each case the pilots were sentenced after a summary proceeding of less than two hours to either death or life imprisonment.

The judgment of the Far Eastern Tribunal did not state whether the first three charges could properly be brought against the pilots if a fair trial were provided, but instead says: "Conduct defined as offenses

1, 2, and 3 were such as the Japanese themselves had regularly practiced in China. It will be remembered that in July, 1939, the Chief of Staff of the Central China Expeditionary Force reported to War Minister Itagaki that a policy of indiscriminate bombing in order to terrorize the Chinese had been adopted."

With regard to the fourth charge, the tribunal said that a trial of pilots on this charge would be appropriate, if a fair trial were provided: "[V]iolations of the laws of war . . . [were] punishable in any event, but of course only upon proper trial and within the limits of punishment permitted by international law."

The tribunal then described the unfairness of the proceeding: (1) no defense counsel was provided for the accused who was in no position to secure one himself; (2) the accused had no opportunity to prepare his defense or to secure evidence on his own behalf; (3) no witnesses appeared at the trial and the evidence upon which the military judges decided the case seemed superficial, circumstantial, and inconclusive; (4) the entire proceedings lasted in most cases not more than two hours; and (5) the accused was not given an interpreter so that he might follow the conduct of the proceedings. The tribunal ruled that the execution of prisoners without a fair trial is a punishable war crime.

These arguments are not meant to be exhaustive. But they do indicate the kinds of arguments North Vietnam might have legitimately made. The North Vietnamese were not without foundation in thinking that international law justified their trying captured American pilots. An impartial tribunal might have concluded that they were wrong, but it would not have concluded that they were totally irrational. In any event, the merits of the arguments were never tested. After pleas from leaders all over the world, the North Vietnamese, in August, 1966, retreated from their insistence on holding trials. Instead, they appointed an eleven-member committee to investigate United States war crimes in Vietnam, which has periodically released documents on alleged U.S. atrocities.

One of the more flagrant atrocities the North Vietnamese accused the United States of committing was the destruction of the Quynh Lap leprosarium in the southern panhandle of North Vietnam. During 1965, when the bombing was getting under-way, this hospital was repeatedly hit — thirty-nine times according to North Vietnamese statistics. I was working in the Office of the Legal Adviser in the Department of State during the summer of 1966, when reports of the destruction of this hospital were first


issued by the North Vietnamese, and I went to the Pentagon to discuss the matter with officials there. The response I received provides an example of how U.S. government officials — at least lower-level bureaucrats — then viewed the obligations of the laws of war.

The Air Force provided me with pictures of the Quynh Lap hospital taken from aerial-reconnaissance planes after it had been bombed. The aerial photographs showed that all the buildings connected with the hospital were destroyed. The photo interpreter said the bombing was justified because he could see, in the long-distance photographs, squiggles along the ground that were trenches and small circles that were anti-aircraft sites. The photo interpreter said that, because anti-aircraft guns had been set up near these buildings and because trenches had been dug, the Air Force determined that these buildings were being used to house soldiers rather than as a hospital. I suggested to him that it was not unreasonable to put anti-aircraft guns near a hospital if bombers were flying over the hospital daily, and that the digging of trenches was a normal precaution, given the fact that the whole countryside was being bombed regularly. The photo interpreter said it was Air Force policy to view every structure that had defense installations built nearby as a military target.

A final example of how our bombing policy might be deemed to violate international law involves the crime of genocide. Article II of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines "genocide" as follows:

"In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."

The United States has not yet ratified this convention, but on March 30, 1971, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the treaty and the full Senate will consider the matter as soon as implementing legislation is drafted. The convention passed the United Nations General Assembly by a vote of 55-0 on December 7, 1948. Enough nations have now ratified it that it can be considered a part of international law.



WORLD WAR II — SINGAPORE STREET SCENE

The Genocide Convention was drafted in the aftermath of the Nazi extermination of six million Jews, but its language is broad and covers any action that threatens the existence of a recognizable group. The United States has not done anything that rivals the Nazi mass murders. But a number of persons have argued that the bombing practices seem to have as their natural and probable consequence the killing of many civilians and the forced resettlement of many others.

There have been, since 1965, about one and one-half million civilian casualties in South Vietnam according to the reports of Senator Edward Kennedy's Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees. About five million persons in South Vietnam, comprising one-third of the population of that country, have been forced to leave their homes and become refugees because United States or Saigon ground forces wanted to clear the area for combat or because of American bombing. The rate at which Vietnamese villagers have been forced to leave their homes has increased dramatically since November, 1970. In some new sites as many as ten per cent of the refugees die because of changed conditions. In Cambodia, one million of the six million people in the country were refugees as of August, 1970, and the number has risen since then because of continued U.S. bombing.

The situation in Laos seems to be worse, especially among the Meo tribesmen who inhabit the mountains of northeastern Laos. The Meo have been funded by the C.I.A. since the early nineteen-sixties to fight against communist troops. During the past ten years they have maintained an army of ten thousand men.

Since the increase in United States bombing of their homeland, virtually all the Meo, some three hundred thousand persons, have been forced to leave their mountain homes because of daily bombing from American planes. The Meo are obliged to move into protected hamlets, mostly in the plains, requiring a dramatic readjustment of their whole life-style. The infant-mortality rate, which was four out of every ten before the bombing, has risen because of this forced movement. About ten thousand of the young men in the tribe have been killed in battle. In all, according to Senator Kennedy's subcommittee, "at least forty to fifty per cent of the men have been killed and twenty-five per cent of the women have fallen as casualties of the war." The tribes are, therefore, facing possible extinction. Whether U.S. policy actually constitutes genocide would have to be determined after further evidence and testimony about U.S. policy and inten-

tions. But it is clear that American actions at least raise the question of whether the Genocide Convention has been violated.

Because the evidence seems overwhelming that the United States has used tactics in Southeast Asia that violate the laws of war, more and more Americans have called for an investigation of U.S. war crimes. Neil Sheehan, a veteran *New York Times* reporter and Vietnam correspondent, wrote a long article in the March 28, 1971, *New York Times Book Review* analyzing war crimes. He concluded that a top-level national commission should investigate the matter. On April 1, 1971, *The New York Times* carried an editorial urging the creation of an investigating commission with the power of subpoena. The National Committee for a Citizens Commission of Inquiry on U.S. War Crimes in Vietnam and the Vietnam Veterans Against the War have already conducted ad-hoc inquiries into the question of war crimes at which veterans have described atrocities they saw or participated in. A small group of New York legislators received testimony in Albany on April 6, 1971, from returned veterans. A number of U.S. congressmen have also concluded that an investigation is necessary. Representatives Bob Eckhardt of Texas, Benjamin S. Rosenthal and John Dow of New York, and Abner J. Mikva of Illinois have tried to prevail upon the House Armed Services Committee to hold formal hearings into alleged war crimes. Representatives Ronald V. Dellums of California, Bella S. Abzug of New York, John Conyers, Jr., of Michigan, and Parren J. Mitchell of Maryland organized public, informal hearings into the "command responsibility" for the United States' "war atrocities" in Vietnam. The hearings ran for four days during the last week of April, 1971.

The past record of U.S. official investigations of alleged war crimes does not, however, inspire confidence that any American commission will do a thorough and conscientious job. Thus far, the armed forces have tried to suppress evidence of war crimes rather than investigate and punish those Americans who have violated the laws of war. Our government has also failed to protest or prevent the manifest commission of war crimes by the armed forces of the Saigon regime.

The trial of Lieutenant James Brian Duffy provides an example of the official attitude toward the commission of war crimes. Duffy commanded a com-

pany in Binhphuoc district which, on September 7, 1969, was attempting to set up an ambush. The company discovered a man hiding inside a bunker. Documents indicated he was a deserter from the South Vietnamese Army. They suspected he was a tiger scout for the Vietcong and imprisoned him.

Subsequently, according to Army allegations accepted by the court-martial, Lieutenant Duffy told Sergeant John R. La Nasa, "It's time to get up and get out and shoot him." La Nasa then put an M-16 to the prisoner's head and did in fact shoot him between the eyes. Lieutenant Duffy reported to his superiors that the man was shot while trying to escape.

Duffy's lawyer did not deny that any of these events took place. Instead he argued that Duffy was acting in accordance with an Army policy not to take prisoners in combat operations.

Two fellow lieutenants in Duffy's company testified in his behalf that there was a conscious policy to avoid taking prisoners.

"Our policy," the first officer said, "was that once contact was made we kept firing until everything in the kill zone was killed. We did not take prisoners." He added that his battalion operations officer, a major, had previously gotten very angry when he brought in two prisoners.

The second young officer agreed. "My policy was that a man does not surrender during a firefight. If a VC comes out of a fight to give himself up, that man is dead." These policies, needless to say, violate the Geneva Convention.

The eight-man military court implicitly accepted this defense. They first concluded that Duffy was guilty of premeditated murder, but upon learning that such a finding required a sentence of life imprisonment they changed their verdict to involuntary manslaughter and gave him a six-month sentence. Duffy continued to be paid by the Army while in prison, with a forfeiture of twenty-five dollars per month, and he was allowed to remain in the Army. The court-martial panel wanted, in fact, to avoid imposing any sentence at all. Only after being told complete suspension of sentence was not within their power did they impose the lightest possible sentence.

Before Lieutenant Calley received his life sentence for the premeditated murder of Vietnamese civilians, twenty-one other Americans had been given the same sentence for this crime. In every previous case, however, the sentences were reduced on appeal. Most of them were reduced substantially. The longest sentence given final approval was thirty-five years. Most

terms were cut to five to ten years. Military judicial records also show that the sentences for two hundred and forty-seven other crimes against Vietnamese citizens, including robbery, rape, and lesser degrees of murder, have been consistently reduced by the reviewing authorities.

For instance, Thomas C. Stevens was sentenced to life imprisonment for the rape and premeditated murder of a Vietnamese girl. His commanding general reduced the sentence to twenty years. The military board of review cut it to eight years. He was paroled June 23, 1970, after having served three years and three months in prison.

Staff Sergeant Walter Griffen was charged with the premeditated murder of a suspected Vietcong prisoner in 1967. Griffen admitted shooting the prisoner, but argued that he had done so under orders. The presiding judge said that when orders "are so palpably illegal on their face that a man of ordinary sense and understanding would know them to be illegal, then the fact of obedience to the order of a superior officer will not protect the soldier for acts pursuant to such illegal orders." Sergeant Griffen was, however, convicted only of unpremeditated murder and sentenced to ten years in prison. That sentence was reduced to seven years by his commanding general and then knocked down to two years by the board of review. He returned to duty in December, 1968, after having been in prison for seventeen months.

The conviction record of the men who participated in or covered up the My Lai massacre is also one that raises doubts about the commitment of the United States armed forces to police its ranks. Two of the twenty-five men against whom charges were lodged have been acquitted at a court-martial. The charges against nineteen have been dropped. One, Lieutenant Calley, has been convicted and the charges against three others are still pending. Fifteen other persons involved in the massacre left the service before the matter was brought to public attention and the Army has concluded that these men cannot be prosecuted. Our reluctance or inability to prosecute these men seems to violate Article 146 of the 1949 Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons, which makes incumbent upon signatories to enact legislation "to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches," such as willful killing, torture, or inhuman treatment.

Perhaps the most discouraging illustration of the reluctance of the United States to prosecute its war

criminals was the 1969 murder by Green Beret forces of a Vietnamese double, or perhaps triple, agent, Thai Khac Chuyen. The evidence that Army Special Forces members killed Chuyen was overwhelming and *The New York Times* and other newspapers published the full details of how the murder was carried out. The Army refused to prosecute, however, arguing that such a prosecution would require testimony of C.I.A. officials and would hinder U.S. intelligence efforts.



Some prominent Americans think that the talk about war-crimes investigations and prosecutions is foolish, and that the appropriate response to the present furore over American atrocities is merely to terminate U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. Burke Marshall, who was Assistant U.S. Attorney General during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, and is now deputy dean of the Yale Law School, asserted in the April 10, 1971, *New York Times* that it is "unwise as well as politically impossible" to establish war-crimes tribunals, even though many violations of the laws of war have occurred:

"It is, therefore, right and fitting that President Nixon should assume, as he has, a personal responsibility for Lieutenant Calley's punishment. He must deal with that case in a way that makes it clear that Calley is not being punished for deeds we have all participated in. For those who believe in the Nuremberg path of personal accountability, that would seem inevitably to lead to further trials, of generals and political leaders and military bureaucrats, as well as lieutenants and colonels. But I think now that the path is unwise as well as politically impossible. The accountability is national and the act of expiation that should accompany any diminution of Lieutenant Calley's punishment must be national. The only possible such act that meets the needs of our moral crisis would be an immediate cessation by the United States of all war-making in Indochina. That is the logic of events that Mr. Nixon will have to face; it is the only escape open to him and to us from an endless series of prosecutions, on the one hand, or a denial of plain guilt and any system of responsibility, on the other." Thus wrote Mr. Marshall.

More than a year earlier, in January, 1970, Townsend Hoopes, the last Undersecretary of the Air Force in the Johnson Administration and author of a book describing how the American bombing policy was changed in March, 1968, wrote in the *Wash-*

ington Monthly that American officials who planned strategy in Vietnam should not be considered war criminals, because — even though their policies were wrong — they were honorable men who acted with public support and without criminal intent. Mr. Hoopes failed to mention that the civilian and military officials who led us into our involvement in Southeast Asia gained our support by intimating that they had superior knowledge of what was happening in Southeast Asia and that we should, therefore, trust their analyses of classified data and their judgments.

Mr. Hoopes's suggestion that we ignore the possible applicability of the laws of war also runs counter to the principles enunciated at Nuremberg and the accompanying war-crimes tribunals, which were designed to civilize the waging of war. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, the chief prosecutor at Nuremberg, wrote, "If certain acts and violations of treaties are crimes, they are crimes whether the United States does them or whether Germany does them. We are not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against others which we would not be willing to have invoked against us." One of the principles clearly established at Nuremberg and in other postwar tribunals was that personal responsibility rests with the leaders who make policies that violate the laws of war. Perhaps the most explicit affirmation of that principle occurred in 1946 when the United States Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of General Tomoyuki Yamashita.

General Yamashita was charged with being responsible for the indiscriminate murder of unarmed civilians, including helpless women and children. Soldiers under his command killed thousands of innocent Filipino villagers, often throwing their bodies into ditches either before or after their execution. Some sixty thousand persons were butchered during the last stages of the war when Yamashita was making a last stand against General Douglas MacArthur.

Even though General Yamashita was not personally on the scene when these deaths were carried out, a five-man military commission concluded that he was responsible for the policy that had led to the deaths. The Supreme Court confirmed the commission's understanding of command responsibility and Yamashita was hanged as a war criminal.

American military and civilian leaders have similarly formulated policies (free-fire zones, search-and-destroy missions, anti-personnel bombardment, no prisoners) that seem to have led inevitably to the commission of war crimes. Although I recoil at the thought of hanging them, and am not even sure

whether any physical punishment is appropriate, it would be useful to have a thorough investigation of U.S. war policies — and those who formulated these policies — to determine what laws of war were violated and who violated them.

2

The feeble record of investigations of war crimes thus far conducted in the United States makes it

unrealistic to expect any American investigating tribunal to judge fairly the criminal responsibility of American military and political leaders. Only an international commission can hope to have the objectivity needed to make such a difficult determination.

Since the end of World War II, international fact-finding commissions have been used with increasing frequency by agencies of the United Nations, particularly in the area of human-rights violations. Two of the most important recent commissions of inquiry

are the Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, established by a resolution of the General Assembly passed in December, 1968, and the Special Working Group of Experts appointed by the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations in 1969. Both of these groups took testimony about the practices of the Israeli government in the territories occupied by the Israelis since the six-day war of 1967. Both issued reports somewhat critical of Israel that had the effect of bringing public attention to human-rights violations and probably had some effect on subsequent Israeli conduct. The Israeli government did not cooperate with either of these investigating committees and has subsequently accused the committees of bias, but the committees nonetheless were able to acquire considerable data and issue reports.

An investigation of war crimes in Vietnam should similarly be conducted by a group of experts appointed by a United Nations body, perhaps in collaboration with the International Committee of the Red Cross. Experts acting on their own would be preferable to representatives of governments in order to keep political influences to a minimum. This commission should study the conduct and policies of all the parties fighting in Southeast Asia, not only those of the United States. The international commission need not be given the power to punish, but should be asked to make a thorough investigation, determining which laws of war have been violated and naming names of those who are responsible for the violations. Ideally the United States and the other parties fighting in Southeast Asia should cooperate with the commission to the extent of granting the commission the right to subpoena any national that the commission wants to take testimony from.

The Bertrand Russell International War Crimes Tribunal was in certain respects like the international commission now proposed. Although the Russell Tribunal was composed of outspoken critics of American policy in Vietnam and examined only the war crimes allegedly committed by Americans, the tribunal worked within the existing laws of war and it performed a respectable job in assembling information about American strategy and practices. Richard A. Falk, Milbank Professor of International Law at Princeton University, has said that the proceedings of the Russell Tribunal "stand up well under the tests of time and independent security."

Seven of the twenty-two members of the Russell Tribunal were lawyers. They came from more than a

dozen different nations (four were Americans), and all qualified as experts of one sort or another. The tribunal met for about two weeks in Stockholm in the spring of 1967 and for two more weeks in Copenhagen in the fall of 1967. Discussions of the laws of war were presented to the tribunal and numerous persons who had previously been sent to North and South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia presented their findings to the tribunal members. The tribunal sought answers to these questions:

- (1) Has the United States government and its allies committed acts of aggression according to international law?
- (2) Has the American Army made use of or experimented with new weapons or weapons forbidden by the laws of war?
- (3) Has there been bombardment of targets of a purely civilian character, for example, hospitals, schools, sanatoria, dams, etc., and on what scale has this occurred?
- (4) Have prisoners of war captured by the armed forces of the United States been subjected to treatment prohibited by the laws of war?
- (5) Have the armed forces of the United States subjected the civilian population to inhuman treatment prohibited by the laws of war?
- (6) Does the combination of crimes imputed to the government of the United States in its war in Vietnam constitute the crime of genocide?

The tribunal concluded on the basis of the evidence it received that the answers to all these questions were "yes."

There are grounds on which the objectivity of the Russell Tribunal can be challenged. But it provides a useful model for a more impartial commission that might now be constituted. The United States government has traditionally taken a lead in promoting and developing the laws of war, and so we should be anxious to cooperate with such an international commission. We should want guidance on how future wars should be conducted and should not fear having our actions judged by international standards. If the international body does not have power to punish but only to condemn by the voice of international law, our government should not have anything to fear in the way of vengeance.

Mr. Van Dyke, a Visiting Fellow, was recently appointed an associate professor at the Hastings College of Law, San Francisco.

If I Were Pope

Fragment from an Imaginary Journal

by C. Edward Crowther

And now I am alone. Of course I am still in a state of shock, not so much from my election, which in these times will probably surprise no one, but because I am introduced so immediately to the extent of my power and it is more awesome than anything I had imagined.

Who I now am has come to mean more than merely a symbol to whom homage can be paid and conscience thereby stilled. I see myself in what I represent of history, the only hope left that man can survive his freedom to choose to die.

It is to my sense of history, which is also my overarching sense of hope for a more abundant life than mankind has had before, that I turn for the reasons why I do not seek immediately to sever the Church from her past. To insure, for instance, the temporary relief of much hunger, poverty, and misery in this generation, I could tomorrow dispense the material riches of the Church. But to do so would be to feed the exploiters of the poor. Our power will best be spent in removing the sources of poverty, exploitation, and oppression.

I must first speak to the oppressed of the world.

As a young bishop in South Africa there was burned into my soul the sense of feeling helpless in the face of bigotry and the violence of oppression. If the Church will not defend God's children from their tormenters to whom can they turn? I am ashamed of those lifeless priorities which then made less immediate the needs of my black children. Our secular concerns have numbered us with the oppressors. We Christians have tried so hard to become accepted by the world that we have succeeded in becoming acceptable to the world. Anchored to the preservation of our institutions we have confused our law with the law of God; the love of our structures with the love of God for man.

We have often given our imprimatur to the violence of oppression in order to keep things as they are. We pronounced anathemas upon the attempts of

men to win their freedom from oppression. I can understand, then, why poor and oppressed people see the Church as the ally of their exploiters.

It is the compassionate Church to which I have pledged my life, committed my allegiance, and which, demanding allegiance, I am now called to rule. My quarrels with the Church have been lovers' quarrels. Now, in love, I must seek to translate into actions which reach into the souls of men, and embrace their bodies too, my belief that only in freedom can man choose to live, to love, to be. But freedom in the first instance means the right of man to be free from those who live on his blood.

I am a man of peace, the servant of the Prince of Peace. Longing for peace on earth I understand that what often passes for peace is the power of oppressors to express their violence through economics, education, and law. There are ways in which men die without a mark being left on their bodies. Nevertheless they are killed and mutilated just as surely as by any weapon of war. (There is also murder from our pulpits when people are bored to death!)

Wherever dialogue between the oppressed and their oppressors is possible, we must initiate it. Our power can be employed on behalf of those who by themselves are trapped. We can make no peace with oppression and must exhaust ourselves in the service of recognizable freedom. But we shall reach out to the oppressors for whom we also have compassion.

Will my heart be heard as the Latin words roll out my love for the alienated, the broken, the poor, the oppressed, the lonely, the outcast, the maimed, the blind . . . *ad miseros terrae* . . . to my beloved, my fellow prisoners, the wretched of the earth — greeting — oh, much more than greeting. . .

C. Edward Crowther is the Assistant Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of California and lecturer in black studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara.

WHAT IS A SOCIAL PROBLEM?

It is widely believed that the American nation confronts serious social problems. Many hold that our society is being shaken by a succession of overlapping and interrelated crises, including population growth and concentration, environmental pollution, poverty, crime, drugs, racial enmity, malnutrition, urban blight, and the war in Southeast Asia. Most of those in the New Left aver that unresolved problems are mounting in intensity. Changes in social institutions are occurring too slowly, they say, to accommodate changes in the goals, beliefs, and expectations of the public. Hence, the potentiality of a political revolution — of a sudden drastic restructuring of our social institutions — is rising. Indeed, extremist groups like the Weathermen and the Black Panthers, along with such mentors as Professor Herbert Marcuse, are actively fomenting revolution. They deliberately reject the course of working peacefully within the social system to shape its development along desired lines. The mounting level of violence in American society throughout the sixties suggests that not a few persons have given credence to this line of thought.

It is therefore timely to examine the meaning of social problems. How do they arise? By what process do they escalate into crises? How can they be ameliorated or resolved?

A basic premise of our inquiry is that peaceful evolution is nearly always to be preferred to violent revolution as a path of social reform. Although revo-

lution may in some circumstances be necessary, man's history shows that it is an extremely wasteful mode of social change. Revolution destroys physical and social capital and leaves in its wake a large reservoir of wrongs and inequities that require generations to liquidate. Evolutionary social change can avoid these setbacks. It can steadily augment social justice and material well-being. It can yield progress without hiatus.

Let us consider the nature of a "social problem." In January, 1969, the distinguished Panel on Social Indicators appointed by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare reported that, by nearly all measures, the well-being of the American people had improved materially since World War II. Yet it found that public disaffection had also risen markedly. The reason was, it wisely observed, that people's expectations had risen faster than reality could improve.

The phenomenon noted by the Panel on Social Indicators was the same as that observed by Toqueville in eighteenth-century France: "The evil which was suffered patiently as inevitable, seems unendurable as soon as the idea of escaping from it crosses men's minds. All the abuses then removed call attention to those that remain, and they now appear more galling. The evil, it is true, has become less, but sensibility to it has become more acute."

A social problem, then, may be defined as a gap between society's expectations of social conditions

and the present social realities. Social expectations are the set of demands and priorities held by the people of a society at a given time. Social realities mean the set of laws, regulations, customs, and organizations, along with the pertinent economic, political, and social processes that prevail at a given time.

Social problems are created by public awareness of, or belief in, the existence of an expectation-reality gap. They are basically psychological phenomena — ideas held in the minds of people — about the disparity between what should be, and what is, in our society. Social problems are not definable solely in physical or biological terms, such as so many calories of food intake per day, or so many square feet of housing per capita. They must be defined in terms of the extent of the expectation-reality gap.

One may illustrate the independence of a social problem from any particular social condition by considering the example of poverty. Poverty is now perceived by Americans to be an important social problem in the United States, because in 1970 eleven per cent of the population had incomes under the official poverty level (about \$3,500 per year for a family of four), whereas Americans generally believe that no one should live under the poverty line. Poverty was not perceived to be an important social problem in 1947, although twenty-seven per cent of the population then lived under the poverty line by 1970 standards. Despite an astonishing gain in the real incomes of those in the lowest brackets, public expectations outraced realities. Hence the expectation-reality gap with respect to poverty is wider today than it was in 1947. The problem of poverty has become more serious at the same time that the incidence of poverty has been cut sixty per cent and continues to decline.



Once the concept is grasped that a social problem is a gap between public expectations of social conditions and social realities, it becomes clear that our society, and especially its political leaders, must pay as much attention to the forces that determine public expectations as to those that shape social realities. They should seek to keep the gap at a tolerable size and thereby avoid violent or disruptive social behavior.

The expectation-reality gap is, of course, a dynamic system that changes through time. Public expectations change as a consequence of the expand-

ing size and concentration of the human population, of rising affluence, or of technological advances. Thus, the high priority now assigned to the problem of environmental pollution reflects an elevation in the social expectations of clean air and water and other environmental amenities by a richer and more crowded population. Public expectations are also shaped by the flow of information, words, and pictures that they receive from the mass media of communication — newspapers, magazines, radio, and television. Expectations are likewise heavily influenced by publicly expressed views of political leaders. For example, President Eisenhower raised the nation's expectations for better highways with his support of the interstate highway system in the fifties; President Johnson boosted public expectations of an end to poverty with his "war on poverty" in the sixties.

Changes in social expectations require responsive changes in social realities, if a rise in social tensions

*The Kerner Report
added fuel to
the fires of discontent
when it stated that
the nation was moving
toward two societies*

— that is, in revolutionary potential — is to be avoided. For example, racial tensions have risen in the United States partly because the rising social expectation of racial integration of the public-school system, called for by the 1954 *Brown* decision of the Supreme Court, has not yet produced a commensurate shift in the racial structure of the educational system. As with the social problem of poverty, the realities of educational integration have improved, but have been outrun by the rise in public expectations.

Revolutionary potential — the degree of public frustration caused by a gap between expectations and realities — is also a function of time. It will rise as the time lapse lengthens between a given expectation and responsive change in social institutions and processes. The American Revolution of 1776 exploded when a sufficiently large number of colonials found that the gap between their long-reiterated demands for a larger voice in their own government and

the intransigency of the British Crown was no longer endurable. Timely action by the British to delegate powers of self-government would have reduced the revolutionary potential and even possibly avoided a political revolution.

There have been periods in American history when popular expectations of social improvement have been extremely low. During the Great Depression, for example, the revolutionary potential was surprisingly weak. Public expectations of social improvement had become so deflated by 1933 that only a small gap separated them from the grim social realities of those times. President Roosevelt and his New Deal performed a magnificent act of political leadership in regenerating public expectations.

The mass media play an important role in the creation and magnification of social problems. They do this by increasing public awareness of gaps between social goals and current realities, and also by magnifying public perceptions of such gaps. Millions of Americans read about and see on their television screens crime on the streets, slums in the cities, deprivation in the ghettos, smog in the air, and sewage in the water. The American public was only remotely informed about these conditions fifty years ago. The mass media are frighteningly effective in widening public awareness of the chasms that separate man's expectations of peace, plenty, justice, and stability from the realities of the human condition. Thus they create social problems where none had existed before, and they escalate minor problems into major crises.

If the mass media operated simply as faithful transmitters of printed and pictorial images of society as it is, one could not complain about their effect on the public's perception of reality or the size of the expectation-reality gap. However, they are more than mere transmitters. They are selectors of the information and images presented to people. Because they thrive on the shocking, the extreme, the bizarre, they have little interest in conveying to their audiences the normal life or the quiet incremental progress of society. The mass media tend to screen out words and images that reveal normality, and to transmit those that show deprivation, injustice, suffering, and maladjustment, on the one hand, and those that depict wealth, extravagance, or conspicuous consumption, on the other. Thus they function as magnifiers or amplifiers of the expectation-reality gap that previously existed in the public's mind. Expectations of social improvement are elevated even higher; social realities are seen to be even worse than before.

7
Art Buchwald recently recounted how George III suppressed television in Britain during the latter eighteenth century, because TV pictures of British mercenaries suppressing colonial Americans were inciting the British public to a state of rebellion against its colonial policies. Despite its humorous approach, the proposal has a serious point. Buchwald used this imaginary analogy to suggest that the U.S. government should suppress all television coverage of the war in Southeast Asia.

A recent example of journalistic distortion was the pronouncement by *The New York Times* and the *Washington Post* that the police have killed twenty-eight Black Panthers since January 1, 1968. This "news" statement was widely copied, and followed by editorial speculation that the police were conspiring to wipe out Black Panther leadership. The Negro community reacted in anger. In a carefully researched article in the *New Yorker* of February 13, 1971, Edward J. Epstein showed that the source of this inflammatory statement was Charles R. Garry, counsel for the Panther organization, and that it was false. Ten of the twenty-eight Panthers had been killed by their own political opponents. With two possible exceptions about which the facts are unclear, a study of the other sixteen deaths showed that in every case the Panthers were armed, threatened the police, and shot first. There was not a shred of evidence to support the conspiracy thesis.

If the mass media are a powerful instrument in the formation of public attitudes and expectations, it becomes vitally important that they present accurate and balanced word-and-picture images of events within their proper historical contexts. No one would suggest governmental censorship of information flows to the public. What is proposed is self-disciplined objectivity so that the mass media will perform their function of accurate and objective transmission of information that can be the basis of rational and realistic public attitudes and expectations.

Our political system of representative democracy also tends to create or to expand social problems by raising public expectations of social gains and by exaggerating gaps between expectations and realities. Politicians generally do not challenge the validity of existing public expectations, or seek to reduce them to realizable levels. The basic reason for their one-sided influence is clear enough. It is in the professional interest of the politician to inflate rather than

deflate unrealistic expectations. Politicians are elected by "viewing with alarm" the empty records of their opponents in office and by leading the voters to believe that the incumbent scoundrels have prevented them from getting their share of the good things of life. If only the electorate turns the rascals out, change will bring great improvements. Of course, by the time of the next election the roles of politicians in the two parties are often reversed; the "great society" still has not been achieved and the people are more frustrated than ever. The expectation-reality gap has widened.

Intellectuals are also traditional "viewers with alarm" because any other attitude would compromise their professional reputations as social critics. They consider it a duty to decry gaps between the performance of the society and its potential. Otherwise their colleagues would believe that they had sold out to the Establishment or had lost their critical faculties. Given the strong propensity to hypercriticize in scholarly teaching and writing, and considering the now vast number of youths under academic influence in the higher educational system, it is no wonder that a rising fraction of the U.S. population has become alienated from society and its institutions.

Presidential Task Forces and Commissions and other public groups often generate or enlarge social problems by attention-getting public statements. Although such bodies are supposed to provide calm and objective assessments of social problems, their effort to compete with the tidal wave of information that daily inundates us all often leads them to make shocking statements that create distorted impressions or beliefs in the public mind. Because the whole truth is rarely dramatic, they tend to twist the truth or to convey partial truths in order to create shock value.

An instance of headline-grabbing by distortion is the 1968 Report of the National Advisory Commission on Racial Disorders, commonly known as the Kerner Report. Although this weighty document contained much wisdom, what stood out when it was issued was the inflammatory headlined statement that "this nation is moving toward two societies, black and white, separate and unequal." The vast majority of people who read this headline, but who did not read the whole report, concluded that the Kerner Commission found that racial inequality and separation in America was rising in all dimensions. The implications of the statement were extremely disruptive. By implying that the Establishment was failing to improve racial relations, and that the racial

gap was widening, the Kerner Report added fuel to the fiery demands of militant groups for revolutionary changes. Seeds of bitterness were sown in the minds of the uninformed. Racial tensions were exacerbated at home. The nation was denigrated abroad.

Yet the truth is that our democratic political institutions and our market economy, despite imperfections, have been making steady progress in narrowing the economic, educational, political, and social inequalities between the races ever since World War II. The median income of nonwhite families rose from fifty-five per cent of that of white families in 1950 to sixty-three per cent in 1968; and, according to figures cited by Daniel Moynihan, the incomes of black young married couples had become equal to those of white young married couples in 1970. The proportionate reduction in poverty since 1959 has been almost as great among blacks as among whites. Whereas in 1947 black adult Americans completed thirty-four per cent fewer years of schooling than the entire population, by 1969 this difference had narrowed to nineteen per cent; and, for persons in the age bracket from twenty-five to twenty-nine years, it had nearly vanished. The differences between the life expectancies at birth of the two races diminished significantly during the postwar era. The steadily rising proportion of black citizens that are registered and vote in elections and of blacks in public office shows a narrowing of the political gap. Blacks themselves overwhelmingly believe that conditions are improving for their race in this country, as sociologist Gary T. Marx reported in his book *Protest and Prejudice*. All these facts demonstrate impressive postwar progress of the American Negro toward economic and political equality, although many will understandably say "too little and too late." The correct conclusion to be drawn, however, is to keep public policy on the present course and to try to accelerate its pace.



The gravity of the nation's social problems is also enlarged by the teachings and writings of the liberal left. Much liberal left social thought is based upon illusory concepts of the nature of man and society, well described by Professor Harold Demsetz as the "Nirvana," "other grass is greener," "free lunch," and "people could be different" fallacies (*Journal of Law and Economics*, April, 1960).

The "Nirvana" approach to social policy presents a choice between a theoretical ideal never approached

in man's history and existing conditions. The vast distance between the two naturally creates a social "crisis." The true choice, however, lies between existing conditions and others that are feasible in the sense of being capable of attainment. Because the expectation-reality gap in the latter case is usually small, the "crisis" is reduced to a manageable problem.

The "other grass is greener" illusion credits an alternative social condition, usually in some foreign country, with great virtues said to be lacking in American society. Thus atmospheric pollution is said to be the product of capitalistic enterprise, and its cure is to adopt state socialism. This idea is repeated by social critics who have not taken the trouble to ascertain that pollution levels in socialist countries have risen, along with their G.N.P.'s, even faster than in capitalist countries.

The "free lunch" fallacy is that there are costless

*Americans have
recently demanded
social improvements
beyond the capacity
of this or any other
society to produce*

remedies for social ills. Since unemployment is an evil, say the critics, abolish it and reduce the unemployment ratio to zero. They choose to ignore the heavy social costs of such a policy in the form of restrictions on individual freedom, lowered productivity, and price inflation. Every decision that produces public benefits imposes costs, and the problem is to weigh both and determine the balance.

The "people could be different" fallacy is that the Good Society can be attained by radical changes in the moral and ethical behavior of people. Thus the "new communist man," imbued with a totally altruistic concern for the public welfare, was seen by the older Marxists as the condition for the ultimate transformation of socialism into true communism. Unfortunately, he has not yet appeared in sufficient numbers to make this possible; and he shows no sign of doing so. While moderate changes in men's values and behavior can occur over time (indeed, changes

are essential if our society is to improve), sharp mutations in human nature are a fantasy. In reforming our society, we are wise to take human nature as a datum, and to design structures and processes for imperfect men and women rather than for saints or philosophers.



In his report to the nation on U.S. foreign policy for the nineteen-seventies, President Nixon observed: "No nation has the wisdom and the understanding and the energy required to act wisely on all problems, at all times, in every part of the world." The statement is equally true and important if we substitute "nation" for "world." The number of different domestic problems that the people of a nation can cope with effectively at any given time is limited, not only by the stock of popular wisdom, energy, and understanding, but also by the available economic resources of the society. In view of the fact that available economic resources form a severe constraint upon national capability to improve real social conditions, whereas public expectations of social improvement can soar at a virtually unlimited rate, it is far more likely that a social problem will escalate into a "crisis" through an inordinate rise in expectations than by a failure of real conditions to improve.

If national political and intellectual leaders ignore the resource constraints upon real social improvements, they may, by dramatizing one social deficiency after another, stimulate public expectations so powerfully that multiple social "crises" are created in the public mind. During the Administration of President Johnson, for example, a "war on poverty" was followed by a "war on hunger" and a "war on slums" and so on. Faced by a "war" on a new social front every few months without having won any of those already in progress the American people became progressively confused, frustrated, angered, and alienated from their government. Failure of the national political leadership to hold social expectations within the boundaries of national capabilities led to the violence and disruptive behavior that marked the last half of the sixties.

By the end of 1968 public frustration and social tensions in the United States had reached a dangerous level. Americans demanded a quantity and variety of social improvements far beyond the capacity of this or any other society to produce. People's energies were being dissipated in dropoutism, absenteeism, and irrelevant protest rather than utilized in con-

structive action — as shown by a catastrophic drop in productivity. Fortunately the succeeding Nixon Administration applied the remedies of “low profile” and “benign neglect,” which succeeded in reducing many social “crises” into manageable problems by deflating exaggerated public expectations.

It is a mistaken view that real social progress only occurs after a “crisis” has been generated, or that a deflation of exaggerated public expectations is tantamount to foot-dragging in making necessary social reforms. On the contrary, there is a good deal of evidence that “crises” — especially if accompanied by violence — are inimical to long-run progress; and that the maintenance of a proper relation between expectations and realities avoids disruptive social behavior that retards real social progress. Thus, poverty in the United States was being rapidly reduced after World War II and there is no convincing evidence that the “war on poverty” launched in 1965 speeded up the process.

Our theory of social tensions helps to explain the almost pathological mood of self-criticism and self-deprecation that has descended upon Americans in recent years. William James said that an individual's self-esteem could be measured by the ratio of his success or achievement to his potential. By analogy, national self-esteem is the ratio of national achievement to national potential, as they are generally perceived by people. As national achievements (i.e., social realities) are depreciated, and national potentialities (i.e., social expectations) are exaggerated, the quotient of national self-esteem will fall to the vanishing point.

Our society is a dynamic system in which public values and expectations and social institutions and processes change through time. The central aims of public policy should be to maintain an optimal expectation-reality gap and to achieve an optimal rate of change in both social expectations and social realities.

An optimal expectation-reality gap is wide enough to preserve incentive and motive for beneficial changes in social institutions and processes. (“Man's reach should exceed his grasp, else what is Heaven for?”) Yet it is not so wide as to cause public frustration and diversion of energy from constructive action to inaction or to disruptive behavior. Public goals and expectations should advance through time, fast enough to maintain social flexibility and adaptability, but not so rapidly as to lose contact with realities.

The real conditions of life should also be improved through time, fast enough to sustain a popular belief

in progress but not so fast as to lead to malallocations of resources and social imbalances.

Because the rate of improvement in social conditions is determined within a fairly narrow range by well-known constraints upon the growth of production, whereas the rate of increase in public expectations is virtually unlimited, it is likely that political leaders will more frequently find it necessary to moderate public expectations than to raise them in order to avoid dangerous gaps. This appears especially probable in our society which, as has been seen, is institutionally organized to magnify expectation-reality gaps and in which high achievement is the normal goal.

The general strategy for approaching the optimum gap between expectations and realities will include the following elements: (1) accelerate desired institutional changes in the economic, political, and social systems to an optimum rate; (2) publicize the changes that are occurring in the society to reduce poverty, racial discrimination, crime, or to improve health, housing, and other conditions; (3) instruct the public in the political and economic processes of change and their time dimensions so that there will emerge a general appreciation of what is realistically possible; (4) develop through research more frequent and reliable indicators of social conditions and of the state of public expectations, and of their rates of change through time, as guides to social policymakers. Social scientists should also try to measure the sustainable rates of change in social institutions. Leonard Lecht's pioneering effort to measure the dollar costs of attaining U.S. national goals, and to compare it with national production capacity is a type of research that should be expanded (*Goals, Priorities, and Dollars*. New York: Free Press, 1966).

Managing public expectations has become a vital new dimension of political leadership in the United States, of coördinate importance with the engineering of orderly reform of our social institutions. Political leaders need to observe expectation-reality gaps constantly in order to maintain the proper state of tension in society. The statesmen of the future will be those who know how to bring about orderly social change and also to keep public expectations in a productive relationship to realities. Thus they will enable our society to resolve successfully a constantly emerging set of new social problems.

Mr. Jacoby, a Center Associate, has long taught in the Graduate School of Business Administration at the University of California, Los Angeles.

Nowhere to Run

by Tom and Lucia Taylor

It was more than a mere news item — the revelation that mercury poisoning threatens the Ojibway Indians of Whitedog, Ontario, a seemingly untouched corner of a remote wilderness. The irony cuts deep — overshadowing the sympathy that normally wells up when one hears of human tragedy, and packing a punch beyond that of other reports of other pollution problems, however grave.

That the innocent Ojibway is threatened by mercury poisoning is proof that there is nowhere to run. And — even more than the statistics on respiratory ailments in, say, Gary, Indiana — he may be a frightening symbol of the human being as endangered species.

His plight shakes us personally — in part because we are among the few urban Americans who have actually been to Whitedog, Ontario, and even more because of the special circumstances that took us there. Three years ago Whitedog was our first “wilderness” stop in a summer-long adventure in outdoor living. We had put Chicago behind us — and presumably all the problems of our complex, troubled society, pollution most of all. It took us ten days to find out that we could, but at the end we were dipping our drinking water from the river just like the Ojibways.

Oh, the wilderness was flawed. A huge, automated power dam stood where older maps showed a wild rapids. And the Ojibways, riding cabs back and forth from Minaki, twenty miles away, and portaging outboard motors past that power dam, weren't quite in the same league as Rousseau's “noble savage.”

But it was no Sheridan Road either. We hewed our own firewood, dug our bean hole, caught fish for supper as well as for sport, and lived a self-sufficient outdoor life. We began to feel the oneness with nature we had come to Canada to seek. At night we sat in front of our tent and listened to the loons, where a month earlier we had sat in Chicago and listened to traffic. Civilization had never seemed more remote. But it was not. It turns out that paper mills upstream have been spewing mercury into the water,

and Whitedog may have the worst mercury-pollution problem in North America.

We are shaken. Don't misunderstand; we are not particularly fretful about our own health; if anything were going to happen to us, it would have by now; it has been three years. Besides, we were at Whitedog only a few weeks. The Canadian government's concern is for the Indians who have been eating mercury-poisoned fish day in and day out for twenty years.

We probably ran less risk than in eating canned tuna — or in six seasons of fishing in the Wisconsin River, which also turns out to be full of mercury. But earlier, when we saw the Wisconsin River on the list of waters with mercury pollution, we shrugged. We were saddened, but not surprised. We had known all along that the Wisconsin River was somewhat polluted, and we knew about the paper mills.

But Whitedog, Ontario, the almost-wilderness?

Where is there to go? What is there to do? What is there to say? Has mankind had it? This, of course, is a generalization. There is a detached scientific point of view which holds that if one aborigine — make that two aborigines — can be around to start over again, everything is all right, after all. That is the long view — probably valid — but it is not ours.

Suppose the individual Roman had been given a glimpse into the future. As a Roman, he probably would have liked Western civilization, the glory that was England, the grandeur that was the United States. But would he have felt one whit better about the Goths?

The owners of the paper mills were not conscious exploiters. It never occurred to them that mercury would be transformed into a harmful compound. But why were they using our rivers as dumping grounds? So maybe it is manslaughter, rather than murder. But up there in Whitedog, the bell tolls for us. 20

Mr. and Mrs. Taylor, of Sarasota, Florida, describe themselves as “amateur naturalists.”

These articles were prepared for a recent convocation of Center members at the Palmer House in Chicago. In addition to Robert M. Hutchins and Jon M. Van Dyke of the Center staff, the speakers included F. Champion Ward, former dean of the College of the University of Chicago and now an executive of the Ford Foundation, and George N. Shuster, former president of Hunter College and now Assistant to the President, the University of Notre Dame.

TOWARD A LEARNING SOCIETY

The Institutional Illusion

by ROBERT M. HUTCHINS

*We do not ask what a graduate knows
but whether he has his diploma*

We did not talk much about the prospects for a learning society in the old days at the University of Chicago. We were having enough trouble trying to make sense of what we were doing already. And we could not really imagine a learning society. We knew about technology and knew that technological change would make idiots of those who thought people should be trained to acquire technical skill. We knew that because John Dewey had told us so when

he was a member of the Chicago community in 1897. We saw that the aim of education must be manhood and not manpower. We could not foresee a day in which everybody, by virtue of technology, would have free time and the question would be what in the world he would do with himself. We believed that everybody could learn, a conviction since confirmed by the scientific work of Bruner and others. We believed he could learn all his life long; we considered that the efforts of the University of Chicago since Mr. Harper's day proved that. We could see that American education was enormously wasteful of time and money, that the lockstep did not accommodate individual differences, that a system based on time served and credits accumulated could only by accident provide an education, and that by wiping out this system, which we did, we could make it possible for people to proceed at their own pace, to drop in and drop out, and to continue to use their

minds as long as they lived. But we thought there would not be many.

Except for radio (the University of Chicago had the oldest program on the air) and films (with which we began to experiment around 1940) we had available as a means of distribution only that which had originated with Gutenberg. The trouble with radio was that it was in the hands of the oligopoly that controls it today. The University of Chicago Roundtable suffered a fatal blow when N.B.C. moved it to an impossible hour. The 7-Up Company had bought the half-hour next to the Roundtable's traditional time and demanded that the Roundtable be moved on the ground that it was not a "good adjacency." The trouble with films was that the so-called portable equipment used in the classroom had to be moved by a truck and operated by a graduate of M.I.T.

Thomas Jefferson thought that some were destined to rule the commonwealth; the others were destined for labor. We do not believe in this kind of natural selection any more. Samuel Johnson held that all intellectual improvement came from leisure and that all leisure came from one working for another. We know now that leisure can come from technology: machines can do for us what slaves did for the Athenians. Tocqueville found that it was as impossible to have everybody educated as it was to have everybody rich. Now we do not think it idle to talk about the abolition of poverty. We are no longer bothered by these ancient prejudices. Our trouble now is that we are confused about the purpose and meaning of education and that we suffer from what may be called the Institutional Illusion.

A president of Harvard once said that he did not want to discuss what education was. As far as he was concerned he was prepared to call education anything that was going on in an institution that called itself educational. So a president of Sarah Lawrence said that every student should plan his own curriculum, which is the same as saying that education is anything that is going on in anybody that calls himself a student. What goes on in most institutions that call themselves educational is some education, some child care, some training, some vocational certification that calls itself training or education but is not, and, at the higher levels, some research. As for students, the Special Task Force that reported to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare the other day said, "Most students entering higher education today are not academically oriented." If then they were to plan their own courses of collegiate study, such academic institutions as

we possess would rapidly pass out of existence.

There is a fundamental, though not always sharp and clear, distinction between a learning society and a society in training. Learning, as I am using the word, aims at understanding, which is good in itself, and hence at nothing beyond itself. Training is instrumental; it may not require or lead to any understanding at all; it aims at the performance of prescribed tasks by prescribed methods.

This distinction does not depreciate specialized, technical training. Any society, certainly any industrial one, has to have it. A rapidly changing, cybernated society will have a tremendous job of continual retraining on its hands. The only question about such training is how to give it effectively. There is no apparent reason why industries, occupations, and professions that want trained hands should not train them themselves. Including training in educational programs or institutions simply means that they work at cross-purposes.

Training, which is simple, direct, with an easily definable and defensible object, is also quite readily measurable. It may involve no higher mental faculty than memory. Learning, or education, on the other hand, is infinitely complicated, frequently unappealing, and not readily accessible to quantitative assessment. Hence the attraction of training to a man like the new United States Commissioner of Education, who proposes to chloroform whatever there is of general education in the schools and replace it with something real, vital, and interesting, namely vocational training. In an effort to make this more palatable he adds to the confusion by officially renaming vocational training: he calls it "career education."

Training will always be seductive, if only because it puts little strain on the mind of the teacher or the student. The trouble is, as John Dewey pointed out, it is always obsolescent. And the rate of obsolescence is higher now than at any time in history. René Dubos has remarked that the more technical a society is the less technical its education has to be.

Yet most programs in most institutions called educational are now largely technical. And the remarkable fact is that all pretend that the curriculum has any relation to technical skill or that the diploma or degree awarded on the completion of the program denotes possession of technical skill has been abandoned. We do not ask what a high-school, college, or university graduate knows or what he can do. We merely inquire whether he has graduated. Educational credentials are helpful to

Q. If the university is the place where minds interact, are we not denying to the common man the opportunity to reach that goal, the opportunity to think critically and develop his reasoning powers, by relegating him to a life of learning primarily from the mass media, which rely heavily on behavioral engineering to instill knowledge?

HUTCHINS: We want education for all people. This does not mean that all people should go to the university. I believe that basic liberal education can begin and be carried out in a continuous way as far as formally organized educational institutions need to carry it, so that by the age of eighteen people would have the kind of education every citizen ought to have. I think the role of educational institutions in doing this is absolutely clear. I do not think that the university is the place for the continuation of formal liberal education. A six-year elementary school education, a three- or four-year high-school education, and a

three- or four-year college education should give everybody by the age of seventeen or eighteen a basic education, the equivalent of an A.B. degree.

That is perfectly feasible. It would require the elimination of tremendous amounts of water that now fill the curriculum. It would force us to decide what is really important in a curriculum instead of providing anything that anybody wants, either in the student body, in the school board, or in the community.

We would then be able to turn people loose, to go either to work or to specialized institutions of another kind where they might learn technical skills or anything else they wanted to learn. The opportunity to continue learning after the age of seventeen or eighteen must be made continuously available to all. If some want to join the dialogue in the university, and if they are qualified to do so, they should have the opportunity. But in this realignment I do not regard the object of the university to be the continuation of formal liberal education.

Q. What correlation do you see between our basically capitalist system and education as we know it in our schools with grades, competition, and the rest?

WARD: There is in the ethos of today's students a sense of lateral solidarity. I do not mean simply a joint defying of their elders, but a student's genuine concern for the students on each side of him. This elbows out the kind of individual competition that ten years ago one might have said happens in schools in a capitalist society. We seem to be undergoing such a change whether or not we remain a capitalist society. For example, when the Yale plan for deferred payment of tuition was considered, the thing the Yale student responded to in the plan was not that for the rest

of his life he would be supporting Yale but that he and his classmates would help each other, so that the student who wanted to go on and practice medicine in the slums, for example, could afford to do so because the other Yale alumni who went into corporate law or investment banking or medicine in the affluent suburbs would help pay for it. I think this ethos is a new one. I do not think that ten years ago we would have had it.

This kind of experience has loosened up my thinking; it has opened my mind up as to the degree to which one might be able to combine the heritage of capitalist institutions with this new ethos of the young and thus harness "the machine" to somewhat more humane and necessary uses.

harried personnel managers, who simply announce that persons not having the requisite credentials, though capable of doing the work, will not be employed.

Learning, or education, cannot be defended as a means to anything beyond itself. It has no predictable effect on the prosperity of states or individuals. We cannot say whether the United States is rich and powerful because of its educational system or in spite of it. As for the developing nations, we know that as countries develop, their educational systems and expenditures expand. We do not know whether this expansion is a cause or a result of economic development.

It cannot even be shown that literacy is always indispensable to economic development. A big biscuit factory in Hanover in West Germany, which is fully automated, is staffed largely by illiterate Spanish women who cannot speak a word of German.

We should ponder, too, the report made in 1948 to the American Association on Mental Deficiency by an eminent sociologist. She showed that the typical male moron earned as much as \$3.50 a week more than the average industrial wage and that the female moron uniformly made more money than the normal woman industrial worker.

A cybernated world is likely to be one in which a few highly trained experts and a small labor force, whose qualifications are that they can see a red light or hear a whistle, can operate an industrial plant. We need education in science and technology in a scientific age not to train us for the work we have to do but rather to understand the world we are living in.

The report of the Task Force to which I have referred ends with an absurd question: "How can students be freed from the infatuation of American society with the form rather than the substance of learning?" The students cannot be freed from this infatuation until the form rather than the substance of learning ceases to satisfy those upon whom their educational, economic, and social future depends.

The real question is, why is American society infatuated with the form rather than the substance of learning? The answer must be that if you don't know what the substance is you have to be content with the form. Or if you are confused about the substance you can at least identify and seek the form. You may not be able to tell whether a person is educated, but you can always count his credits, grades, and diplomas and the number of years he has been in school. Since the Second World War we have said two things: first, that education pro-

motes the power and prosperity of states and individuals, which cannot be proved, and second, that the status of persons rises in proportion to the time they have spent in educational institutions and the number of diplomas they have, which may be true but which makes no sense.

We shall not have a learning society until we get over our infatuation with form rather than substance. I see no hope of this until the cost of confusion resulting from a preoccupation with form becomes so obvious and overwhelming as to bring us to the realization that form without substance is as wasteful as it is meaningless. Think of the prospects of a learning society if we were to do what I have proposed many times before, if we were to confer the bachelor's degree on every American citizen at birth.



This brings us to the Institutional Illusion. Institutions calling themselves educational are the only culturally accredited instruments of education. Their forms are the only ones that count. In the advanced countries they are largely custodial: they take up the time of the young until we are ready to have them go to work. Everywhere in the world the length of time one spends in educational institutions and the success one has in them are determined by one's socio-economic status and family background. This means that the power and prosperity presumably promoted by an educational system are conferred upon those who already have the most. The educational system, in short, is a means of maintaining the status quo.

We see this most clearly in the case of the developing countries. Many of them spend a third of their budgets on schools and universities. They all find the bulk of this money going to perpetuate the advantages of that tiny fraction of the population which is at the top of the social and economic pyramid. The overwhelming majority of the children never get beyond the first few grades. They not only fail to receive any benefits from the expenditures on education, but also suffer grave indignities that might not be visited upon them if the educational system did not exist. The graded curriculum degrades those who are unable to continue in it. These are uniformly the children of the poor. It is not that they are ineducable. The failure is that of the institution and its bureaucracy and the rigidities inherent in them.

As Ivan Illich has said, "Educators appeal to the gambling instinct of the entire population when they raise money for schools. They advertise the jackpot without mentioning the odds." The odds against the poor in the educational systems of every country are such as to intimidate the most hardened habitué of Las Vegas or Monte Carlo. The dice are loaded. We must look forward to an immense decentralization, debureaucratization, and deinstitutionalization if we are to have a learning society.

Here technology can help us. The electronic devices now available can make every home a learning unit, for all the family. All the members of the family might be continuously engaged in learning. Teachers might function as visiting nurses do today—and as physicians used to do. The new electronic devices do not eliminate the need for face-to-face instruction or for schools, but they enable us to shift attention from the wrong question, which is how can we get everybody in schools and keep him there as long as possible, to the right one, which is how can we give everybody a chance to learn all his life? The new technology gives a flexibility that will encourage us to abandon the old self-imposed limitations. They are that education is a matter for part of life, part of the year, or part of the day, that it is open in all its richness only to those who need it least, and that it must be conducted formally, in buildings designed for the purpose, by people who have spent their lives in schools, in accordance with an incomprehensible program, the chief aim of which is to separate the sheep from the goats.

The Open University in England, if it can hold off the Tories and avoid suffocation from its credits and degrees, gives us some intimation of what the educational future could look like. The Open University is nothing less than a national commitment to use all the intellectual and technological resources of the country in a coherent way to give every citizen, no matter what his background or academic qualifications, an opportunity to keep on learning throughout his life.

In this country the University Without Walls, which is just getting started under the sponsorship of nineteen colleges and universities, including the University of Chicago, appears to be contemplating the same thing.

The other day L. E. Dennis, provost of the Massachusetts State College System, responding to the question, "What's at the other end of 'Sesame Street'?" proposed a University of North America on the same lines.

Other technological possibilities are suggested by the agreement recently made between NASA (the space agency of the United States) and the government of India. It provides for educational broadcasting via satellite to some five thousand remote Indian villages. Brazil has shown interest in similar arrangements. The United Nations has set up a Working Group on Direct Broadcasting to promote and follow such experiments.

Then there are cables, cassettes, computers, and videotape. It is reported that a cable system is now being built in San Jose, California, that will have forty-eight channels. It is hard to accept the proposition that all of these must be dedicated to the kind of triviality that is now the common fare on commercial television. The San Jose people would have to make a tremendous effort to avoid using some of these channels—and we are told that many more are technically possible—for cultural, artistic, and educational purposes, and in particular for the discussion of political, economic, and social issues.

Of course I know there is little in the record of the American people to suggest that we will use these new devices for our enlightenment. I remember running into E. M. Herr, president of Westinghouse, forty-five years ago. He said he had been at a big meeting in Washington with Mr. Herbert Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce, which had been called to settle the future of radio. I said, "Did you settle anything?" Mr. Herr replied: "We certainly did. We decided there should never be any advertising on the air." Therefore I do not say we will use the new instruments. Technology has given us in order to create a learning society. I say only that we can create such a society.



We can have a learning society. Its object would be to raise every man and woman and every community to the highest cultural level attainable. The affluence of a world in which science creates wealth will make it impossible to plead poverty as an excuse for not trying to educate everybody. As for our pitiful record in the use of our free time, Arnold Toynbee, who has a long historical view, reassures us by saying that free time may be abused at first by people who have had no experience of it; but sooner or later we shall be able to salvage some of it for learning.

In such a society the role of educational institutions would be to provide for what is notably missing

from them today, and that is the interaction of minds. Eventually these institutions would not be "processing" anybody for anything or awarding diplomas or degrees. The search for what have been called sheepskins to cover our intellectual nakedness, which has been necessary to gain status in an industrial society, has held back learning.

In the coming age the university could be transformed into a contemporary version of the Platonic Academy. It could be a center of independent thought and criticism, bringing the great intellectual disciplines together so that they might shed light on one another and on the major issues facing modern man.

So when Karl Jaspers proposed something new for Europe, a technical faculty in the university, he did not do so in order to turn out more engineers or to get ahead of Russia. He did it because he thought how to live with science and technology was the most urgent problem of humanity. It could be solved, if at all, only by forcing technology to wrestle with other disciplines and forcing them to face up to it. The place for such confrontation, if you will forgive the expression, is the university.

No doubt this would compel a change in the organization and personnel of the university, which is now a collection of specialists who appear to grow more narrow as they become more numerous. The recent statement of Victor Ferkiss of the Department of Government at Georgetown University about what specialists in political science have done has the ring of truth. Mr. Ferkiss said, "The great issues of politics have been left untouched not so much because of a quasi-conspiracy in favor of the status quo as because of a trained incapacity to think in a creative, innovative, interdisciplinary way about social matters, an incapacity fostered by the entire process of professional socialization, now beginning even at the undergraduate level." If a trained incapacity to think is the result of university study, we should perhaps reexamine its structure and its purposes.

To attain full humanity is to reach the level of critical consciousness. This means understanding reality and understanding that men can and should transform it. The university is the institution which should lead in the achievement of critical consciousness. It must use and contain within itself all the major modes of understanding and transforming reality. Thus the university would represent and constitute the circle of knowledge, in which everything is understood in the light of everything else.

Such a university could preside over the progress of the learning society. 20

Guiltmakers, Farewell

by JON VAN DYKE

*The young are tired of having
the school impose shame,
alienation from one's self, dependence,
and insecurity on them in
its determination to
turn out "good citizens"*

Americans who are concerned about changing this country around have spent an unusual amount of energy trying to build an alternative system of education because it is through the educational structure that the dominant culture has tried to perpetuate itself. The present educational structure machine-tools the young to meet the needs of our various bureaucracies: corporate, governmental, military, trade-union, and educational. Our schools take children who are free and imaginative and try to mold them into the automatons our corporate society needs.

At the royal courts in the Middle Ages, they sometimes "created" court jesters by putting young children in boxes and force-feeding them so that, as they grew, their bones would warp in unusual shapes. Many of our schools today attempt to do the same thing with children's minds.

The children are of course resisting this force-feeding, and with good reason. They see what the American educational system did to their parents and they do not want the same fate for themselves. The children see that many of their parents have succumbed to what Paul Goodman calls the "nothing-can-be-done disease" and that for many of their parents being an adult means nothing more than that they are tall and debt-ridden and able to buy liquor without having to show their driver's license.

The children want becoming an adult to mean more for them. They want to participate in making morally demanding decisions, in generating ideals, in controlling public authorities, in safeguarding the society against its despoilers, and in making the changes that will be necessary. The children are thus demanding an education that will train them to be full participating adults.

The education the children want must differ from what happens today in most public schools in at least one important way: the educational process must not

Higher education as presently conducted in the United States is in the main a highly unproductive and perhaps even immoral enterprise. The liberal arts college can survive only if it begins to realize what its function is outside the university as well as within it.

Outside? Ours is, of course, a mass-media society. Whatever television decides we ought to know, we know. Whatever it says we should do, we tend to do. By comparison the liberal arts college may seem a sort of antiquated game preserve for intellectual aristocrats. If, then, every citizen is to get an opportunity to receive a liberal education, the mass media must become in part a serious educational enterprise. But this can happen only if those who have been formed by the liberal arts college shape the new pedagogy and give it direction. I do not mean that they are to preach. I believe, rather, that we can dramatize such essential aspects of the liberal arts point of view as that reason and emotion are not the same thing, that love is meaningless without justice, and that the teaching and passion of Socrates and Jesus, revolutionary though they be in essence, do not add up to violence.

I believe that one could show that the environment in which we live need not be inhuman. We might suggest the theme stressed years ago by Lecomte du Noüy and reemphasized recently by René Dubos: "As the power of science increases, its uses become less sacred, more trivial, more brutal, and often quite immoral. Academicians and technologists proudly proclaim that we live in an age of science. What this really means is that we exploit the world's natural resources, usually without regard for genuine human needs. . . . When man truly enters the age of science he will abandon his crude and destructive attempts to conquer nature. He will instead learn to insert himself into the environment in such a manner that his ways of life and his technologies make him once more in harmony with nature."

To show that this can be done is first of all to

make evident that it has in part been done. That is the core of the liberal arts program at its best. When Robert Hutchins said that the liberal arts could be managed in two years, and I said three, I believe that we both meant not that a lifetime task could be concentrated into that amount of time but only that a good direction might be indicated.

Of the liberal arts college in terms of its own intellectual performance and character, I would say first of all that it should be somewhat more interdisciplinary in its course of study but not unaware of the pitfalls into which interdisciplinary efforts have sometimes tumbled in the past. It should also focus more attention on science in the sense of creatively and imaginatively seeking the meaning of science in terms of its own tradition and its own present forward thrust. I shall not say, however, that its major concern will be with what so many of us have vaguely defined as "values." Rather it will wrestle day and night with good and evil.

We are all rather fond of saying that more scientists are alive today than have existed during all the previous centuries of human history. To me this often seems like saying that there were more pyramid builders in ancient Egypt than there are at present and or were in the past. But is it perhaps true that the number who are now enamored of the good is smaller now? What wonder, therefore, that our culture is so destructive of aspirations to be clean of heart, not to seek wealth as an end unto itself, and to risk persecution for justice's sake.

And so if the liberal arts college can explore the possible effect on mankind's destiny of the quest for, if not insight into, the good, it will acquire new significance. Support? I have no doubt about that. What so many, many people who have lived according to their traditions really feel is what Plato says at the close of the *Gorgias*: "Let us take as our leader reason, which tells us that this way of life is the best — to live and die practicing justice and all the other forms of excellence."

GEORGE N. SHUSTER

be conducted in an authoritarian fashion that will restrict the individual child from growing in his own way and that will discourage the child from ever wanting to continue learning on his own.



The Port Huron Statement, which was drawn up at the founding of the Students for a Democratic Society in 1962, describes nicely the need to break down authoritarian structures and replace them with values that emphasize the importance of each individual human being.

"We regard men," the statement begins, "as infinitely precious and possessed of unfulfilled capacities for reason, freedom, and love. . . . We oppose the depersonalization that reduces human beings to the status of things. If anything, the brutalities of the twentieth century teach that means and ends are intimately related, that vague appeals to 'posterity' cannot justify the mutilations of the present. . . .

"Loneliness, estrangement, isolation describe the vast distance between man and man today. These dominant tendencies cannot be overcome by better personnel management, nor by improved gadgets, but only when a love of man overcomes the idolatrous worship of things by man."

Peter Marin has illustrated the dehumanization of our schools by comparing them to the rites of passage of primitive tribes. Primitive people recognized that children and adolescents have energies that cannot and should not be repressed. The elders of the tribes legitimized and accepted these energies and turned them toward collective aims. The young were merged with the life of the tribe and in this way acknowledged, honored, and domesticated — but not destroyed.

In most initiation rites the participant was led through the mythical or sacred world (or a symbolic version thereof) and then was returned, transformed, to the secular world as a new person, with a new role. In many cultures the symbolic figures in the rites were unmasked at the end, as if to reveal to the initiate the interpenetration of the secular and sacred worlds.

Occasionally the initiate was asked to don the ritual mask himself — joining, as he did, one world with another and assuming the responsibility for their connection. This shift in status, in relation, is the heart of the rite — a liturgized merging of the individual with shared sources of power.

Compare this ritual with our schools, which so-

cialize our students by depriving them of everything the rites bestow. Our public schools educate our young by repressing their energies. They isolate the young from most other parts of the community. They categorically refuse to make use of the individual's private experiences. This socialization process imposes a cultural schizophrenia on the student in which he is forced to choose between his own perception of reality and the one demanded by the institution.

Our schools are organized to weaken the student so that he is forced to accept the values and demands of the institution. To this end we deprive the student of mobility and experience. Through law and custom we make school the only legal place for him to be. And then, to make sure he remains dependent and manipulable, we empty the school of all life.

The changes necessary to reverse the evils of our present school system must be far more daring and far-reaching than the proposals that are generally heard. Revisions of curriculum, teaching machines, smaller classes, encounter groups, redistribution of power — all of these are stopgap measures, desperate attempts to keep the young in schools that are hopelessly inappropriate for the students of today.

What needs changing are not the methods of the school system but its aims. And what is troubling the young and forcing upon their teachers an intolerable burden is the idea of childhood itself — the ways we think about adolescents and their place in the culture.

We must stop gearing our educational system to feed the industrialized, corporate state, which needs persons technically capable but relatively dependent and responsive to authority so that their energies will be available when needed. We must instead gear our educational system to the human needs of the individuals seeking an education.

To expand a bit on the problem of authoritarianism, I would like to offer as text a statement Bobby Seale made in September, 1968, at a meeting held in Berkeley to protest the decision of the California Board of Regents denying credit for a course Eldridge Cleaver was teaching. In the course of his speech, Bobby Seale made the following statement:

"Archie and Jughead never kissed Veronica and Betty. Superman never kissed Lois Lane. We are tired of relating to comic-book conceptions. Adam should have defended the Garden of Eden against the omnipotent administrator. Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness mean nothing to me if I can't go home and feel safe with my wife in bed replenishing the earth."

It may not be obvious at first what these senti-

ments have to do with an issue of academic freedom, but the young understand the intuitive leap that Bobby Seale was making. The young recognize that authoritarianism in our society operates overtly or subtly at every level of life, from comic-strip imagery to Christian theology, from the college classroom to the privacy of the bedroom, and the young are ready to discard the culture that relies on such sleazy coercion.

The young are insisting that the nameless and faceless authority that has been controlling their lives be unmasked, that this authority come down to them and confront them honestly. The young are tired of having their schools impose guilt, shame, alienation from one's self, dependence, and insecurity on them in an attempt to make the students manipulable, obedient, "good citizens," as we call it, and useful to the state. The young recognize that the schools are used to deprive them of their own sense of individual responsibility, their own sense of personhood, and they are not likely to accept this system much longer.



As a final text, I would like to quote a statement made by Albert Einstein when he was reflecting on his own education:

"One had to cram all this stuff into one's mind, whether one liked it or not. This coercion had such a deterring effect that, after I had passed the final examination, I found the consideration of any scientific problems distasteful to me for an entire year. . . . It is in fact nothing short of a miracle that the modern methods of instruction have not yet entirely strangled the holy curiosity of inquiry; for this delicate little plant, aside from stimulation, stands mainly in need of freedom; without this it goes to wrack and ruin without fail. . . .

"It is a very grave mistake to think that the enjoyment of seeing and searching can be promoted by means of coercion and a sense of duty. To the contrary, I believe that it would be possible to rob even a healthy beast of prey of its voraciousness, if it were possible, with the aid of a whip, to force the beast to devour continuously, even when not hungry — especially if the food, handed out under such coercion, were to be selected accordingly."

This statement is probably even more true today than when it was made because today the gap between what the educational administrators think students ought to learn and what the students really want to know is greater than ever. 20

International Education

by F. CHAMPION WARD

*Americans are no longer so sure
that their educational system
is worth exporting to peoples
with quite different needs
and expectations*

The developments in international education during the last twenty years have been extraordinary. The movement of national and popular self-assertion has spread across Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, with Latin America catching the fever. At the start of this period, the United States, almost alone among all the major nations of the World North, had both the money and the will to help the World South. But it also had the least knowledge of that suddenly discovered and clamorous scene. I remember asking a distinguished American economist to go to a Middle East country to advise its government on taxation. "Tell me where it is," he said, "and I'll go." On the whole, our ignorance of the Third World was at first forgiven by its people, who had convinced themselves at a distance that we not only had money but possibly, in the form of our educational system, also a magic key to their development.

To serve as an American educational consultant overseas in those years was to learn not only about other systems of education, but about one's own. The systems were in most cases derived from European originals and were often out-of-date versions of those models. Also, whether their politics were representative or authoritarian, most of the states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America were affected by the spirit of equality and the compulsion to modernize which marked American educational growth, and so they were repeating in large part earlier chapters of our own educational history. As Tocqueville, visiting the new American democracy more than a century ago, could say to Europe, "This is how it will be with us," so the Westerner visiting the Third World in recent years could say, "This is how it was with us."

Under these circumstances, one came to view with a fresh eye the powers and limitations of the American system as a model and midwife in helping new societies into what Whitehead called the "age of steam and democracy."

Let us consider more closely what the American educational adviser typically encountered overseas and what he brought to that encounter. His ordeal was likely to pass through three stages. Upon arrival, he often knew about the country only that it needed many things, including — and this was heady wine — advice from him. He was apt to be ignorant of its educational system since he had not expected to find one at all. And he was often repelled by his first glimpses of that system and by the strange idioms and haughty airs of the local elite who were its product. I remember the shock American agricultural assistants suffered in India after visiting an Oxford graduate in one of the Indian ministries. One of the Americans came out shaking his head and saying, "Jeez, that guy speaks better English than I do."

The American consultant's first impulse was to tear up the existing educational system and start all over, preferably with something familiar like a land-grant college or a comprehensive high school. Indeed, when circumstances were particularly favorable to this first simple impulse (as they were during the American occupation of Japan) the full punishment of a prostrate foe included imposing on him the whole educational system of the conqueror, complete with junior high schools, junior colleges, locally elected school boards, and even the P.T.A.

The educational adviser's confidence in his dismissal of traditional education was strengthened by the expectations of his hosts, who tended to regard all Americans as uncouth but temporarily necessary. They had acquired this view from listening to colonialists and from watching tourists. They took for granted that Americans would deplore their literary culture and would prescribe practical education as its cure. In large part, American consultants obliged. Never have I praised manual labor more or done less of it than in my four years in India.

To help these new nations enter the "age of steam" the United States has supplied manpower experts, planning economists, technical and vocational specialists, agriculturists, testers, measurers, and other experts, energetic and earnest, uncritical and not always entirely couth. In spite of enormous obstacles and handicaps at home and abroad, a very great deal has been accomplished, particularly in the last few years, as trained manpower and training facilities

have reached critical numbers in some fields and places.

But many American educational prescriptions have not followed directly from a calculation of a country's economic needs. Americans have also urged universal literacy, the rapid expansion of secondary education, talent searches and scholarships for poor students, techniques for handling masses of university students, and even the encouragement of native arts. To give them and their authors a hard-bitten air, these proposals have often been clothed in the idiom of economics or politics. Any amount or kind of education may be loosely defended as an "investment in human resources"; or it may be said to be "politically explosive" to withhold education from young people who want it or to give it to those, often alas the same young people, who are likely to be out of work.

But basically these educational prescriptions have been articles of faith for American advisers, deeply democratic assertions of the rightness of educating every person not because of his economic value or political influence but because of his dignity as a human being and his rights as a citizen.



This takes us into the second stage of our American consultant's experience abroad. As befits a second act, this stage was marked by complications and by the general puzzlement of our hero. The complications arose from two sources: the existing system in the country the American consultant was trying to help, and the tensions and discrepancies he found in his own bag of prescriptions.

The local system turned out to be more persistent and more versatile than he had at first supposed. On the one hand, the elite of the country, although they gave verbal and even sincere agreement to the reform of the system that produced them and were apt to agree that the village people should have the new kind of education, were nevertheless careful to insure that their own children would continue to be educated in the very tradition which they had agreed to reform.

On the other hand, the existing educational system turned out, under labels that were unfamiliar to our adviser, to have been trying to provide a number of the forms of practical training that he had thought were neglected altogether. He was forced to concede, for example, that adults may actually be educated by agencies called "extramural departments," and that

People who think that good will and reason are both necessary for the making of an educated individual are losing ground to those who think that good will alone is sufficient. The counter-culture motto is that innocence is sufficient.

HUTCHINS: If the implication of your comment is that it is impossible to make clear the reasons for intelligent action and therefore we are either going to get no action or unintelligent action, this seems to me to be so hopeless a conclusion about our democratic society that we ought to close up shop and forget about survival or anything else. But things do change. The most spectacular change in recent years has been our willingness to consider that even the gross national product, the sacred cow of American economics and politics, can actually be reduced in order to avoid destroying the environment. I believe that social change comes about because we eventually recognize the facts of life. We begin to discover that the G.N.P. consists of cigarettes, cosmetics, liquor, and other things, some highly pleasant, some highly dangerous and damaging (like the handguns that the American Rifle Association wishes to preserve for us), but none of them essential. We begin to realize that the desire to have a grosser gross national product may be suicidal. So something begins to happen.

Of course, when you have lived as long as I have you do not think that because something is going on today it will continue to go on tomorrow. One has seen too many good movements and good ideas die. Still, an important — perhaps temporary — change has been brought about by the recognition of the facts of life.

Similarly, when you have the situation that exists in some Latin American countries where billions are being poured into an educational system, at some point you begin to ask what you are getting in return. You begin to ask whether there is some way in which these resources can be used to obtain the results you really want, which is not to have five per cent of the population graduating from the university and absorbing the bulk of this educational money but to raise the cultural

level of the entire population. At that point you begin to think about alternatives to the school.

You ask yourself whether it would be possible to have the school year organized so that the child goes for two months a year, or at different hours, or under different circumstances. You ask whether you would like to organize storefront schools, which are very inexpensive and which are operated very informally, in order to get at pupils you could not otherwise reach. Once we begin to recognize that we are making a tremendous public investment in education and ask whether we are getting from it anything like what we proposed to ourselves when we adopted it, then things will begin to move.

What evidence is there that our society — or any society — wants to be a learning society?

HUTCHINS: I do not think there is much evidence of that. One has to say that one believes, on the basis of what one thinks is one's knowledge of human nature, that it is impossible for human beings to satisfy themselves indefinitely by drinking, playing cards, going to the movies, watching television, or riding around in second-hand Fords and catching glimpses of the countryside between the billboards. We have to assume what Aristotle said in the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, that "all men by nature desire to know." But it may be that, because of our inexperience with leisure, we are not going to be able to overcome our desire to lie around making bums of ourselves. I have faith, which I think is justified, that sooner or later boredom, if nothing else, is going to drive us to see if we can make something of ourselves. And the way to do this is to keep on learning. This is the way to become human and to stay human.

If you ask me, then, well, how do you know this is going to happen, I say, of course, I don't. But I do say that we now have the opportunity and the resources and that we humans are such animals that, whether we like it or not, we will be driven to become members of a learning society.

secondary schools may be influenced usefully by institutes of education. He also discovered that the colonial past was strewn with attempts to get Africans and Asians to patronize farm institutes, technical schools, and other colonial centers of practical education, and that there were even records of colonial district officers having to spend much of their time persuading Asian and African parents to let their children go to school at all.

Along with this growing complication in his response to the existing educational systems, the American educational adviser was further sobered by the uneasy mixture of instrumental and liberal nostrums which his own system provided him. Under the pressure of limited funds in the new countries, obscurities about educational policies and programs which he had been able to leave more or less unexamined at home became quite troublesome abroad.

Above all, Robert Hutchins's trenchant question, "Must democracy mean that everyone is entitled to a bad education?" came to haunt and plague the adviser's mind and conscience. If, for example, not everyone could be educated, should as many as possible be educated somehow? Or should a Jeffersonian approach be adopted and equality be sought only through equal access by the talented few to a system small enough to be good? Should the mass media be used to maximize literacy and useful knowledge, or should such investments be resisted on the ground that a minimum number of critical, independent, individual minds is the first requirement of a free society? Should manpower planning be carried to the point where career choices are not made by individual students but by planners allocating them to quotas of high-level manpower?

Again, what do we Westerners assume when we deride the fact that at an African university the first chair established was in classics? Our usual response is, "This is not what these people need." Does this mean that the free world shares with its global adversary the view that prosperity comes before freedom? Are the humanities to be cultivated only in affluent societies? Is steam the precursor of democracy? Would New England have flowered on that hypothesis? Would Harvard have been established when it was?

At this point, our American educational consultant will have entered the third phase in which he is likely to remain. I am afraid that no neat denouement marks this third act. Rather, a mood of chastened eclecticism sets in. He now accepts the spotted ac-

tuality of what he finds in being and of what he brings with him from the United States. If his temper is sanguine, as it usually is, he may even display that exuberant fatalism with which Americans embrace large shapeless trends and which helps to make them larger. He decides to take only short views, to do what he can, starting when and where he can, and then take it from there.

On their part, the nationals of the World South have themselves evolved as education in their countries has expanded. It is well to remember how much has been accomplished, for that growth is part of the problem now to be faced. Taking the less-developed countries as a whole, elementary education has doubled, and secondary education and higher education have virtually quadrupled during the last twenty years. Investment in education has grown from one and one-half billion dollars in 1950 to eleven billion dollars in 1969. To maintain this investment, educational expenditures have expanded more than twice as fast as gross national products, a rate which can hardly be exceeded or even maintained without serious distortion of economic plans.

This strain on resources for the expansion of education is the most striking and widespread source of concern and bemusement to educators in both the World South and the World North. The concern is intensified by the youthful character of the populations of the Third World countries. Despite the gains of recent years, it is estimated that three hundred million children are not now enrolled in elementary schools. And to add the impossible to the difficult, by 1985 there will be half again as many school-age children as there were in 1965.

Equally serious is the inefficiency of the systems thus expanded. This is true both in the internal sense (e.g., half of the elementary-school children fail to complete the fourth grade) and in the external sense (e.g., except in a few specialized categories, there are already fewer jobs than there are school leavers looking for them).

No wonder that many educators in the World South are beginning to believe that they have had the worst of both worlds in the last two decades. Not only have they developed inefficient, incomplete versions of other people's educational systems, they have also, in the process, reduced the possibility that they might have found, in their own pasts and in their own imaginations, systems better suited to their cultures and circumstances. A strong do-it-yourself spirit is now very marked, and it may be expected to be intensified during the next decade.

For its part, the World North has been shaken in its assumption that the sole task of the World South is to attain the character and meet the standards of the World North as quickly as possible. Our own internal troubles in education, our dawning realization that those young Americans who believe most in education are least likely to get it, and those who get it are least likely to believe in it, have shaken confidence in our capacity to help the Third World. We are certainly not as sure of ourselves as we once were.

Hence, there is now a prospect that we can learn something from the World South which can be useful in our own future, and there is even a chance that we may wish to learn it. Because its population has already outstripped its economy, it is quite possible that educators in the Third World will now face, more persistently than we have to date, the problem

of adapting education to life rather than employment.

As the present decade begins, there are countries where, in part because of the Green Revolution which has kept them alive, tens of millions of people now face a state of semipermanent unemployment or permanent semiemployment. After twenty years of relating education to employment, the notion of education for unemployment has a bizarre and unwelcome sound. I do not see how most economic planners, budgeteers, and treasury types can be expected to cope with it. In fact, I would expect them to find in this prospect ground for curbing the further growth of education. Yet the people and their political leaders will almost certainly see things differently. The democratic demand for social equality continues at flood tide throughout the world. Regimes of almost every kind feel compelled to respond to it.



On Charismatic Leaders

by Donald M. Gregory, II

Richard Nixon's lack of charisma and seeming inability to transmit personal warmth may be one of the best things to happen to our form of government since the Supreme Court assumed the power of judicial review. In a democratic society there is no room for what the communists call a "cult of personality," and yet in the years following World War II we had developed precisely that at our highest levels of government.

America was by no means alone in this trend. Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union, Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, Mao Tse-tung in China, Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, Charles de Gaulle in France, to name a few outstanding examples, were followed as much for their personal magnetism as for their politics.

But the last four or five years have seen a decline

of the easily identifiable head of state, the leader who seemed to many to embody all that his particular country stood for. The average man in the street, in any country except the one in question, for example, would probably now have trouble identifying the President of North Vietnam, the Premier of France, or the Premier of the Soviet Union, whereas not too long ago the names Ho Chi Minh, Charles de Gaulle and Nikita Khrushchev would have come easily to mind.

The phenomenon of super-heroes in American government was probably never so obvious as it was during the Kennedy Administration and in the years that immediately followed. Besides John, there was Bobby and then Teddy. It became fashionable for liberal politicians to pattern themselves after the youthful model of the Kennedys even if they were not all as fortunate as John Tunney of California, who even looks like a Kennedy.

Lyndon B. Johnson was criticized by many for not having the grace and style of the Kennedys, yet he certainly had a very definite style of his own. As a result, in the minds of many he became personally responsible for the war in Indochina even though he was simply continuing a trend started under Dwight D. Eisenhower and reinforced by John F. Kennedy.

Because of the role of the American President as a world leader, with all its attendant publicity, it is understandable that we would be one of the last countries to evolve from the cult-of-personality phase of leadership to a phase where it is the man in

What seems most likely, therefore, is that learning will have to be conceived of as itself an occupation rather than a preparation for one.

In one of the first and wisest books ever written about development, entitled *Development for Free Asia*, Maurice Zinkin concluded wistfully that Asia was faced with the hard necessity of choosing "development" over "contentment." On the whole, official and articulate Asia has so chosen, without so far achieving sufficient development to compensate for a reduced contentment. Development will of course be pursued further in the decade now beginning, but it may have to be married in some new way to contentment. And education may have to be directed to achieving the latter as well as the former.

It is too soon to do more than speculate on how this will be attempted let alone accomplished. It

may be that old forms of teaching and learning, and old ways of living which have been viewed as obstructions to modernization, will be given a second look and a second chance. And it may be that new forms of educational opportunity will be provided through open universities and continental colleges such as those being tried out in Britain and the United States, or through extensions of the techniques developed by the television producers of "Sesame Street."

If, under the pressure of necessity, education for contentment is deliberately and resourcefully pursued in the Third World during the next ten years, it is possible that the vector of social change and emulation will be reversed and that a new Tocqueville may return some day from the World South to say to a World North that is still convinced its future will resemble its past: "That is how it will be with us."

the Oval Office rather than the image of the man who fulfills a role.

Richard Nixon is neither a country bumpkin nor one of the "beautiful people"; he is neither a great statesman nor a great politician; he is not a person whose life has been filled with one success after another; and there is no significant group of Americans who think Richard Nixon can do no wrong. There used to be, but that can probably be attributed more to a holdover of earlier attitudes toward Presidents than to any personal power of Richard Nixon.

The most notable example of change was the hardhat support President Nixon's Vietnam policy received until the Administration directed anti-inflationary moves toward the construction industry. After that hardhats and anti-war demonstrators jeered the President side by side on the steps of the Capitol.

What does all this have to do with the strength of our representative democracy? Simply this: power and direction in a democracy should not come from one or a handful of influential people at the top of the governing structure. As long as the needs and wants of the citizens are subordinated to what an enormously popular and charismatic leader tells us we ought to want, the forces of repression and autocracy will continue to gain strength until the will of the people is no longer a governing factor.

When an individual like Richard Nixon becomes President, he must rely on genuinely satisfying the

needs of the people. The Congress will refuse to be intimidated, as they showed on the S.S.T. issue, and the people will refuse to be intimidated, as they are showing with their continuing pressure to end the war in Vietnam.

Mr. Nixon may not be dynamic and charismatic, but he is capable and energetic. His innovations on welfare and foreign policy are good courses for America to be following. But they will be possible only if the American people support them — and only if Richard Nixon realizes he cannot succeed by force of personality alone. He must genuinely satisfy the needs of the people. That one factor is essential to the maintenance of representative democracy.

Government should exist to standardize and codify the will of the majority. It should follow opinion, not mold it. Opinion should be molded by the people organized in special-interest groups, molded by the press (both reportorially and editorially), and by other nongovernmental agencies.

The Nixon Administration certainly has a long way to go, especially on the issues of Indochina and domestic dissent. But hopefully a new trend has begun. We should not despair when we are told that Edmund Muskie or George McGovern is not charismatic enough to be President. Less charisma and more logical thinking and hard work might do us and our democracy a little good.

Mr. Gregory, of Providence, Rhode Island, works as a free-lance photographer.

2nd

SECOND EDITION

The American Character

Ten years ago the Center assembled an articulate group of citizens in Washington, D.C., to discuss the American character. John F. Kennedy was just settling down in the White House at the time, Nikita Khrushchev presided omnipotently in the Kremlin, and John XXIII reigned in the Vatican. American campuses were comparatively tranquil and the first massive protest was still to be held in the Capital. Only a few Americans were quite sure of Vietnam's exact location and a pig was nothing more than a designation for a barnyard animal. The Beatles were still obscure figures — as were Bob Dylan, Tom Hayden, Eldridge Cleaver, Spiro T. Agnew, Angela Davis, the Berrigan brothers, Betty Friedan, the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, John Glenn, and Timothy Leary. The world, in short, looked somewhat different. Here is what some of the participants in that conference had to say at the time. Excerpted from a 1961 pamphlet.



THE AMERICAN CHARACTER

THE REAL AND THE IDEAL

JOHN F. DAY, Television Executive: Those early and distinctive American traits that were once perhaps quite properly associated with the American character — independence, manliness, inventiveness, egalitarianism, bootstrap ambitiousness, honesty — are now held up by the mass media, if at all, only in the most pallid and conventional terms and with a lack of interest that reveals how far we have come from the early American character.

EDWARD ENGBERG, Journalist:

What we need to address ourselves to is the question of how to make a man secure in his own person, because only the secure man is able to accept change and great upheaval, and to prevent them from becoming destructive. The tempo of events today has been so stepped up that the man charged with making decisions has been deprived of what used to be a process of deliberation. The time between making a decision and executing it has been so foreshortened by various technological devices that even the hours that used to be left to us to decide whether we were going to war, the time once used for modification, for revision, for change, for deliberation, has been taken from us.

The authority that can recognize what action we ought to take is atro-

phying, while the need for it is increasing. Politicians, out of weariness or in fear for their political lives, instead of meeting problems head on tend to moralize and obstruct our view of what is taking place.

Our political leadership tends to take an out — “I can’t persuade the American people to do thus and so,” when frequently it doesn’t know if it can or not.

STEVEN S. SCHWARZSCHILD, Rabbi:

A number of books have been written on the question of whether bigness is really the end of the way of life and of the values that we treasure. I wonder whether some of us may not be looking for an ideal of American life and character that is irretrievably gone, and whether it will do us much good to pine for the lost nineteenth century.

The question I would like to submit is whether all these values which we presumably have dedicated ourselves to foster will not have to be found in our new type of big society. Is it possible that we might transcend the contrast of collectivism and bigness on the one hand and individualism on the other? Might we not find the two intermingled within one another so that we can stay in our present century and be able to cope with the problems that confront us?

EUGENE J. LIPMAN, Rabbi:

Was our ideal American character ever American at all? It occurs to me that two kinds of people possess maximally the supposed ideals. The first were immigrants who were revolutionaries against the society from which they ran away; the second were the individuals who were isolated from other Americans and were off by themselves. Every time Americans stayed in one place long enough to get together and become a stable community they began to homogenize. The volatility, individualism, and excitement of the ethnic, religious, and racial groups that came to this country soon began to disintegrate. When we talk about pluralism in American society today, it is not the pluralism of the nineteenth century. We Jews are probably freer today to express ourselves than we ever were, but we don’t want to express as much Jewishness as our grandparents did a hundred years ago. The Irish who came to this country were “wild Irishmen.” Irish-Americans are freer today but not so wild. Something bland seems to come into our characters when we have been Americans long enough.

I don’t know how, without new infusions of immigrants, we are going to capture the kind of revolutionary thinking that we are being challenged to find. 20

THE AMERICAN CHARACTER

IS AMERICA THE STATUS QUO?

WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS,
Supreme Court Justice:

I hope that America's only dream of empire will be the common good of humanity. I hope America will come to realize that her strength is not in firepower but in ideas of justice, tolerance, equality. We have a decisive role to play; and we have on our side assets which will make it easy for us to win the contest. We have the Declaration of Independence, Abraham Lincoln, and the Bill of Rights. . . .

I know none better than the practical and idealistic American to provide both the higher education needed for free societies and the plans and programs necessary for a reconstruction of the villages of the world.

MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Writer:

Power, not ideas, defines America for the rest of the world. We live in a society dominated by power. To most people in the underprivileged world we are personified by our oil companies, sugar companies, and the like. We are the status quo in the world.

Justice Douglas has asked, "Why don't we shape the revolutions in the underdeveloped countries?" We don't make revolutions because of what we are *inside*. We are a conservative society in a revolutionary world. Where, within our status-quo society, do we find the possibility for internal change, which is the precondition for external change? Some of us once looked to the labor movement. I still do, but I suspect this is due more to nostalgia than to conviction.

If one were to look elsewhere one would probably say that the only group that is a practical and powerful carrier of idealism is the civil-rights movement. But I doubt that the civil-rights movement, for all its dynamism, representing as it does only ten per cent of the American people, is capable of defining our society.

The real problem, then, is this: Where within a conservative society in a revolutionary world do you find the Archimedean point of internal change that will make external change possible?

HENRY STEELE COMMAGER,
Historian:

I was fascinated to hear Mr. Harrington equate power with the status quo. When Henry Adams sought a symbol of change and complexity and the breakup of the world, he found it in the dynamo, a figure of power. For my part I must say that I am not worried about the American affair with the status quo. Santayana said that Americans never solve any of their problems, they amiably bid them good-bye. In a sense, I think we are doing this with the status quo every day. Every time we export a dynamo, every time we export any of the things that remake societies, promote an equalitarian system, or develop a technological civilization, we are exporting revolution.

The interest in the American character lies, rather, in the extent to which Americans can adapt themselves to revolutions outside the United States, insofar as they affect America. Heretofore, we have been able to enjoy revolution and all the advantages of the status quo at the same time. We have been able to have our revolutionary cake and eat it. Whether we can adapt ourselves to the revolutionary phenomena in Asia and Africa today, whether we can find the resourcefulness to cooperate with these revolutions, is a genuine question.

The crucial problem for the next generation is whether it can develop the inventiveness and resourcefulness necessary to counter the forces making for a dangerous kind of bigness and conformity in America. It is something

of an illusion to believe that there was anything especially liberating about the frontier or anything especially liberating about the small rural societies of America. They had their limitations. But somehow, cut off as we were from the Old World, we did discover in the eighteenth century and in the early nineteenth most extraordinary resources, intellectual and moral inventive resources in the realm of politics beyond those of any other people.

Whether the American character can prove itself equally resourceful in inventing new ways of cherishing intellectual and moral interests and values, new ways of developing revolutionary change without necessarily upsetting everything is the kind of question that fascinated Henry Adams in the eighteen-nineties and I think must still fascinate us.

WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS: There is a danger in thinking that American ideas of liberty, justice, and equality necessarily go along with the export of American goods. It might have been true at one time but now there is nothing ideological about a jeep, a tractor, or a cement plant. The man who can read the instruction book that goes with it can also read the *Communist Manifesto*. Democratic ideas do not necessarily follow American goods.

I am very much disturbed that in fifty-six per cent of American high schools there is not a single foreign language offered, at a time when we should be turning into the great linguists of the world. Of the sixty-eight major languages of the world, there are forty we are not yet fully equipped to teach.

I would think that one of our educational goals might be to turn out a hundred thousand students every year who look like Americans, dress like Americans, eat like Americans, and are Americans, but who can think like Chinese. And a hundred thousand who can think like Persians, and a hundred thousand who can think like Venezuelans, and so on. 20

TECHNOLOGY AND PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING

LOUIS FINKELSTEIN, Theologian:

The vast increase of power, of technical and scientific knowledge in our time, can be entrusted only to the unusual — let us say saintly — or, to use less challenging language, wise men and women. The unsaintly and the unwise are sure to use power for wicked purposes.

Mankind today stands at a pinnacle of power which leaves no room for the unsaintly, for those who do not find room in their hearts to transform an enemy into a friend, to forgive real or imagined inequities against themselves, to worry more about injuring others than about whether others are injuring them. The saintly cannot be separated from the marketplace, for it is in the marketplace that man's future is being decided.

ERIC LARRABEE, Editor:

The idea that what is good for Americans is good for everybody persists in this country. To overgeneralize, the kind of thinking that has emerged from this is illustrated by our technology. We assume that technology is good for the whole world. Long before Point Four got under way, we were exporting it under the assumption that what we have learned about the mixture of technology and democracy is a useful lesson for the rest of the world. Gertrude Stein touched on the question when she said that the Americans are the oldest people in the world because they came into the twentieth century first and have been here the longest.

I believe we *have* learned something that is usable elsewhere. Most of all, we have learned that, contrary to what many Europeans seem to believe, technology is not simply a neutral gadget that can be exported anywhere, but that the mixture of technology with democracy is the essential thing. This is one reason why I hope the American experience will be exported.

Another way of putting it would be to say that technology on which our enormous plenty is based does not function merely as a machine but creates social classes that are required

if the machines are going to work. An extension of this position is the argument that mass production will not work unless you are willing to raise the level of the middle classes. In that sense the seeds of democracy are inherent in mass production.

When Henry Ford discovered that the assembly line must be kept moving and that anything that holds up the flow of work or holds up the natural productivity of the men on the line is bad for the machine, he learned that what is bad for the machines is also bad for the men who work them.

DONALD N. MICHAEL, Educator:

We are moving into a world not only of automation, which displaces jobs, but of extremely sophisticated computers, which will replace much of routine human thinking and make more complicated the thinking that is done by human beings. And add the coming potential for manipulating populations via psychopharmacology and the behavioral sciences. We are also moving into a world with tremendous population problems and genetic engineering, a world ever more complex.

It seems to me that we must face up to the question of what character is adequate for Americans, or for citizens anywhere, if they are going to cope with such a world, where they cannot possibly hope to be in touch with most of the crucial factors of their lives, factors that will determine what they are and what their world will be.

ERIC LARRABEE: I would like to come at Mr. Michael's statement by way of a tangent, because I think he has pointed up a central issue, public understanding.

When Anthony Eden was going to resign at the time of Munich, Churchill reproached him by saying, "You have failed to build your issue. When you take this step it will not be clear to people what it is really about; your resignation won't have the impact that it should have."

In recent years in this country there have been many such short circuits and failures of public understanding. One reads someone like Churchill on the subject with an ungrudging admiration for the tradition in which he was immersed almost from birth, the good fortune he had in being nurtured in the House of Commons and in being buoyed up intellectually and politically over the entire period that he was out of office. There was an understanding on the part of the British Establishment that such a man had to be kept in touch. All the time Churchill was out of government, and theoretically in disgrace, he was being fully briefed by the Admiralty just as though he were a member of government, though, in fact, the people who were keeping him informed knew he would get up in the Commons and speak against the policy of the government. The tradition was so strong that it couldn't be denied.

What has gone wrong with our tradition of an informed, "in touch" citizenry? I can't even begin to say. There have been some eloquent indictments of it.

Douglass Cater's book, *The Fourth Branch of Government*, contains horrifying examples of ways in which information breaking through to the public has not made any impact.

What Mr. Michael is worried about calls for the most vigorous dialogue. Anything that can be done to develop a modern American substitute for the tradition that Churchill profited from would be all to the good. 20

CHARACTER AND POLITICAL LIFE

IRVING KRISTOL, Editor:

On the whole, I like the American character. I am against the total reform of the social system, the economic system, the political system, or the psychological system. I certainly much prefer Americans as they are to many of the ideals of the American character that I have heard proposed. I should not like to see this nation become a country of self-righteous prigs, which, I fear, would be the consequence of Justice Douglas's remarks being translated into action. I have no faith whatsoever in sending out young kids to Africa or Asia, or wherever, to set the world right. They can't even set the slums of Chicago or Washington right, and I would like to see them get some experience there first.

I do not think the American people are sick. I think they are misgoverned. I think we have very serious problems of democracy in this country. But I do not think that all the defects of American democracy flow from the American character, though over the long run they can have an effect on the American character. The basic things I object to today, even those things which *seem* to reside in our character, are essentially political.

I resent the state of our mass media. I don't think the mass media are bad because of the American character. I think the mass media are bad because the political authorities have not seen to it that they are better. I resent the decline of our educational system, and I think this is bad, again because the political authorities have not taken adequate action.

I believe, in short, that America has always had the classic problem of democracy, namely, how do you reconcile good government with democratic government?

This problem does have an aspect that is connected with character. It was expressed in the phrase the Founding Fathers used, "republican virtue." The Founding Fathers — at least some of them — thought that self-government could work only in a country where people had certain qualities, and they thought it the duty of the government to encourage these qualities, to sustain these qualities, and

to discourage their opposites. I think that over the past hundred years or so the government, either through inability or unwillingness, has failed to do its job.

LEONARD J. DUHL, Psychiatrist:

I too believe our problems are political. To approach them in terms of individual adjustment is to succumb to a dangerous and arrogant smugness and to blind ourselves to social changes of great importance.

I am tired of seeing so many issues being put on the shoulders of us psychiatrists. There are psychiatrists who have accepted this burden. They have, for example, accepted delinquency as a mental-health problem, whereas it is basically a social problem. Delinquency has to be dealt with socially at all levels — urban renewal, job opportunities, education, and many other things that have nothing to do with psychology at all.

To accept such a role may bring short-term prestige and wealth, but at the price of helping a society sweep its own problems under the rug. The adjustment model with its prescription for two-person therapy is socially and politically inadequate outside of a narrow range of problems, and its application, along with the application of medical metaphors to problems outside that range, is futile.

EUGENE LIPMAN: Mr. Kristol inadvertently raised what I consider to be a very serious defect in the American

character. He acknowledged the gap between the citizen and government; the implication is that the government has failed. I deny this dichotomy, the acceptance of which is one of the most serious defects we have in American life. We may like the government or not — but we tend to insist that *we* have nothing to do with it. We react to it; we deny that we have helped create it. We deny our duty to influence it.

We react violently against the government of Alabama, or against the federal government, depending on where we stand in a racial situation. We react violently for or against the government in a labor situation, again depending on where we stand. But, withal, government is looked upon as a thing apart from the individual citizen and his character. I say no. I say I have to face the fact that if the American educational system has failed, I have failed. If our civil-rights system is failing, then I as a citizen have failed. We all must bear a part of the guilt. The character of the citizen is inevitably involved in this dichotomy and all its implications.

DAVID LOWENTHAL, Geographer:

When we Americans start thinking about ourselves, what is wrong or what is right with us, we get so confused by opposites that we neutralize just about everything we have to say. We keep going to one extreme or the other.

Some people feel that the American character is right on the surface, and that you can take it and play around with it. It is malleable; it is something you can make into something different if you want to; you can change it. And there are other people who say, "Oh, no. It is so complicated that we can't understand it at all."

The first view is illustrated by an incident that happened at a college where I used to teach. Margaret Mead came and talked to a group of girls about different ways of raising children. She said that in some cultures children are socialized before they are two years old and certain standards of behavior inculcated. In other cultures it happens later. In America,

CHARACTER AND CAPITALISM

if it happens at all, it usually happens after the children are four and before they are six, and conscience is the main impetus. There are lots of different ways of bringing up children, Dr. Mead said. After she finished talking, a girl got up in the audience and said, "Well, you have told us about all these ways of bringing up children, but which is the best way?" And Margaret Mead replied, "That is a typically American question."

Of course it was typically American. The girl assumed not only that there was *a* right way, but that all you had to do was to decide which one it was and you could choose it.

We have the notion that Americans can make choices of this kind, even if nobody else can. We assume that all possibilities are open to us, and that, unlike other people, Americans can make up their minds what they want to be and then be it — that our value system is not tied to our social system or our environment. Consequently we not only think that we are free to choose but that we *must* choose.

This makes the American character, in the view of many of its critics, principally a set of values; that is to say, our true character is to be found in what we think is good, not what we actually *are*. This leads some Americans to pat themselves on the back but leads even more of them to beat their breasts about what is wrong with American life.

The reason they beat their breasts is that they see a gulf between the way things ought to be, ideally, and the way things actually are. But the trouble is that the notion of some ideal character we never live up to is an intolerable burden for most people to carry.

Actually, of course, they just can't do this. But as long as they think they can, the burden is almost too great to bear. What do they do when they learn that it just can't be done? Some go all the way over to the opposite side and say, "American life is too complicated for anybody to understand. We don't know anything about the way we are, and consequently there is no use trying to make any recommendations for the future." 20

EDWARD L. CUSHMAN, Industrialist: The contribution of businessmen to social advance is not widely publicized or understood. Henry David Thoreau in his famous essay "On Civil Disobedience" wrote: "It is truly enough said that a corporation has no conscience, but a corporation of conscientious men is a corporation with a conscience." For the most part businessmen have been men of conscience.

MICHAEL HARRINGTON: The American character operates within the economic system of capitalism. This has enormous consequences. That ours was dynamic capitalism is, I think, true; that it is no longer so dynamic is also true.

To be sure, it is a changed capitalism, with a welfare state and state intervention. Nevertheless, we still allocate resources in this society basically for profits. For example, we organize television not merely for culture and entertainment but for advertising. We do not live in a society in which business reflects the ethics of the society, but in a society in which business establishes the ethics.

We have heard some loose, genteel talk here about how we need to promote a democratic revolution in the rest of the world. I couldn't agree more. But I would remind you that a revolution involves basic changes. It disturbs people, it turns things topsy-turvy. If you are talking about a revolutionary America, you are talking about an America much different from the one we have today.

PERRY MILLER, Historian:

Actually, America is a business civilization. That is the central point. It is the dominant theme of American history. Other things — religion, literature, scientific research — also form the image of America; but since about the year 1815, when the textile mills were opened in New England, ours, perhaps more than any other, has been a business civilization.

I have lately been studying the pre-Civil War period, and I have been astonished to perceive that the acceleration of business development in that period — the steamboat, the textile mills, the Hoe press, the telegraph — was fantastic. We are often presented in our cultural history with the religious aspects of the period, or the literary aspects, but we do not realize until we get right down into the literature of the business enterprise how rapidly the business civilization came to dominate.

Business has never taken any leadership in reforming itself. Reforms have been imposed by political crises. During the crisis brought on by the Great Depression, it turned out that business was intellectually, morally, and spiritually bankrupt, and all our talking about it since, and the world's opinion about our business civilization since, are based upon that perception — American business in its greatest crisis found itself bankrupt.

Business has dominated this country because our immense resources were such that it could use technology to produce articles. First, it produced articles for use. As the country became more prosperous, it produced articles for beauty and elegance. We have now entered a stage in which production is organized for obsolescence, and the most remarkable, the most telling instance of planned obsolescence is the automobile.

EDWARD L. CUSHMAN: I agree we have a business-dominated society, and as a businessman I offer no apologies. I think it is an important fact of life because of the failure of other institutions to make the contribution that they should be making to our lives. I say that for the churches, I

say it for the government, I say it for the unions, I say it for the educational institutions, and I say it, indeed, for the family itself, which has become less and less significant as the basic unit of society.

There have been regulations and reforms because of the abuses of business, and what has been said here is also true, business did not seek to reform itself. Businessmen are no different from other human beings, and I do not know any human beings who seek to have their freedom limited out of a sense of social responsibility or responsibility to others.

I take exception, though, to the comment about planned obsolescence because I am in a company where we have worked against planned obsolescence in the auto industry. We still make the Rambler American, which was started in 1950: it is essentially the same vehicle it was at that time.

We do have in America at least the opportunity for individual companies to adopt different policies, based upon what appeals most to the consumer. It is my conviction that if any company decides what the standard for its product should be, and then does a competent job of designing, manufacturing, and merchandising its product, it has at least as good an opportunity as we have with our particular enterprise.

BENJAMIN SEGAL, Trade Unionist: I wish Mr. Cushman's views were typical of the business community. I would be very happy if they were. Unfortunately, they are not.

I would challenge the notion, for example, that a growing number of businessmen favor and accept collective bargaining. My experience is to the contrary, and I am speaking about a number of major corporations all over the United States.

I would also like to challenge the contention that the business community has given constructive leadership. I cite one example to contradict this, namely the civil-rights movement. It has been my experience that in state after state, whether California,

Ohio, or Illinois, the business community as represented through its organizations has fought tooth and nail every effort to pass civil-rights legislation. Even here in Washington, during the fights for civil rights, the Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers joined hands with the Southerners in opposing civil-rights legislation.

If we look at the legislative scene in Washington, we find the business community, as represented by its spokesmen, on the wrong side of nearly every effort to pass social legislation, be it medical care of the aged, aid to education, or whatever. It seems that any kind of legislation that will aid the people the business groups such as the National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce are against.

ROBERT GORDIS, Rabbi, Professor: I agree with Mr. Cushman that it is not within the power of business to reform itself. The churches never reformed themselves. Schools never reform themselves. Reform and revolution are always the prerogative of the amateur on the outside, and this must happen here too. The changes required in society can only be carried out by the citizenry as a whole, not by the vested interests that have a stake in the status quo.

Recently, Sir Charles Snow has urged that the scientist be entrusted with the destinies of society. I am sufficiently convinced, not of the inalienable wickedness of human nature but of its inalienable weakness, to feel that no one can be trusted with the reform of society except society itself. Business, the labor union, the school system, and organized religion, all constantly need to be brought before the bar of judgment, the collective conscience, of society. That seems to me to be the only way in which progress can be made.

THOMAS O'HERRON, Student:

We have been told in essence that labor men are nicer than businessmen. We have been told that we should view individuals as products of the social

influences that mold them. I look for someone to stand up and ask, "Well, then, are we no longer individuals?"

We have been told that business has been on the wrong side of good bills. I look for someone to jump up and say, "What is a good bill? Who is to determine?"

We have heard talk about revolution. We have heard that there is a revolution against the white race in progress in the world. The point I think I would have to make is, "I thought a revolution was *for* something."

In speaking of the revolution against the white race, one speaker mentioned that this revolution was for fellowship. I find this difficult to reconcile, a revolution *against* the white race *for* fellowship.

We talked about revolution but no one mentioned the word evolution. I look for someone to shout that "evolution is the American revolution," and that our emphasis on the discernment of the individual is a characteristic of America and about the only one that can be exported.

In answer to the question, "What should the American character be?" I would answer that the American first of all must find his responsibility and do well what he is called upon to do as an individual. This responsibility falls on all Americans. To a given number falls the added responsibility of going outside their own fields with a commitment to excellence, to do what they can for the general betterment of the world, the betterment of mankind. But one does this as an individual, not by virtue of the fact that he is an American individual.

I am first of all an individual, a human being. Secondly, I am an American. Thirdly, or tenthly, or twentiethly, I am a college student. And finally I am a brown-haired individual. The first aspect of my personality is that I am an individual, I am a human being, and have certain responsibilities from this fact that must be considered before my responsibilities as an American can even be considered. 20

THE OTHER AMERICANS

MICHAEL HARRINGTON: There is a growing body of research to indicate that poor people in the United States have a character structure different from the character structure of, say, the people in this room. Among the poor, for example, you have people who are both more passive and more given to violence, who tend to consume rather than to save. They are Americans, forming from twenty to twenty-five per cent of our society, somewhere between thirty-two and fifty million people in the United States. I think that one of the mistakes we can make in discussing the American character is to assume that our character, which will generally be middle-class, is *the* American character.

The most important definitions of American character in recent decades were established in the nineteen-thirties with the rise of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and the change in human relationships that the C.I.O. brought about. Changes in our character have come about in the recent past from a civil-rights movement made up of domestic servants, Pullman porters, people whose "characters" are different from ours. Those who talk about character need to break out of the assumption that their middle-class character is somehow typical, or actually *the* American character.

LEONARD J. DUHL: Even within this group, [the poor] there are many variations. There are variations between the "undeserving poor" of the West Virginia coal mines, and the "undeserving poor" of the New York slums. There is endless variety *within* these groups, too, but there are certain general characteristics as well. One is that they are not upwardly mobile but have built themselves into the total system around them with reinforcements sufficient to allow them to continue to behave as they do. And the society around them continues to reinforce their behavior, too. So it is almost impossible for them to break loose from their habitual behavior patterns.

ARTHUR GILBERT, Educator:

On the basis of my experiences in the South, where I have been meeting with clergy groups preparing for desegregation, I found that when a compelling and well-understood value system wells up within the individual as he confronts the choices involved in such a crisis, he finds the strength with which to act; man does not just passively accept the direction of the prevailing institutions and patterns in society.

C. VANN WOODWARD, Historian:

I think we are the products of a peculiar heritage that other people have not shared — free land for one, free security for another. The assumption that such a precious thing as security from outside attack is almost a natural right has molded our character and made us what we are. I think we have to assume that other peoples in the world simply do not have our fortunate, fortunate history. We have to recognize a world where there is diversity, not one divided into two antagonistic forces in a cold war but a world in which there are many kinds of peoples with very different cultures. What is good for America is not necessarily going to be good for other people. We cannot export all the values that we ourselves love and cherish.

WILLIAM WORTHY, Journalist:

It isn't just people abroad we do not understand. Even a group like this is so segregated from the thinking of

Negroes that when it talks about the American character it is talking about the white American character.

Justice Douglas said that only eight large papers in the country really opposed Joseph McCarthy. He meant eight white papers. I never made an accurate survey, but if you would read the Negro press, which most white people do not — to their loss because of its growing significance — you would find that the Negro press was never terrified of McCarthy. I am afraid that if the John Birch Society were to get out of control and assume a McCarthy-like role in American society, virtually every major group in this country except the Negro community would cower again. But I am thoroughly convinced that since the John Birch Society is for the status quo and Negroes are thoroughly against the status quo, Negroes are the one significant group that would stand up to it.

It seems to me there has been a corrosive effect on white America's mental health as a result of evading the problem of race discrimination for three hundred years. What does this say about the present state of American mental health, and what bearing does this deep-seated guilt and this deep-seated fear have on the American character?

LEONARD J. DUHL: Almost all people avoid issues outside the social system they know well. I would guess that if we really looked searchingly into the Negro social system we would find that Negroes have the same kind of stereotypes about other communities that the whites may have about them.

What happens again and again is that by living within our own system we tend constantly to reinforce it, not only by our own private efforts but by our means of communication — radio, television, newspapers, etc. How do we break out of our own system so that we can start taking cognizance of things outside of it? If we do not realize that every human social system and system of values is interrelated with every other one, we are not going to survive at all. 20

ETHICS AND RELIGION

REINHOLD NIEBUHR, Theologian: What about man, this strange and pathetic individual, who is so insignificant in the coherences and incoherences of nature and of history and so significant to himself and to the people who love him . . . ?

What are you going to do with the pathos of individual existence? And what are you going to answer when he asks the question, "What is the meaning of my individual and my collective destiny, anyway?"

ROBERT GORDIS: William Lee Miller has pointed out that the voluntaristic and individualistic ethic with which American society has operated for so long is proving increasingly inadequate for contemporary society.

I have propounded the thesis that this is not the only possible framework and basis for a moral outlook that is open to us who share what may be called the Judeo-Christian tradition. There are richer resources available than are included within the conventional individualistic ethic generally regarded as the whole of Biblical ethics. Whether we stand squarely within the Judeo-Christian tradition, or are the heirs of that tradition, we may find them within the classic sources from which we all draw. A divorcement between politics and ethics is by no means inevitable if we adopt what seems to me to be the necessary framework for ethics, as against the voluntaristic and individualistic morality with which we have operated.

We need a wider exploration of the sources of natural law and a greater consciousness of those sources than we now possess. While natural law has been cultivated with loyalty and insight by the Roman Catholic thinkers of the last few centuries, it is, of course, not merely Catholic. It is not even exclusively Christian, because it also draws upon humanist, Graeco-Roman, and Hebraic sources which have been largely overlooked, particularly in modern times. There is value in exploring this historical background for two reasons.

First, on the practical level of strategy. If you give enough people a sense of participation, you are more likely to get more allies in the effort to rehabilitate natural law, the insights of which I think our age needs. Second, for the sake of historical truth and in order to overcome the weaknesses that inhere all too often in the usual formulations and applications of natural law, I would urge the values of establishing this broader base for the natural-law doctrine.

WILLIAM LEE MILLER, Sociologist: I think you are right. One wants a combination of ethical and social-political reflection that makes it possible for us to reason constructively and critically, and to make judgments about the society in which we live. The corporate realities of our existence should be more forcefully presented, and some reflection about ethics that is not so deeply committed to a picture of the individual as free and his social relations as simply additive, is necessary. Some other way of thinking about society and ethics is what we both want.

WILL SPARKS, Writer:

Aren't we making an assumption that religion is a unifying force and that we can get community out of religion? The need for religion, the goodness of religion in human life, is something that remains to be proved. It has not been demonstrated to my satisfaction that more good than evil has been done in history in the name of God.

LOUIS FINKELSTEIN: Addressing himself to Mr. Sparks's question, Professor John Herman Randall, Jr., of Columbia University, has said that until the nineteen-thirties one really could make out such a case against religion. But since the nineteen-thirties, we have learned something that may turn out to be the most important discovery of the twentieth century; namely, if you take religion *out* of the social structure, all the evils remain — the bigotry, the wars, the group hatreds, everything that one objects to in religious history remains. All that is taken away is the mitigating influence of religion, as one can see by observing recent history.

WILLIAM F. LYNCH, Jesuit Priest:

It occurs to me that we are inclined to reverse the real question that should be asked about religion. We ask, what has religion done for us in history? And the parallel question, what has religion done for the West? What is happening in this question is that we are asking, what has God done for us?

I think the real question is: What have we done for religion? It is not God who is in question. It is *we* who are in question. That is the religious question. We are dependent, we are in grave trouble, we need God. I take it that it is *we* who have the problem — God is doing very well indeed.

ROBERT GORDIS: Even if it should prove to be true that religion has been a disastrous factor in human history, it would still be true that men are incurably religious. No civilization even on the most primitive level has yet been found that was free from religion. When organized religion, as we think of it in the West, is driven out of the door, it comes in through the window. New types of religion are developed, of course, of which communism is perhaps the most striking. And with these new religions comes a whole series of new abuses. That, to me, would simply indicate that the problem we have to face is located in our human nature.

I think that the record of organized religion is a very long, difficult one.

THE AUTONOMOUS INDIVIDUAL

The debit side of the ledger is unfortunately real. But in any good accounting system you also have a credit side. The historical fact remains that religion has supplied much of the dynamic for protests against social evil. It should not shock any one of us that religion, as an institution, has often been subservient to the dominant social, economic, and political forces of the age in which it exists, since religious institutions consist not of disembodied spirits, but of human beings, who are part and parcel of their particular economy, social system, political structure. But it is also important to recognize, for example, that there is a very strong tradition of opposition to slavery, which can be documented in both Biblical and post-Biblical Judaism. The church played a great role in ameliorating the status of slaves at a time when social and economic conditions made it impossible to abolish slavery, and abolitionism had strong roots in the churches.

Irrespective of how you evaluate the record of organized religion, the ultimate justification for religion does not lie in the area of its social utility, real as it is. The religious impulse is a constant of human nature. If it be a constant of human nature, it becomes our task to utilize it for the enhancement of human values.

JOHN COGLEY, Editor:

I think I have learned many things during these meetings. One idea, which was not first learned here but has been more deeply reinforced, is that once you associate yourself with a human community, whether it be a church, a political party, or even a nation, you are then burdened with stupidity, with venality, and all the faults and vices of the men and women who make up that particular community. This is a problem for all of us, because we would like both to escape history and to get our brothers off our back. But we are all involved in mankind and simply cannot take the kind of Olympian view of our country, our culture, our tradition, that habitually refers to "they" and never to "we." 20

ERIC LARRABEE: We all conform in nonessentials, the clothes we wear, the customs we observe, in order to obtain freedom for the things that matter to us. It is in the awareness of our choices, awareness of what being human consists in, that our autonomy is born and bred. Here, modern man, for all his seeming cowardice and compromising, has advanced beyond his predecessors. And so I speak for conformity. I wish there were more of it in the world.

MORTON WHITE, Philosopher:

What I am about to say may be relevant to Eric Larrabee's remarks on the autonomous individual. Mr. Larrabee said he felt that the autonomous man is closer to the conformist than he is to what David Riesman calls the "inner-directed" person. But it seems to me that when you speak of conformity you may mean a number of very different things. For example, you may have in mind conforming to moral principle, in contrast to making decisions in an unprincipled way. In this sense of the word, I can imagine thinking that conformity is a great value. Or when you speak of conformity you may have in mind acting with due regard to the feelings of other people as well as to your own. A third thing you may mean by a conformist is a person who is extremely concerned to have his behavior conform to what other people *say* or *claim* or *believe* is the right thing.

Now I should assign great weight to the claims of conformity in the first

two senses. It is enormously important to act in accordance with moral principle and it is enormously important to take into account the feelings of other people where they are relevant to the problem at hand. What I find extraordinary, however, is the suggestion that the ideal or autonomous individual should be excessively anxious that his actions be in accord with what other people *say* is right, once he has conscientiously examined the facts and tried to act in a principled way.

ERIC LARRABEE: I think you move from admittedly desirable qualities and then leap to the extreme. I want, myself, to speak for the middle ground where there are results from being sensitive to others that seem to me useful, desirable human qualities. It is on that middle ground that the circumstances favorable to the autonomous individual reside.

MORTON WHITE: I think, really, if we are to have a clear understanding of what is involved here, the first thing to do is to get straight what this ideal individual called the autonomous individual is.

As I understand Mr. Larrabee, the autonomous individual is *not* the inner-directed individual in Riesman's terminology. And I further understand Mr. Larrabee to say that the inner-directed individual is a man who acts in accordance with what he thinks is the right thing to do, a man who makes his moral decisions on the basis of what he conceives the evidence to be, with due attention to his moral principles. Such a man, I submit, has been the ideal figure in the history of moral philosophy as conceived by Aristotle, by Kant, and by John Stuart Mill. Is this the man who is now to be described as rigid, an individual who pays no attention to the values of other people, who is unfortunately limited by his own conception of the world?

In contrast, as I understand Mr. Larrabee, there is the individual who is said to be autonomous. But I confess I may not grasp the difference

between this autonomous individual and the inner-directed individual as I have previously described him. Of course I recognize that individuals who try to examine all the evidence when they make a moral decision have made mistakes — that is to say, some people who have tried to be inner-directed have gotten the facts wrong or have acted on objectionable moral principles.

Perhaps if Mr. Larrabee would tell us what an autonomous individual is and just how he is to be distinguished from the inner-directed man, we could go a long way toward understanding the ideal American as Mr. Larrabee conceives him. Is he, for example, a man who does whatever he wants to do, provided he does not harm other people? That simple formula has been presented by many moral philosophers.

ERIC LARRABEE: The inner-directed person has his inherent weaknesses, just as the other-directed has his inherent weaknesses. Hardness and inner flexibility are among the weaknesses of the inner-directed. It is necessary when talking about these types to escape from those terms and have a word for something else. "Autonomy" is Riesman's word for something else.

STEVEN S. SCHWARZSCHILD: Mr. Larrabee has made a valuable point in directing our attention to the fact that the much-lauded inner-directed person may very likely have certain qualities that we find undesirable. Indeed, it would seem that when the American nowadays turns away from the outside world and goes into himself, he finds there only his own self.

The American, when he turns into himself, no longer finds God. A term that belongs in this discussion, namely, "theonomy," does not seem to arise at all. I think there is an interesting implication in this, and that is that God is exclusively part of the *outside* world, from which the inner-directed person turns away.

Some facts of American life today would appear to substantiate this conclusion. I remember that I used to have discussions with the mayor of my

former community as to why the city council felt it was necessary to have prayerful invocations when there were public city-council sessions, but when they had caucuses among themselves the thought never occurred to them that prayer might be at least equally desirable. In America, God has become part of the outside world, part of the social scene. He has become a tool of individual and social or perhaps even national psychological policy.

PERRY MILLER: It often is assumed that the Puritan tradition is the source of inner-direction. Of course, the Puritan was a man of conscience, and he had to make his decision — and in accordance with Puritan theology. He felt himself directly responsible to the Lord. But the orthodox society in Puritan New England was actually so other-directed that nothing we have today can compare with it. Can you imagine a member of Cotton Mather's church being an inner-directed man? Or can you imagine any woman in that church being inner-directed? And, of course, because the society was tightly organized, when inner-directed men or women appeared, they exhibited some of the unpleasant traits of that character. Roger Williams was a great prophet of religious freedom, but he was a hell of a guy to deal with, like Anne Hutchinson. . . . And what about Jonathan Edwards? Jonathan Edwards was an inner-directed man if there ever was one, and what did the society do? It kicked him out into the wilderness.

Then what happened in the early nineteenth century to independent inner-directed people? Henry Thoreau had to go to Walden Pond and live on twenty-three dollars a year and couldn't sell his book. Herman Melville was disowned and suppressed. Walt Whitman, the great spokesman for the independent spirit, was utterly neglected by the democracy of his time.

BENJAMIN SEGAL: I maintain that our people are *too* inner-directed: there is too much concern about ourselves and our private problems. What we have to figure out is how to reach

out beyond ourselves, to become concerned not only for our own affairs but to be concerned about what happens to our fellowman.

Some of the discussion here seems to have no bearing on the America that I know, the people I work with, the shop workers, the union members. Rather than feeling that they are part of an affluent society, they are ridden with insecurity. They worry about how long their job is going to last, whether they are going to be automated out of existence. They worry about unemployment. They are not worried about the problem of leisure but about what they are going to do when they have the free time of the unemployed.

I detect a considerable cynicism about moralism and preaching among the people I work with. They have been preached to for years, for instance, about the importance of not asking for wage increases because increases might cause inflation, and then, lo and behold, we finally learn about price-fixing and find that some of the companies that have been preaching their heads off about free enterprise and competition have been doing everything possible to weaken it.

Many of you must have read about a poll that was conducted to prove that people do not know what is going on. This was a poll on the question, "Do you believe the Mann Act deters or helps the cause of organized labor? And if so, would you favor its repeal?" Only about twelve per cent knew what the Mann Act was. One answer was, "I'm against repeal. Labor would just go wild without it." Another answer was, "Hoffa gets away with too much already." Still another was, "They're all a bunch of crooks anyway. I don't care what they do." Finally, a woman said, "I'm against repeal of the act, because my husband is in the union and I'm for anything that helps the workingman."

I have forgotten a good deal of my learning, I am afraid, but I believe it was an ancient Greek scholar who, when asked, "Will we ever achieve justice in Athens?" replied, "We will achieve justice when those who are not injured are as indignant as those who are."



TOPICS & COMMENT

Upward and Onward to What?

The depth of the cultural changes now being heralded can hardly be exaggerated. They reach to basic attitudes toward man's place in the world, the relationship between the sexes, the measurement of morals, and the over-arching goals of society. Reason is suspect as it has not been for a long, long time while emotion, feeling, and the mystical insight are unprecedentedly glorified. The very mode of thinking, then, is being revolutionized.

Take a few examples.

The old civilization was built on the belief that man represented a radical discontinuity with the rest of nature and was the lord of creation. That notion, deeply implanted in the culture, accounted for the dynamism of Western societies — but eventually it also led to the present worldwide ecological crisis. We went so far in fulfilling the Biblical injunction to "subdue" the earth that the planet itself, we hear now, is in serious danger.

Does that mean, as some seem to be arguing, that we should make a complete about-face, return to the idea of a divinized nature, and look upon the natural order as unambiguously benign? If it does, the consequences may be catastrophic, not only for the West, but for the underdeveloped two-thirds of the world. The argument in any case is certainly worth more consideration than it gets from the *simplificateurs terribles* who are sending us messianic messages from the woods.

The West idealized womanhood and glorified motherhood perhaps inordinately, but at the same time it systematically excluded women from positions of power and authority (except for an occasional Elizabeth the First or Catherine the Great). If the woman of the future is at long last going to achieve her true identity, what should it be? Is unisex the ideal or will the New Woman be molded into a wholly new human pattern unleashing unprecedented torrents of feminine energy? What will the world look like when women are truly liberated? Surely the question reaches beyond day nurseries, abortions-on-request, and equal pay for equal work.

If, as we now hear, the nuclear family is simply beyond redemption, what does the communal family offer a child that will undo the mischief of the past? What superior satisfactions will it provide to adults that were denied to men and women caught up in the age-old arrangement?

The West has accepted the historical view of the world and studiously rejected the idea that time is cyclical. Now we hear that history is only a bad trip and that the good life consists in going along passively with the rhythm of the seasons. If the New Man really returns to this ancient notion, how shall we measure human progress in the future? Or should we even make the attempt? Is progress simply another outmoded notion?

If sheer survival is the new goal, then how shall we test the value of an individual life? Already the idea is abroad that the not-yet-born must be

sacrificed for the living. What will be the measuring-rod when it appears that the living too have to make way for the larger survival?

Again, what will the heightened sensibility being heralded contribute to law or philosophy? How will it transform political decision-making? How will it reconcile the conflicting claims of justice and love?

These are only a few of the questions that occur to one who feels the rumblings of change and is exposed, as we all are these days, to talk about abandoning the old culture.

Every reader of Toynbee knows that cultures actually do die and are replaced. But the process has usually been a gradual and even tortuous product of history rather than the result of any millennial declarations of the kind now commonplace. It is conceivable however that what is happening today does represent a break with the usual pattern and that we truly can expect an epochal change in the near future. At least it should not be too easily dismissed as a possibility.

That the old culture, for all its massive failures, represented a fantastic human accomplishment should go without saying. Those who are determined to overthrow it have an obligation, then, to show that they have really understood its strength as well as its weakness and are not merely responding petulantly to its all too obvious failures; more than that, they ought to tell us where they think they are taking us. For by the time Western man gets where they are leading him, it may be too late to turn back. J.C.

The British North America Act created for Canada a highly centralized federal structure, one of the manifestations of which was that residuary powers were given to the federal government. The actual words of the Act could hardly be clearer. Article 91 says that "it shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Canada, in relation to all matters not coming within the classes of subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the legislatures of the provinces."

However, by a forensic tour de force which could have been politically motivated, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, sitting in London, which was the Canadians' final court of appeal up until 1949, distorted the plain meaning of these words to the point where in effect the residuary powers came to rest in the provinces under Article 92, paragraph 13, of the Act, which gives them the right to legislate in the matter of "property and civil rights in the province." It was, Their Lordships said, in effect only in time of emergency that Parliament had the right "to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Canada" unless it could be shown that the subject matter fell within one of the classes of subjects exclusively assigned to Parliament by the Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada which is now our final court of appeal is still bound by these precedents. It would in any case be difficult for the Supreme Court to repair the damage. The members of the Court are appointed by the federal cabinet and any attempts it made to return to the original clear meaning of the British North America Act would be criticized in some of the provinces as political interference.

One consequence of the doctrine laid down by the Privy Council is that in time of war or other national emergency, Parliament can assume great

powers. The latest assumption of such powers was during the crisis of last October when, at the request of the Québec government, the federal government invoked the War Measures Act.

There is plenty of additional evidence in the British North America Act of the intention of the fathers to create a strong central authority. Article 132 provides that "the Parliament and Government of Canada shall have all powers necessary or proper for performing the obligations of Canada or of any province thereof, as part of the British Empire, towards foreign countries, arising under treaties between the Empire and such foreign countries." The Privy Council interpreted this article strictly, as if it were part of a statute creating a municipality, on the pretext that treaties now entered into by Canada are not treaties between the Empire and foreign countries; it further decided that Parliament has no right to implement such treaties if their subject matter falls within provincial jurisdiction. As a result of this interpretation, Canada, although it is now a full member of the international community, cannot implement her treaty obligations without the coöperation of the provinces. This is one of the reasons why we have not ratified many international conventions, including International Labor Organization Conventions, the International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Radical Discrimination, and the two Covenants on Human Rights.

Someone once said that federations tend to move in one of two directions, either toward greater centralization and possibly a unitary state, or, centrifugally toward the separation of the component units into independent entities. The trick is to maintain a balance between centralization and decentralization. Compared to the United States, Canada is already a weak federation and, in the light of other centrifugal forces including the pull of continentalism, regional disparities, and the new French Canadian nationalism, any further weakening of the federal power might mean the end of Canada. If that were to happen it is unlikely that some if any of the new entities could long survive.

These dangers are, however, nothing compared to the threat to Canada posed by the new French Canadian nationalism. Traditionally French Canadian nationalism was directed toward the achievement of two main goals: recognition of *le fait français* throughout Canada, and achievement of Canadian independence from Britain. The second goal has been achieved but not the first. Most French Canadians still want a Canada in which their linguistic rights will be recognized throughout the country. Some — perhaps most — want more powers for Québec, and some favor recognition of a special status for the province.

But there has now appeared a new kind of nationalist who wants Québec to break away from Canada completely and to form a new independent state. Lord Durham once described Canada as a country in which two nations were warring within the bosom of a single state. That was probably an overstatement in 1839 and it would be now. It is nevertheless a fact that there is now a political party, the *Parti Québécois*, the chief plank in whose platform is separation from Canada. In the last provincial elections, twenty-four per cent of the popular vote was cast in favor of this party. Its leader, René Lévesque, claims that thirty per cent of all French-speaking Canadians in the province voted for his party; this means that nearly one out of every three Francophones in the province is a separatist or at least voted for a separatist party.

The *Parti Québécois* hopes to achieve its end by democratic means, although it undoubtedly includes in its membership many people who favor quicker and more direct action.

There is a small, noisy minority, including the *Front de Libération du Québec*, which advocates, and indeed has already had recourse to, violence. They are probably a liability to the cause of the separatists; but Prime Minister Trudeau was probably wrong when, during the October crisis, he said that the Cross and Laporte kidnappings would result in the end of separatism. There is no evidence that the *Parti Québécois* has lost any of its popular support. In a recent by-election occasioned by the death of Pierre Laporte the party did not elect

its candidates but it did increase its share of the vote.

Until recently the separatists were mainly professional people, teachers and, above all, students. But separatism now appears to have solid support in the labor unions. One reason for this perhaps is that there is no alternative left-wing party in Québec. The *Parti Québécois* has a strong socialist element; but this does not necessarily mean that it would be left-wing if it came to power. It is indeed possible that it will split on this very issue. On the emotional issues of language and nationalism the party stands united but agreement probably ends there.

Another important factor is that the separatists have strong influence in much of the mass media, including the federally owned Radio Canada. The most prestigious French newspaper in Québec, *Le Devoir*, while it has not yet come out openly in favor of an independent Québec, is certainly sympathetic to the *Parti Québécois*. Its editor, Claude Ryan, calls himself a federalist, though Alexander Hamilton would hardly recognize him as a kindred spirit. Paradoxically, some of the most outspoken federalists are French Canadians, including three members of the federal cabinet: Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau; Jean Marchand, Minister for Regional Development; and Gérard Pelletier, Secretary of State.

Although probably less of a threat to the survival of Canada than the more moderate *Parti Québécois*, the F.L.Q. and its terrorist activity have received more attention in the United States. What has been happening in Québec is at least in part a local manifestation of the current worldwide challenge to authority. Young people are everywhere looking for causes to espouse, and the more revolutionary the better. In Québec, separatism is a natural. At McGill University, the very heart of *le fait anglais* in Québec and one of the principal targets of the new French-Canadian nationalism, even some of the Anglophone students are separatists.

I am convinced that for many of the revolutionaries nationalism and the language question are mere facades behind which other motivation lies. In *White Niggers of America*, Pierre Valières wrote: "Understand me. I am

not against the independence of Québec but against the illusory independence of Québec which, dressed up in various guises — from an associate state to a republic — is now being proposed to us by the parasitic petite bourgeoisie. And that is why I am for revolution, because only a revolution in depth can make us independent. That is not a question of ideology but of fact. And one must voluntarily close one's eyes and one's mind to pretend not to recognize it."

The majority of French Canadians do not share the goals of the extremists and there are sharp differences even between the extremists. The *Parti Québécois* is, on economic and social matters, considerably left of center. But signs of polarization are becoming evident, and it is questionable whether the party can long maintain its present facade of unity. This is perhaps one of

*A civil war
is possible
but still seems
quite improbable*

the reasons why Lévesque recently said that independence must be achieved in the next four or five years if it is ever to be achieved. In Québec as elsewhere the determining divisive factors are probably economic and social and when the chips are down the population will divide along these lines. And if we come to civil war — the words have been used by both Lévesque and Marchand — it could well be in the first instance a conflict between French Canadians. I hasten to add that I do not think there will be civil war, but I suppose that there were many Americans who consoled themselves with the same kind of wishful thinking before 1861.

There is apparently no way of knowing how many terrorists or even members of the *Front de Libération du Québec* there are in the province. In a recent book, *La Crise d'Octobre*, Gérard Pelletier says that there may

be as many as two or three thousand. Marchand has made the same guess. Some of the principal activists have now been arrested or allowed to leave the country. One of them, Paul Rose, has been convicted for the non-capital murder (in Canada only murderers of policemen and prison guards are liable to the death penalty) of Pierre Laporte.

The circumstances surrounding the kidnapping of James Richard Cross and Pierre Laporte are well known, but something must be said about the way in which the Québec and federal governments reacted to the crisis and the challenge to their authority.

Cross was abducted on October 5 and Laporte on October 10. Both were held as hostages under threat that they would be killed unless the authorities agreed to a long list of conditions for their release. On October 15, the army was called out, at the request of the Québec government, under the civil-power clause of the National Defense Act and came under the control of the Québec Provincial Police. The next day, again at the request of the provincial government, the federal cabinet proclaimed the War Measures Act.

This Act had been proclaimed in both the First and Second World Wars but never before in peacetime. Regulations under the Act made it illegal to belong to or to have belonged to the F.L.Q. or any similar organization; to communicate statements from them; to advocate the acts, aims, or principles of such groups; to contribute money to them; or to harbor, provide meeting places, or associate with them. The same regulations gave to the police extraordinary powers of arrest and search without warrant, of detention without trial, and, in effect, suspended habeas corpus.

This energetic reaction was and still is being attacked by numbers of people, including enemies of the government, for a variety of reasons, including political advantage. But the public-opinion polls showed that eighty-seven per cent of the population, including eighty-six per cent of Québécois, supported the invocation of the War Measures Act.

One of the criticisms of the government was that it used a sledgehammer to swat a fly. The instrument used was undoubtedly blunt; but, apart from the Criminal Code, there was no other

legislation available at the time to cope with the emergency. The War Measures Act was subsequently replaced by new legislation, the Public Order Act or so-called Turner Act, which was better tailored to the situation; but this Act remained in force only until April 30, by which time the federal government had undertaken to introduce new permanent emergency legislation.

Whether the invocation of the War Measures Act was justified will remain a matter of subjective opinion and judgment. My own opinion is that it was justified. The test is, I think, what might have happened had the situation been allowed to deteriorate still further. There was a risk, if not that the Québec government would be overthrown, at least of rioting and other civil disorders, and of more kidnappings and even assassinations. If any of these things had happened, the people who are now criticizing the government for its handling of the crisis would be the first to criticize it for not having taken the energetic action it did take.

No evidence I know of suggests that either the government or the police abused their great powers under the emergency legislation, although there might have been cases of police brutality and overzealousness.

The question may be put whether a democratic country ever has the moral right to invoke such powers in circumstances short of war. The answer is, I think, that organized society has always the right to protect itself against destruction and that in certain circumstances it may be necessary to curb certain liberties in order to protect others. This right has been recognized internationally. Both the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the United Nations draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights have done so. Article 15 of the European Convention, which is substantially the same as Article 4 of the draft Covenant, reads as follows: "In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such mea-

sures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law."

Recognition of *le fait français* in the broader Canadian society has come late in our history. By our indifference and, worse, hostility to this reality, we Canadian Anglophones are partly responsible for the present situation. We do not like to be reminded of the fact, for example, that for many years French-speaking minorities were refused the right to use French as a language of instruction in schools in the Anglophone provinces.

But in recent years there has been an important change in attitude. I attribute this to two main reasons. First, Anglophones now realize that the future of Canada depends upon whether or not they can reach a *modus vivendi* with their French-speaking compatriots. This, of course, is partly a reaction to fear.

*Canadians now agree
they must be
consciously different
from Americans*

The second reason is not so deeply rooted. It has to do with national image and identity. Canadians are beginning to realize that on a continent which they share with some two hundred million Americans their best chance of cultural survival is to foster some of the things which differentiate them most from the Americans. One of the most important of these differences is the Canadian heritage of two of the world's greatest cultures. When I was at the United Nations I met many people from all over the world, both in New York and abroad. In social gatherings I was usually accompanied by my wife, who is pure French Canadian. I am sure that many of the people we met and who had never been in Canada thought that most Canadians are bilingual like us. In fact, it is not like that at all, but perhaps that is the way it should be.

In 1963, the federal government appointed a Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. The commission issued a preliminary report in 1965 in which it bluntly said that "Canada, without being fully conscious of the fact, is passing through the greatest crisis in its history." In later volumes the commission made many recommendations, some of which are now being implemented. One of them is that in districts where there is a French- or English-speaking minority constituting ten per cent of the population, all federal services should be available in the two languages.

More important perhaps than the response of the federal government to the recommendations of the commission has been the response of the provinces of Ontario and New Brunswick, which border Québec and where most of the Francophone minorities live. In these provinces — and this is also the case in some of the other English provinces — French Canadians can now send their children to schools where French is used as a language of instruction. New Brunswick, my native province, where some forty per cent of the population is French-speaking, has now become officially bilingual.

The question is whether such developments may not have come too late. They will not convert to federalism the hard-core separatists who are now committed to their course and who greet them with derision and hostility, which is perhaps logical since any improvement in the lot of Francophone minorities outside of Québec weakens the case for an independent Québec. But it may still be possible to retain the loyalty of the majority, including some nationalists, who may come to see that French culture in America has a better chance of survival in a sympathetic Canada than in an independent but weak Québec.

The question is important for Americans, because on the answer to it will depend the kind of neighbors Americans will have in the north. If Americans really want to absorb us — and I doubt this — or if Americans simply want to divide and rule, they will encourage separatism in Québec.

If Canada divides into two or more separate states Americans need only

pick up the pieces. But some of these pieces will be hard to digest and it will be an expensive meal. But if Americans think that it is in the interest of the United States to have a strong northern neighbor which by its very distinctiveness may help correct some of their own imbalances, they will be sympathetic to the efforts which the great majority of Canadians are making to solve their problems and to build up a united bilingual and multicultural society.

Mr. Humphrey is professor of law and political science at McGill University, and was director of the Division of Human Rights at the United Nations from 1946 to 1966.

SUSAN ROSENBLUM:

Communes

The counter culture, expressed by its trend toward communitarianism and new life-styles, suggests that future generations will build experiences which will allow men to enjoy and participate "in something other than oneself." For many that will be the experience of communitarian living.

Communitarianism and collectivism have always been characteristic of utopian socialist movements. They emphasize the cooperative rather than the competitive way of life, and thus offer an alternative to the private individualism of a capitalist society.

In contrast to the repressive society, the communitarian movement is an attempt to create an expressive life-style where genuine human needs are acknowledged, not artificially created. While the decision-making process in the communitarian family is cooperative rather than competitive, individual needs and feelings are encouraged. Decisions in the community are usually made by consensus after each member has taken the opportunity to express his feelings about the question confronting the group. Many com-

munities think of themselves as families and live according to the communitarian principle, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need." But the concept of "ability" is expressed in terms of one's gifts, thus giving ability a more personal attribute, a virtue which is to be shared rather than appropriated as labor for social production.

In communitarian living, the ethic of work does not become a compulsive end in itself. The economics of most communitarian families or institutions involves an income-sharing arrangement by which individual members work full-time, part-time, or only when there is an immediate need for money to cover a major expense. Usually with the communitarian life-style the costs of rent and food are reduced, and individuals are free to spend time organizing or pursuing work independently. In some of the more politically conscious communities, "work" includes draft counseling, community organizing, writing, or guerrilla theater. The really important point about work in the communitarian life style is that even the most routine office job may become more tolerable if one knows that the income one receives from the system is being used to support a more human way of living.

Much of the communitarian movement is actively involved in building or at least experimenting with possible models which could be the basis for radically altering the economy and the society. In the concept of "seasonal life-style," communitarians are not simply advocating a return to the land for idyllic, romantic reasons. They are striving to recognize and reaffirm the psychological and economic need for living independently and ecologically.

Living with the land for some part of the year allows an individual to experience his "eros" or "life-force," particularly if one is living on subsistence and growing one's own food. The source of one's life can no longer be taken for granted; the land suddenly acquires a life-force of its own; man's unity with nature is restored. Gary Snyder, a contemporary poet who describes himself as a spokesman for "the wilderness," has suggested that the root of our ecological

crisis lies in an attitude toward Nature: "At the root of the problem of that order of human social organization we call civilization is the feeling that Nature is less than authentic, that Nature herself is not as alive as man is, or as intelligent, but is dead. . . . The line that is drawn then is between civilized peoples and primitive peoples, but there is an order of wisdom in the lives of primitive peoples that we have to refer ourselves to and learn from, for the primitive world view has tried to open lines of communication with the forces of Nature."

The seasonal life-style proposed by communitarians would correspond to the cycles of nature and create a "seasonal man, who is one with nature and no longer defies and defaces nature." Many communities are already experimenting with organic farming and the possibilities for providing urban-based communities with more nutritious, organically grown fruits and vegetables. Communitarians envision a seasonal life-style as the beginning of liberation from the "death cultures" of advanced industrial societies: "Economically this will free us from the institutions of the past culture. The people of the community will flow between the country and the city in the kind of seasonal way of nature. Three months of working at jobs to draw the money out of the system and into ours; then three months of living and working on the farm; three months' space to read and wander where one needs to; and three months of political organizing and other activities. The people are free to choose the order that is seasonal for them." (James Bruce, communitarian leader)

The seasonal life-style does not negate the importance of spending some part of the year in an urban environment. The city is viewed as the source of capital which is necessary even to maintain a subsistence life in the country. Contrary to what most of its critics say, the communitarian movement, at least in its present phase, does not propose to eliminate the entire economic system as it exists, i.e. the money economy, but rather to design a new style of life which does not depend entirely on money or what money can buy. The function of

money for the communities is to provide initial capital which may be necessary for purchasing such bare essentials as tools or grain, but not for the accumulation of capital or profit.

To most persons, even in the radical movement, a proposal of this kind may appear utopian and irrelevant to the building of a "new society." Our concept of social change, politics, and even revolution often seems limited to changing institutions through law, eliminating the ruling class, or overthrowing the existing government.

While all these results may be a consequence of revolutionary struggle, none of them in isolation is a sufficient condition for radical social and political transformation. While Marx may have been correct in arguing that social class and social conditions create consciousness, and therefore that social conditions must change first, the communarians and other cultural revolutionists are struggling to create that new consciousness *now*, and the alternative institutions to sustain it.

What the Movement probably really needs to do is to liberate every advertising agency, and begin the long, hard work of liberating the people from the monster of consumerism. In an advanced industrial society such as the United States the majority of the people do not feel oppressed or economically deprived because they have been thoroughly socialized to need and want what the system artificially creates, whether that be material goods or a certain definition of life and security. The point made by Marcuse, Erich Fromm, and Norman O. Brown in their current writing is that man does not know how to live with freedom from necessary work or labor. For most Americans, personal freedom is represented by the vacation which they earn because they work productively and behave correctly on the job.

In our culture, our notion of personal identity, and therefore personal worth, is defined by our productivity for someone else, just as our culture's notion of progress and the good life is measured by material production. If we are students we must be productive for our teachers and pro-

fessors, and the measure of our productivity is reflected in our grade-point average. If we are professors in a university we must be productive for the university and feel compelled to write for publication and to compete in an academic marketplace. The professor who enjoys teaching, which involves a sense of sharing and giving, does not survive for long in the university system. And for properly socialized American women productivity and self-worth are defined by the ability to find a husband and be reproductive.

While sociologist David Riesman described this tendency years ago as being "other-directed" and alienated, a more current analysis of the crisis comes from Erich Fromm. In his recent book, *The Revolution of Hope*, Fromm observes that our concept of identity and self-worth derives from our ownership, our need to "have":

*Modern man
has everything;
he is beginning
to discover that
he is nothing*

"The increasing emphasis on ego versus self, on having versus being, finds a glaring expression in the development of our language. It has become customary for people to say 'I have insomnia,' instead of saying 'I cannot sleep.' 'I have a happy marriage' (sometimes successful marriage) instead of saying, 'My wife and I love each other.' All categories or processes of being are transformed into categories of having. The ego, static and unmoved, relates to the world in terms of having objects, while the self is related to the world in the process of participation. Modern man has everything: a car, a house, a job, "kids," a marriage, problems, troubles, satisfactions. . . . He is nothing."

From what we have said thus far about the communitarian movement's desire to restore a sense of being, experience, and active participation in the act of living, we might conclude

that the cultural revolution and counter culture aspire to destroy a notion of personhood and self which finds expression in property and possession. Similarly, the burning down of banks and corporate property expresses frustration with a system which defines the good life as the economically productive, secure life. Woodstock festival and the Festival of Life at Chicago in 1968 threatened or at least challenged that definition.

Both the counter culture with its commitment to personal liberation, the celebration of life in community, and the pursuit of erotic, mystical lifestyles, along with the Weathermen's commitment to a life of revolution, violate what is perhaps the essence of the middle-class culture: the desire for balance and moderation. The middle class denounces the Weathermen and the communitarians for their political and cultural extremism. How many times does the middle-class student hear that he can be both a student and an activist?

Herman Hesse, whose novels are widely read among Movement people, offers this description of the bourgeois style in *Steppenwolf*: "Now what we call 'bourgeois' when regarded as an element always to be found in human life is nothing else than the search for balance. It is the striving after a mean between the countless extremes and opposites that arise in human conduct. . . . He will never surrender himself to lust or to asceticism. He will never be a martyr or agree to his own destruction. On the contrary, his ideal is not to give up, but maintain his own identity. He strives neither for the saintly nor its opposite. He is ready to be virtuous, but likes to be easy and comfortable in the world as well. In short his aim is to make a home for himself between two extremes in a temperate zone without violent storms and tempests; and in this he succeeds though it be at the cost of that intensity of life and feeling which an extreme life affords. A man cannot live intensely except at the cost of the self. Now the bourgeois treasures nothing more highly than the self. And so at the cost of intensity he achieves his own preservation and security."

What revolution and the possibility or inevitability of a socialist society

threaten is that notion of personal security and balance. The Weathermen and the communitarians may frighten those of us who do not know how to live intensely. Communitarian living involves a commitment from the individual member to live intensely within himself and the other people. That intensity expresses itself in the atmosphere of group openness and honesty. The concept of intimacy no longer means exclusiveness or privatism, but, rather, intensity, the depth in oneself and others.

In challenging the notion of the private self who strives for a life of isolated, economic security either for himself or for his family, the communitarian movement ultimately challenges the concept of private property. Most revolutions are fought to challenge or alter the existing notion of property. Less revolutionary but militant movements such as the abolitionists and feminists originated in the fact that blacks and women were given the legal status of "property."

The connection between property and the need for security has been analyzed by R. H. Tawney in *The Acquisitive Society*: "This need for security is fundamental, and almost the gravest indictment of our civilization is that the mass of mankind are without it. Property is one way of organizing it. It is quite comprehensible that the instrument should be confused with the end, and that any proposal to modify it should create dismay. In the past human beings, bridges, ferries, civil, judicial, and clerical offices, and commissions in the army have all been private property. Whenever it was proposed to abolish the rights exercised over them, it was protested that their removal would involve the destruction of an institution in which thrifty men had invested their savings and on which they depended for protection amid the chances of life and for comfort in old age. . . ."

In an advanced industrial society where most of the people have food, clothing, and shelter, the most urgent demand is for control of one's body. The French student revolt at Nanterre in 1968 originated to a large extent with the students' demand for more sexual freedom as they protested

segregated dormitories. Their rebellion was an act of protest against the authority of the university to repress sexuality. In fact, the sexual revolution challenges the convention that the use of sexuality, especially for women, must be sanctioned by certain legal rights of ownership as in the institution of marriage. While many of the communities which experiment with group marriages often find that monogamous relationships tend to be more satisfying, there is still an attempt to create a life-style and definition of family which is not exclusive and privatistic.

The two student revolutionary movements in this country which suggest the direction for the cultural and political revolutions to move are People's Park and Columbia. I choose these two events because they raised in the course of the struggle the issue of land ownership and control in a capitalist system, and the right of the people in a community to exercise local control of the use of land. In both struggles, the focus of events was the use of open land space and parks.

The communitarians while not directly involved in the campus struggles are vitally aware of the land question. One woman who is a member of a small community in northern California described the issue this way: "The biggest problem is land. This is something we feel very strongly about. . . . One of the most basic problems in this country is land reform which we need as desperately as any country in South America or as any of the so-called underdeveloped countries of the world. We have absentee ownership. We have land speculation for profit; people hold it to make money which keeps it from those who need it. Everyone has to have a place to work and to be. We are all crowded into cities instead of trying to find a way to build more self-sufficient communities."

The interdependence and continuity of life which comes from living directly with the land appears as the recurrent theme of the communitarian life-style. Its absence in our own culture provoked the same woman to write: "I know one child eleven years old who lives in a city. His whole life revolves around television and money — the things he can buy. His pleasure,

his joy in life, comes from the things he can buy, because there is nothing else. He plays with his friends, and they play war games, and they go to school, and they watch television, and they watch television again, and he goes to sleep watching television, and his parents buy, buy, buy because this is the only real pleasure they get in life, and we have to build a culture that is different from this."

To the middle class, the question of land is being raised mostly in the context of ecology, the anti-pollution campaigns, or crusades to Save the Redwoods. Solutions to the environmental crisis are delineated mainly in terms of science and technology; thus confrontation with cultural and political values which have led to ecological disaster is avoided. Barry Weisberg, a radical ecologist, attributes the present crisis to a trend in Western civilization. "The origins of our present destruction of the life-support capacity of this planet are rooted in the very fabric of our civilization, reaching their most insane dimensions in the present corporate America. The Greek rationalism of Aristotle, the Roman engineering mentality, the Biblical injunctions to have dominion over the land and subdue every creeping thing, the post-Enlightenment notions of growth and progress, the present technical corporate economic systems motivated by competition — all dominate the Western mentality of man against Nature. Where nature works toward harmony, coöperation, and interdependence, advanced industrial society works toward growth, competition, and independence. The advanced nation state works in direct opposition to those basic life instincts which have nourished our billion-year evolution . . . the domination of man by man and man over nature are two sides of the same coin."

Harmony, coöperation, and interdependence are the values the communitarian movement is struggling to restore in a society whose political and economic system exploits and violates man and nature. In the West, development and the good life have become synonymous with material abundance and economic security expressed in the institution of private

property. The West can be accused not only of economic and political imperialism; but also cultural imperialism. As the sociologist Denis Goulet points out: "Development American-style rewards those who are economically aggressive while stigmatizing those who value coöperation." In the process of building up empire, the West with its Judeo-Christian mentality has consistently destroyed the culture of non-Western peoples who, like the native American Indian, lived *with* Nature and whose social organization might be characterized as communitarian or collective.

If it formulates a radical political definition which relates to the Third World Revolution, the communitarian movement can become a revolutionary force. By building a movement which aspires to restore the American Indian cultural values, especially a life-style where man relates actively to the land, the communitarians confront white America with its oppressive, exploitative definition of progress. As they restore the *root* culture of America and thereby simultaneously expose the oppression of a

minority group, the communitarians create a revolution which derives from a truly native tradition. Their movement might be characterized as the "liberation" of a native culture and life-style from the oppression and repression of the American imperial system.

By focusing on the use of land, the communitarians force a reëxamination of the concept of private property. The word derives from the Latin, "proprietat," which meant both "property" and "propriety," i.e., property which had to be used properly. The radical question, of course, is whether or not land is "properly" used with the present pattern of corporate ownership and control. Those who are building communities could begin relating to Third World Revolution by evolving new concepts of land ownership. Such non-Western experiences as the Gramdan movement in India offer the model of "trusteeship," ownership and control by the local community, in contrast to private ownership. From there, the communitarians could begin to work out both practically and theoretically the politics of a communitarian society. This ap-

proach would inevitably force a re-examination of anarchism as a theory of social and political organization.

For those who demand to know *how* what the new society will look like, we cannot offer a blueprint. Rather, let us say that the new political and economic institutions will emerge from the revolutionary struggle itself. Carl Oglesby, former national secretary of Students for a Democratic Society, has suggested that the new society will be a "political society" in which every issue will be subject to public dialogue and people will really be able to participate in making the decisions affecting their lives. If we have anything to learn from the communitarian experiments here, and the non-elitist models of development in Cuba, China, and Tanzania, perhaps it is that the political society is only possible where the patterns of social organization correspond to decentralized, even self-sufficient communities, economically and politically autonomous, but culturally interdependent.

Miss Rosenblum is a former Junior Fellow of the Center.

Aftermath

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

TO THE EDITORS: It is unfortunate that some of the recommendations and conclusions offered by several panel members ["Crime and Punishment in America," May, 1971] were not followed through to their logical end. Such is the risk when attempting to deal with a broad range of complex problems.

One such failure to consider the consequences of possible solutions was in the area of drug abuse, drug control, and the relationship to crime control. Stemming the flow of illicit and dangerous drugs into this country is indeed an admirable objective, and I support

legislation such as has been offered by Senator Walter Mondale to that end. However, we must be in a position to deal with the consequences — a position we are not in at the present time.

One of the unforeseen by-products of past drug crackdowns on pushers and the like was the entrance of an old economic law that Congress (except in the area of agricultural price supports and subsidies) has generally failed to repeal: the law of supply and demand. One unfortunate result of crackdowns that diminished the supply of an addict's hard drugs was an *increase* in crime. By reducing the supply of drugs available on the street from your neighborhood pusher, the

price of the drug is increased. The addict then must pay more to support his addiction and thereby increase the amount of crime he must undertake to meet the inflated prices.

I am not suggesting that addictive drugs be offered free on street corners as a means to reduce crime. But I am suggesting that the roots of the problem are both the drugs and the addicts. Cutting off the supply of the former does not cure the latter.

The tentative efforts in methadone treatment seem to be attempts to trade one expensive crime-producing addiction for a lower-cost addiction. The rehabilitative effect of methadone treatment is quite a tentative conclu-

sion at this point, and yet rehabilitation must be the end result of any serious drug-control program.

We certainly should attack the drug supply, but at the same time we must not neglect the rehabilitative means to get the addict off the drug and off the crime that supports his addiction.

Unfortunately the present picture is far from clear in attacking the problem at the addict level. One court has ruled possession by an addict of a hard drug is not a crime since addiction is a sickness, but another court rules that possession is a crime.

Obviously, the legal questions must be answered, hopefully in a way to help us attack the addict's problem. If by some miracle all hard addictive drugs disappeared as of sundown tonight, we would hardly have the facilities for handling the acute withdrawal problems that would ensue.

Yet, we must press forward the effort to stop drug traffic for several reasons — drug traffic deals in human misery, it contributes to crime, and it allows the initiation of new addicts into the drug culture and crime. But at the same time, we must increase our rehabilitative efforts.

This leads to another problem. If a man is both a criminal and an addict, should he be treated as a sick man or a criminal? Should we treat him as a sick person believing that once we remove the reason for his sickness we have removed the symptom of his crime?

Sadly, such a separation of the sick from the criminal could overtax an already pressed system of justice. Yet we cannot rely exclusively on stopgap measures to meet a long-term problem, and we must consider the consequences of our solutions.

JOSEPH E. KARTH

*Member of Congress
Fourth District, Minnesota*

TO THE EDITORS: The significance of [new crime] legislation appears to me to [have been] greatly exaggerated [by some of the conference participants], both in terms of alleged "repressive" qualities and effectiveness in dealing with crime in America.

I am afraid that the lay reader will find the proceedings somewhat difficult to follow in view of the absence of

any summary of the legislation, particularly when broad statements are made concerning the content or effect of the legislation. For instance, the exaggeration of the potential repressive effect of the legislation reaches its apogee in your quotation of the remarks of Elisabeth Mann Borgese to the effect that, under this legislation, "our government can do anything a police state has ever done." Such a statement is, frankly, absurd. The requirement of judicial approval of wiretaps; a no-knock statute which may in practice provide greater protection to the citizen than does existing law; a limitation of pretrial detention to sixty days, and then only in the District of Columbia; a broadened immunity statute; and sentencing provisions which closely parallel proposals of the American Law Institute of a decade ago, do not approach the powers of most of the police states with which we have become familiar during this century. Indeed, these powers are considerably less than those already possessed by most democratic states.

It is likewise misleading to suggest that this legislation will have any substantial impact on the street crimes which greatly concern the public. Conceivably the legislation may permit the government to deal more effectively with organized crime. But organized crime is not the kind of crime that bothers most Americans. The thief, the rapist, and the murderer are not likely to be uncovered through electronic surveillance, no-knock warrants, or immunity accorded to witnesses. Experience thus far in the District of Columbia indicates that pretrial detention under the statute will not be invoked routinely, and, in any case, pretrial detention on the ground of dangerousness is already the rule rather than the exception in most state courts.

I do not suggest that the legislation is desirable. I have opposed pretrial detention and no-knock searches on the ground that they are unnecessary and capable of grave abuse. I am troubled about the constitutionality of some forms of electronic surveillance permitted by the legislation and of transactional immunity.

I am much more concerned, however, about other provisions in the District of Columbia legislation that

may have a much more significant impact on the determination of guilt or innocence. The overruling of the *Luck* decision, which permitted a trial court to prohibit a prosecutor from impeaching a defendant's credibility by proof of prior convictions, may have much more impact upon an innocent defendant with a prior criminal record than the matters discussed in the proceedings. The threat of impeachment by prior conviction will either discourage many defendants from taking the stand or, if they take the stand, subject them to the very real possibility that a jury will convict upon inferences of guilt from prior bad conduct. This is but one of several changes in procedure which limit the rights of defendants in tactical matters.

[The Center's] proceedings provide interesting reading to anyone who is concerned about the problem of our criminal process. Fortunately, they do not limit themselves to the recent legislation. Professor Packer's thesis that we should reduce crime by legalizing many forms of it invites exciting discussion. My only concern is that many readers may be misled, both as to the legislation's impact on civil liberties and its effect upon crime in the streets.

A. KENNETH PYE

*Chancellor,
Duke University
Durham, N. C.*

TO THE EDITORS: Many of the perplexing questions confronting the prosecutor in the Southern District of New York were at the core of the discussion. They are particularly the problems of correction and drugs. Speaking for myself, and not necessarily for the Department of Justice, I am convinced that only a new and enlightened approach to correction throughout the United States on a federal, state, and local level will relieve the scandal of recidivism in our jails. I am also convinced that finding and activating such a new approach would, as well, resolve, or at least promote, new solutions to the drug problem.

In my view prison sentences and large fines are clearly an effective deterrent in white-collar crime situations, and further that they should be the order of the day when organized crime is involved. Those cases apart, prison

and fines are of little or no help as a deterrent. The lower and middle economic classes still constitute eighty or ninety per cent of our prison population. They are there either because of a history of drugs, because they were unable to feed their families and stole to do so, or simply because they had decided to make stealing a career.

Unfortunately, these men and women are frequently the products of an environment punctuated by severe emotional upheaval. Often they grew up as children without fathers. They are adults without values or vocations. To simply keep them off the street with no real effort at rehabilitation is foolhardy. To assume that by doing so the community will wipe out crime is absurd.

Turning to the drug problem, the conference's emphasis on the Drug Abuse and Control Act of 1970 was somewhat misleading. It would appear to the reader that the administration has bent all its efforts to convicting and imprisoning those men and women with any drug history. This is not so.

More importantly, this is not the only act on the books. The Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966 has a totally different emphasis and provides for just the kind of approach which some of the critics at the conference seemed to urge.

This Act provides, under Title I, for thirty-six months of combined confinement and aftercare treatment. It is applicable with some qualifications where the United States Attorney concludes that deferred prosecution is appropriate. Where the Surgeon General certifies to rehabilitative progress the charges will be dismissed by the government. Another series of sections, Title II of the Act, provides for a maximum of ten years of rehabilitative treatment and aftercare services following conviction. As of the end of April the provisions of the Act are being utilized across the board insofar as addict-defendants are concerned. Title I is used where the addict-defendant has no prior record and meets the other qualifications of the Act; Title II, in every other permissible situation. Perhaps such usage is overdue but it is now a policy of this office.

The need is clear. In 1970, 641 men and women were sentenced in this court and 158 of them, or over twenty

per cent, had a drug history. Basically they were simply sent to jail. It is not necessarily a certainty that resort to the Act will reduce recidivism among addict-defendants but it is at least worth a try. What has gone on in the past is apparently not the answer. Each of the 158 defendants referred to above had an average of 6.52 previous arrests. This alone is a serious indictment of our correctional system. It is shocking when we consider that the defendants referred to average twenty-five years of age.

It would seem apparent that a re-evaluation of our correctional facility both with respect to addict-defendants and others deserves the highest priority in the councils of government.

HAROLD BAER, JR.

*Assistant U.S. Attorney
New York City*

TO THE EDITORS: The limited space of a letters column is not adequate to respond to the numerous ill-founded objections to the provisions of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (P. L. 91-452). For those of your readers interested in a more objective treatment of the provisions of the statute and many, if not most, of the objections raised to it in the pages of THE CENTER MAGAZINE, I refer them to my article, "The Organized Crime Control Act (S.30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties?", 46 *Notre Dame Lawyer* 55 (Fall, 1970).

JOHN L. MCCLELLAN

*United States Senate
Washington, D. C.*

TO THE EDITORS: I do not agree with all the views expressed, and certainly wish more attention had been given to the degree to which racism affects the enactment and enforcement of our criminal laws.

Recent studies show that the high percentage of blacks among those arrested, convicted, and sentenced for crime are victims not merely of economic and environmental conditions but of our racist society and the continuing though unspoken belief in this country that the blacks at all costs must be controlled. It is this belief that manifests itself in more serious

charges, higher sentences, less access to parole for blacks than whites arrested for similar activities. And it is this belief that poses an insuperable obstacle to meaningful reform of our criminal laws.

But despite this serious shortcoming, many important issues are raised and the "verbatim transcript" style makes for easy understanding of the various viewpoints on the problem under discussion. With not too much effort, a law teacher could annotate the Center's proceedings with the basic material in his course with excellent educational benefit to the students.

DERRICK A. BELL

*Professor
Harvard University Law School
Cambridge, Mass.*

TO THE EDITORS: The distinguished participants brought to the surface a wide range of problems of immense complexity in criminal law and our courts. They suggested several interesting courses which should be followed to reduce crime and improve the administration of justice. In reference to the latter, I shall comment here only on a suggestion by my friend, Judge Tim Murphy of the Superior Court of Washington, D.C. He is quoted as saying, "Judges should be like specialized surgeons dealing with a very narrow number of specialized issues."

If Judge Murphy means that courts should train and use specialized judges at the trial level, I heartily agree. If, on the other hand, as is implied by the context in which he made this statement, he proposes that the judicial branch retreat from its broad responsibilities to adjudicate whenever our citizens cannot otherwise obtain justice pursuant to law, I see danger ahead.

It seems to me the myriad of administrative agencies which perform adjudicatory as well as regulatory functions in federal and state governments came into being because in the nineteen-thirties and earlier the judicial branch abdicated its responsibility to train specialists and establish procedures to meet the needs of a modern industrial nation. The adjudicatory performance of many of these agencies has not demonstrated superiority over what judges could do with adequate

internal organization. These quasi-judicial activities tend to confuse the distinction between the executive and the judicial branches of government. Further removal of adjudicatory functions from the courts would weaken the judicial branch. Justice would be administered less and less by judges and the imbalance increased between the three theoretically independent and equal branches of government. Self-government under America's concept of government by checks and balances could eventually be destroyed.

Instead of shirking tasks which our form of government has given the judicial branch, the judiciary should lead in encouraging reform of criminal laws and reorganization of the courts. Decriminalization of conduct such as alcohol and drug offenses, gambling offenses, sex offenses, and traffic offenses does not necessarily mean that courts would be no longer involved in judicial functions relating to these activities. It does mean that the penalties and cumbersome procedures used in criminal cases would not be required.

There is a desperate need to eliminate conditions in our courts like those described by Judge Murphy where one judge was assigned to adjudicate three hundred traffic cases in a single day. It seems obvious that no judge or judicial officer by any other title can make fair and thoughtful determinations in such a setting. Such a court becomes a travesty on the ideal of a temple of justice. Unfortunately the scene Judge Murphy described is all too common in large urban centers.

It is not too late to explore better ways for courts to adjudicate within the court structure before we restrict judges "to a very narrow number of specialized issues."

ROBERT BERESFORD

*Judge of the Municipal Court
San Jose, Calif.*

THE NEW NEW POLITICS

TO THE EDITORS: William Pfaff's article [May, 1971] makes the point that the New Left identifies, as the basis of its frustration, the very causes that the old left had been committed to: centralization, bureaucracy, the planned or mixed economy, economic growth,

and the scientific-technological direction of society. He believes this to be an indication that the ideas of the old left have served their time.

While he deserves credit for a perceptive and stimulating article, he has overlooked an important factor contributing to the present malaise: namely, the failure of the present federal government to achieve any reasonable balance in its programs. It is not centralization per se but its bitter fruits that they reject. I submit that the two are quite separable.

Consider the imbalance in federal priorities. In the 1972 budget the President recommends approximately eighty billion dollars for defense out of a projected expenditure total of \$229 billion. Another twenty-one billion dollars will go to agricultural subsidies, commerce, and transportation, and some natural resource preservation. Twenty billion dollars alone goes to interest on the public debt. Exclusive of sixty billion dollars proposed for expenditure on Social Security and welfare, largely derived from specially earmarked payroll taxes, our aggregate investment in community development, housing, education, and manpower comes to only thirteen billion dollars.

As Senator Fulbright has pointed out many times, we have spent over one trillion dollars since World War II on military activities, and our involvement in a costly and brutal Asian war has disenchanted the majority of the population.

It is misleading to blame the problem on centralization and planning. Rather, it is the failure of our society to assert its value preferences in the past that has led to the imbalance. We need more planning and better planning and more *value-laden* planning. Our "centralized" governmental structure has been most efficient in building up a military-industrial empire, mounting a space program, developing atomic energy, and producing a massive road system. But it has failed miserably to lend this efficiency and know-how to resolving the fundamental problems of urban degeneration, poverty, and ignorance.

To propose less planning and jettison notions of growth would evade the problem. The difficulties of our society today call for greater production than

ever, more skillful planning and continuation on a much improved basis of our present three-level governmental structure. If more older people had the value awareness of the young and the young had the appreciation of how to work with the present system, we would be much farther along toward dealing realistically with our problems.

JOHN R. STARK

*Executive Director
Joint Economic Committee
Congress of the United States
Washington, D. C.*

ENCOUNTERING — WHAT?

TO THE EDITORS: There are numerous valid, meaningful criticisms to be made of the "human potential movement" in the United States. The movement has proliferated like Topsy, uncontrolled, uneven in quality, and not without its abuses. The training and preparation of leaders is uneven, ethics need elaboration, and more careful scientific research is needed to evaluate methods, results, and long-term effects. Though there are these meaningful issues to be dealt with, John Silber has not done so in his article [March, 1971].

One must begin with a paradox. There is no "encounter movement" in any monolithic, global sense. The "encounter movement" ("human potential movement," "third force," "sensitivity training") represents a diverse, heterogeneous *mélange* of philosophies, methods, theories. The range is from the bizarre and irresponsible to the conservative and responsible; from the "Establishment" National Training Laboratories to the "counter-culture" Esalen Institute of the West Coast; from the skillful, sophisticated senior social scientist to the untrained, inept quack; from the atheoretical, anti-intellectual "don't think, FEEL" to the sophisticated elaboration of complex theory. To state as Dr. Silber has that "encounter groups invade" or "encounter groups are" is a gross oversimplification which does not recognize a multiversity of phenomena.

Dr. Silber's use of unsubstantiated, value-laden, "well-poisoning" phrases such as "reckless abandon," "subversion of . . . dignity," "operators" of

encounter groups does little to illuminate complex issues and much to reduce scholarly debate to polemics.

Dr. Silber states that "encounter groups are blurring the distinction between authentic human relationships and the playacting that goes on during the typical encounter session." Setting aside for a moment the gross overgeneralization and the fact that there is no "typical encounter session," this statement is inaccurate. The skilled encounter leader is aware of the "encounter-group phony" who relates in inauthentic phrases and jargon and playacts at authenticity. Leaders speak of the "Esalen all-purpose, cop-out hug" as a vehicle for such playacting. This is not to say that one cannot find behavior in groups which is phony and un-authentic. But to characterize encounter-group behavior as "playacting" seems overgeneralized, inaccurate, and unsubstantiated.

Dr. Silber implies that encounter-group leaders have rejected the Judeo-Christian ethic and therefore "forfeited the basis for the respect of the individual person and his dignity." This statement is misleading on two counts: (1) it ignores the fact that much of the human potential movement has occurred within the church, sponsored by the church, and within the philosophical framework of Judeo-Christian ethics; and (2) implies a necessary correlation between the rejection of this tradition and a forfeiting of the basis of respect for human dignity. Is Dr. Silber taking the position that the Judeo-Christian approach to man is the only world view which provides for human dignity? Are there not other anthropocultural ethics which embrace humanistic values or which are valid? I would submit that the Judeo-Christian ethic itself embodies much that is contrary to the dignity of man, and that other philosophical systems (e.g., ethical humanism, existentialism, Zen) are at least as ethically valid as an underpinning of human thought and action.

Dr. Silber states that his gravest concern is the failure of psychologists to offer an "anthropology worthy of the name," and that they "have not offered a theory of man which explains the dignity of his being..." This statement is simply untrue. Human-

istic psychology rests upon a twofold foundation of philosophy and theory. Some of the philosophical antecedents of sensitivity group practice are a rejection of Cartesian mind-body dualism, an affirmation of European phenomenology, the existentialism of Martin Buber, Jean-Paul Sartre, Heidegger, and Tillich, the humanism of Carl Rogers, the wisdom of Zen and other Eastern philosophies, and current philosophers (e.g., Paul Goodman, R. D. Laing).

Some of the theoretical underpinnings of the human potential movement are the psychoanalytic insights of Freud and dynamic psychiatry, the influences of theoretical writers such as Wilhelm Reich, Kurt Lewin, Bion, Adler, Perls, Shostrom, Benne, Jourard, Schutz, Pesso, Gunther, and numerous others. To be sure, the theoretical positions vary with one another and vary in their adequacy, scope, testability, and heuristic value. But to state that the human potential movement is devoid of philosophy and theory is patently and blatantly false.

The question of the extent to which human potential activities help or harm is complex and the final chapter has not been written. The evidence to date suggests that the rate of psychiatric disruption as a result of groups which are conducted within accepted professional standards of ethics and responsibility is quite small indeed. I suspect that it is also true that some individuals decompensate under the stress of groups. It is also true that some people decompensate under the stress of marriage, history courses, and crossing the street. The charge of wholesale psychotic breaks, suicide, decompensation, and other psychological harm seems to be unproven while the available evidence points to the contrary.

The other question which encounter groups must face, along with psychoanalysis and counseling, is the extent to which they bring positive results. To consult the published literature on this point is confusing since one may readily find dozens of studies suggesting the worthlessness of therapeutic endeavor and dozens of others supporting its efficacy. The author's own sense of this literature is that too often the wrong question is asked.

The question, "Does therapy (counseling groups, encounters, psychoanalysis) work?" is hopelessly naïve and cannot be answered. The more appropriate question might be, "What forms of personal growth experience are effective in facilitating what kinds of personal development for what kinds of people at what stages in their psychosocial ontogeny?" The answers that are beginning to come in from the research which has been done on this question seem to be that some forms of experience are highly effective in bringing about certain changes in some individuals at some life junctures. This is not the place for an extensive review of this literature, but it should be clear again that Dr. Silber's view of the whole problem of evaluation is simplistic.

Dr. Silber raises a complex philosophical issue with regard to privacy. Again to assert as he does that "encounter people do not seem to have had sufficient intellectual or theoretical interest to discover and develop this argument" seems to be a statement that ignores a good deal of attention that humanistic psychologists have devoted to the issue of privacy and its invasion. He builds a straw man when he asserts that the human potential view of privacy is based upon a logical-positivist epistemology. Indeed, the opposite is true: many humanistic psychologists eschew the moral sterility of positivism. I share Dr. Silber's view that there is value in nature and in man as a part of nature. I also share his view that privacy is an important commodity too often overlooked in contemporary Western society. The issue for me seems to be that the man who *cannot* choose to reveal his inner self to others because of fears, inhibitions, guilt, shame, etc., is not a free, responsible man. He is in existential chains. The goal of the encounter situation should then be to help him experience what it might be like not to have to be enslaved by his own fears of being known to others such that in the future he might *choose* the extent to which he wishes to maintain privacy from others. In addition, to compare the group pressures toward openness and non-privacy with the rape of privacy by our government is to ignore completely the fact that an

individual entering an encounter group *contracts* to try to be more open with others, whereas the government snooper invades the privacy of the office, home, and bedroom without the consent or wish of the individual.

The issues which the encounter-group movement has raised for society are complex, vital, and relevant. To deal with these issues is both appropriate and important. To deal with these issues on the basis of misinformation, overgeneralization, and half-truths is counter-productive for both the critic and the apologist of humanistic psychology and, ultimately, for a society which is desperately seeking a solution for the problem of man's increasing estrangement from himself and from his fellows.

EDWIN RONALD FEINTECH
*Boston University Counseling Service
Boston, Mass.*

THE SPACE PROGRAM

TO THE EDITORS: There are many contentions of Lord Calder's article ["Our Problems Are Here on Earth," March, 1971] which deserve critical comment, but I wish to concentrate my reply on four main points:

(1) The purpose of the space program. (2) The real cost of the program. (3) The alleged waste of talented manpower. (4) The application of advanced technology to earth problems.

(1) The National Aeronautics and Space Agency's critics seem to focus on the manned-space section as if it were the entire program. Presently it is twenty per cent of the NASA budget and diminishing. Over the past decade, this Apollo program cost twenty-four billion (not forty billion as Lord Calder suggests). Moreover, the program provided a technological base to build on for future manned missions such as Skylab. True, we "cannot eat space hardware," but we may feast on the technological gains again and again. In this context it is astonishing that a man of Senator Fulbright's stature would insult the NASA by suggesting that a decade of excellent work culminated merely in "bringing back moon rocks."

The main purpose of the space program is to inspire man and satisfy his spirit of adventure. It is odd that people without a scientific background find this hard to accept; are the space scientists and engineers the last true romantics? The main project of the program for the seventies is the space shuttle which will make space travel cheap and convenient while again pushing the technology. The oft-repeated question: "If we can go to the moon, why can't we clean up the cities, etc.," deserves some comment. The obvious reply is that many domestic problems are mainly social and political in nature. However, it does appear that the Apollo success irritates non-technologists who are battling frustrating problems with vague goals where progress is slow and unspectacular.

(2) I further submit that all the money spent in the space program has stayed here on earth in salaries and corporation income with large economic multipliers. No money was ignited on the launching pad and the technology gained remains with us. It is nothing short of deception for politicians or others to suggest that simple transferral of space funds would make a considerable dent in urban and/or social problems. This country already spends thirty-seven cents of the tax dollar on social, welfare, community-development, and housing programs, thirty-four cents on defense, and only 1.4 cents on the space program.

It seems to me that some Center Fellows might address themselves to refuting the simplistic view that budgetary items are an either-or spending proposition. There is a relatively small dollar velocity connected with social outlays. It is desirable to have the leading edge of the technology thrusting forward to make for a healthier economy and more jobs at all levels down to the unskilled. Isn't it a more appealing goal to provide jobs for the ghetto poor than to expand already questionable welfare programs by a barely discernible amount?

(3) Lord Calder's suggestion that many capable young men were "sucked into the space program" has merit on the surface in the sense that thousands of talented engineers and scientists were drawn by the glamor of the NASA mission. However, it is de-

batable that a cancer-research crusade or environmental-control project will have the same drawing power. The fact that there are no constructive grand plans with the scope of the space program makes this comparison a moot one.

I must admit that Lord Calder's contention that the program "warped education throughout the world" puzzles me. Good science (including biology) and engineering have benefited tremendously from the post-Sputnik reaction. What areas have suffered drastically? Certainly not the arts!

(4) Lord Calder seems to be well acquainted with certain technological benefits of space yet at the same time he manages to ignore the beneficial impact of communication satellites on various aspects of modern life. He fails to mention the weather satellites, which have already saved mankind billions of dollars and thousands of lives. A significant portion of the extra sixteen billion dollars that Lord Calder incorrectly attributed to Apollo spending was used for space-communications networks and weather and space-science satellites.

In this regard, the NASA is presently developing a direct TV broadcast satellite for use by the Indian government, A.T.S.-H. This satellite will bring agricultural and birth-control information from the Indian government to five thousand villages; the program will hopefully be expanded to a satellite network covering the entire country. The NASA has a great interest (along with the National Labs) in instigating new energy-source concepts, fusion, magnetohydrodynamic (M.H.D.) power generation, fast breeder reactor technology and other advanced schemes. The NASA may plead guilty to not communicating the breadth of its competence and commitment in attacking earthbound problems with "good technology" but *not* to a disinterest in those problems.

JOHN V. DUGAN

Bay Village, Ohio

DRAFT RESISTANCE

TO THE EDITORS: In response to the first part of Mr. Mac Lin's letter [March, 1971] in which he expressed

concern that draft resisters have in effect committed a crime against their peers who did not want to participate in war but did so anyway, I believe it is time that we in America put the blame where it belongs. It is not the draft resister or the conscientious objector who forces men into the military against their will. It is our leaders and we, the people, who are responsible for the laws that exist in America. If anyone has committed a crime against those men in the military who really do not want to be there, it is the people of America.

Conscription of anyone who objects to such service, whatever his grounds, is the establishment of involuntary servitude. It is astonishing that we, the people of America, would presume that we could as a group impose involuntary servitude on individuals while at the same time claiming to support a government whose purpose is the protection of individual rights.

In view of the Thirteenth Amendment it is even more astonishing that we the people of a supposedly constitutional democratic society could continue to allow the existence of such a law. As long as there is a single man in the military, or any other form of government service, not of his own choice but because it is required by "the people," we are making a mockery of all for which our nation stands.

In order to correct the inconsistency that now exists in America, we must either abolish conscription or take the halo from our heads, cease purporting to be a free nation respecting individual rights, and amend our Constitution to state that, in addition to living under the laws of the nation, one of the responsibilities of citizenship is the total subordination of one's will to that of "the people" if the people or an authorized official decide that that is in the national interest.

EDWARD L. BOWMAN
Alexandria, Va.

SCIENCE AND SURVIVAL

TO THE EDITORS: In a recent short article in *The Saturday Review*, Dr. Glenn Seaborg, the erstwhile head of the Atomic Energy Commission, wrote pretty much along the lines of John Platt ["Science for Survival,"

March, 1971] in acknowledging the disaffection and distrust evidenced now in many people toward science and technology. It is a pity that they do not have a Carl Oglesby to eviscerate this issue as he so brilliantly has done in his reply to Mr. Platt.

As Mr. Oglesby so accurately has pointed out, some things simply do not lend themselves to quantification. This is sometimes because we have not developed the measuring apparatus, and at other times because to measure a concept or phenomenon is to limit it and occasionally to destroy it. Art is an example of this, as is a woodland, or a woman's smile. But the truly disturbing thing about all this is that if the concept or phenomenon will not yield properly to the scientific method, it is crossed off as having lesser or no importance in human affairs; and, in extreme cases, as not existing at all.

In many ways, our problems with the environment and the quality of life would seem to emanate from our predilection to allow scientists to establish societal priorities and permit them to sneak in their own value judgments under the cloak of rigid scientific objectivity.

Like Mr. Oglesby, I am not anti-science, and, like him, I plead for a rational place in the human spectrum for scientific analysis. Science is hardly either an "achieved epistemology" or the *raison d'être* of all intelligent energy. Rather it is an attempt to establish a lexicon of applied logic to natural phenomena. In short, while capable of illuminating certain narrow areas of experience, science should be accorded no more sanctity and authority than any other dictionary.

JOHN F. WILSON
Green Bay, Wis.

TO THE EDITORS: In reading the exchange between Platt and Oglesby, I was disappointed that neither offered any new or basic insights into what clearly is a worldwide crisis.

We cannot look for either political or technological panaceas. Better biomedical and agricultural technology will not solve the problems of the Third World so long as we dominate them and turn their resources to our purposes. Neither will a mere change of political system solve the problem

of U.S. imperialism, any more than the revolution of 1917 eliminated Russian imperialism.

It seems that, by and large, we are unwilling, as Daniel Berrigan points out in his *No Bars to Manhood*, to pay the price of a more human world:


"But what of the price of peace? I think of the good, decent, peace-loving people I have known by the thousands, and I wonder. How many of them are so afflicted with the wasting disease of normalcy that, even as they declare for peace, their hands reach out with an instinctive spasm in the direction of their loved ones, in the direction of their comforts, their homes, their security, their income, their future, their plans — that five-year plan of studies, that ten-year plan of professional status, that twenty-year plan of family growth and unity, that fifty-year plan of decent life and honorable natural demise. 'Of course, let us have peace,' we cry, 'but at the same time, let us have normalcy, let us lose nothing, let our lives stand intact, let us know neither prison nor ill repute nor disruption of ties.' And because we must encompass this and protect that, and because at all costs — at all costs — our hopes must march on schedule, and because it is unheard of that in the name of peace a sword should fall, disjoining that fine and cunning thread that our lives have woven, because it is unheard of that good men should suffer injustice or families be sundered or repute be lost — because of this we cry peace and cry peace, and there is no peace. There is no peace because there are no peacemakers. There are no peacemakers because the making of peace is at least as costly as the making of war — at least as exigent, at least as disruptive, at least as liable to bring disgrace and prison and death in its wake."

Truly radical change must come from within each individual, from a recognition of and genuine concern for his fellows as human beings. It must start at the most basic level of each of our lives and build to larger sub-units of a world community (not to be confused with a world state). We must recognize that there is power in each of our lives, not just in systems of organized force.

EDWARD JACKSON
Stanford, Calif.

100-391697-734

AUDIO TAPES:



527. THE HAUNTING PAST

Sooner or later the United States will withdraw from Vietnam, but Vietnam is only a small part of even thornier problems which lie ahead and stem from tragic misconceptions, misinformation, and miscalculations, according to George McT. Kahin, foremost among specialists on Indochina. He warns that unless we understand why and how these policies were initiated and what their effect has been in Southeast Asia, we may, in Santayana's words, be condemned to repeat the history we have not learned. The example detailed here is the case of Cambodia.

528. CHINA OBSESSION

We will never be able to cope with the problems of Southeast Asia or to arrive at solutions with honor or wisdom until we recognize how much our involvement with that unhappy continent has been rooted in a policy of containment of China. Includes an interesting explanation of how the Chinese communists came to put primary emphasis on the peasants. George McT. Kahin leads the discussion.

511. VIETNAM: THE MILITARY PLAYGROUND

Three and a half years of bombing have not brought the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table. Are we malingering on the peninsula because the U.S. military will settle for nothing less than total victory despite the death toll and the chaos it has wrought at home? Or do we really believe that nonnegotiable bombs can blast out a peace? Jon Van Dyke, Center Visiting Fellow and

associate professor at Hastings College of the Law, discusses the effects of bombing with Fellows of the Center. A guest is Vasily Kulish, Deputy Director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations in Moscow.

253. IS HISTORY OUT OF CONTROL?

Historically, more people have died during wars from famine and disease than from weapons. Now for the first time the process is reversed. Yet man, the most adaptable of all species, appears unable to change swiftly enough to adapt to this new phase in our culture, which requires a world without war. A talk by Dr. Jerome Frank, professor of psychiatry at Johns Hopkins University, followed by an exchange with Robert M. Hutchins.

259R. CONSULTING THE ROMANS

In an Occasional Paper entitled "Consulting the Romans," the historian Stringfellow Barr, former president of St. John's College, drew a parallel between America today and the ancient Roman Empire. The discussion of Mr. Barr's paper, excerpted from four sessions at the Center, is erudite, witty, and entertaining.

153. PEACE-KEEPING UNDER THE RULE OF LAW

The basis for an orderly world community rests upon the rule of law. The hard questions revolve around the issue of national sovereignty, long jealously guarded and now an especially sensitive issue for the new nations. The discussion panel includes Earl Warren, Philip C. Jessup, Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan of the International Court of Justice, Luis Quintanilla of Mexico, Lord Caradon of Great Britain, Kenzo Takayanagi of Japan, and Senator J. William Fulbright.

The First Questions

The point at which debunking or unmasking ideas becomes destructive is the point at which it destroys the confidence of a man in his own moral reasoning. It is the point at which the "realistic" questions (about bias and interest, for example) are not critical and subordinate but sweeping and primary.

The awareness of ideology and bias is an indispensable part of our critical and intellectual equipment. There are still occasions when an awareness of ideological taint and of the slipperiness of large moral language needs to be brought home. For example, it is necessary for understanding the problems of collective life: without knowledge of the way the thought of collective man reflects his interest, politics goes astray.

However, it should not become the center and basis of our own thought as moral agents. If we may caricature what sometimes happens, we may observe that a man does not — or should not — say to himself, as the first question, when deciding his own direction as a human being: What is my background? What is the interest of my group? He does not — or should not — say to himself: I am from Chicago; what do Chicago people believe? What do people with \$10,000 a year hold to be true? Rather, the first questions, battered and criticized though they are, must remain: What is just? What is good? What is true?

WILLIAM LEE MILLER

[from a speech at a Center meeting]

100-341647-734